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1. The jury instructions given regarding "discovery" taken as a whole are incorrect 
as a matter of law. Objections to the jury instructions/special verdict were not 
waived. Alternatively, the doctrine of manifest injustice should apply. 
Gamma West Brachytherapy and John K. Hayes ("GWB") argue Mr. Daniels did 
not specify which of the instructions given were incorrect. The special instructions 
having to do with discovery, ultimately numbered 23, 24, 25 and 26 (R. 6061-64) taken 
as a whole, were incorrect. Nowhere in these instructions was the procedure performed 
by GWB, defendants in the statute of limitations trial—the high dose rate brachytherapy 
("HDRB")—referenced. Furthermore, the negligence instruction given by the court 
(initially 24-B) did not include the elements of negligence, but defined it as "that degree 
of care that other qualified physicians would ordinarily exercise under the same 
circumstances" (R. 6064.) However, there was no evidence in the trial and no instruction 
to the jury on what constitutes that "degree of care". Therefore, the jury was left to 
speculate on the type of care required, what constitutes negligence and may have thought 
as one excused juror said in voir dire, "I think if somebody do [sic] their best, I don't 
think they're being negligent." (R. 6265 p. 103:13-104:6, R. 6266 p. 449:18-450:14.) 
A. Mr. Daniels did not waive his objections to the instructions or his objection that 
the verdict should have asked the jury to determine negligence in the context of HDRB. 
Mr. Daniels' first issue states: "The trial court should have instructed the jury and 
provided a special verdict concerning the HDRB procedure in particular, as opposed to 
negligence in general (Appellant's Br. at 16, 19-31.)1 Gamma West Brachytherapy and 
1
 See specifically p. 22, first line of first full paragraph: "Therefore jury instructions and a 
special verdict that required the jury to determine if Mr. Daniels discovered or should 
1 
Dr. Hayes ("GWB") argue Mr. Daniels waived his right to object to the jury instructions 
as given. This is an incorrect conclusion. Mr. Daniels repeatedly argued that the trial 
court needed to reference the cause in fact, GWB's procedure—HDRB—in the jury 
instructions. GWB admits Mr. Daniels objected to instruction #24 (R. 6062) because the 
instruction did not address causation, cause in fact, and/or legal cause and that the jury 
should be instructed on the elements of negligence (Resp. Br. at 12-13.) The trial court 
then asked "if I were to add the word 'cause' would you feel comfortable with it?" Mr. 
Daniels' counsel said "no", explaining that the jury needed to be instructed on cause in 
fact and legal cause (R. 6266: 440 line 23, through 443 line 10), "was it brachytherapy or 
external beam [?]..." (R. 6266: 441 lines 10-11.) The court then went on to state several 
times that it would not define "negligence." (R. 6266: 477-478 & 485-488.) 
The next morning, just before the jury was to be instructed, an instruction hand-
marked 24-B by the court was given to counsel for the first time. The court stated: "I use 
the phrase 'that he may have had a claim for negligence,' the last few words of 
instruction 24-B because it ties into the instruction that I've already decided to give in 
No. 23, which says in the second to the last sentence, This means that the plaintiff must 
be aware of facts that would lead an ordinary person using reasonable diligence to 
conclude that a claim for negligence may exist.' So I tried to tie those two instructions 
together." (R. 6267: 492:12-493:3.) 
have reasonably discovered that the negligent administration of the brachytherapy, the 
HDRB was a cause of his injuries would have been appropriate." (Emphasis in original). 
2 
Later, there was a lot of confusion among both parties and the court regarding the 
numbering of the instructions (R: 6267:513-538.) Prior number 24b was renumbered #26 
and given to counsel. Since Mr. Daniels' counsel had spent considerable time setting 
forth the objections that Mr. Daniels had to suspect negligence from the brachytherapy 
procedure in order to start the statute of limitations running, this objection was not 
repeated. Although the objection was not specifically raised again, this newly numbered 
26, (originally handwritten 24b by the trial court—R. 6064) still did not adequately 
define the term "negligence" to include the brachytherapy—cause in fact or legal cause— 
as originally requested by Mr. Daniels. 
Mr. Daniels' counsel's statement [she was] "pleased with that instruction", is 
qualified by the statement "I'd rather have the ones that we proffered,..." (R. 6267:497.) 
Given the extensive argument on the issue that the jury had to be instructed on whether 
Mr. Daniels suspected the HDRB procedure as the cause of any negligence and whether 
they had to be instructed on the elements of negligence, and the fact that Mr. Daniels 
continued to request a special verdict which asks the jury to determine whether Mr. 
Daniels suspected negligence in the administration of brachytherapy, Mr. Daniels did not 
waive his objections (R. 6267: 497-499.) 
Once a party has objected and specified the basis for an objection for the record, 
he need not further object. The Tenth Circuit has decided this issue in the context of a 
motion in limine objecting to the admission of evidence holding that once an issue has 
been fully presented to the court before trial, and ruled upon, it need not be objected to a 
2
 Hours of discussion were spent on instructions. See Reply Addendum, Ex. #1, record. 
3 
second time. Okland Oil Co. v. Knight, 92 Fed. Appx. 589, 599-600 (10m Cir. 2003.) 
Similarly, the offering and denial by the trial court of Mr. Daniels5 requested jury 
instructions and the subsequent exceptions taken by his counsel adequately preserved 
these objections, especially when those ultimately given, taken as a whole, did not 
include instruction to the jury on the elements of negligence or any mention of the 
brachytherapy procedure, the very act for which the claims were brought against GWB. 
In their brief, GWB failed to address Mr. Daniels' objection to the special verdict. 
Mr. Daniels proposed a verdict specifying he had to have known of the negligent 
administration of the HDRB and not merely negligence in general. However, the trial 
court used a verdict with no reference to HDRB. Mr. Daniels objected to the court's 
verdict "for the record" (R. 6267: 497, line 24-499, line 7.) 
Should this Court find that cause in fact is not a necessary component of the jury 
instructions and verdict, it should remand with an instruction that the trial court give a 
tolling instruction. Both issues present questions of law interpreting "discovery". 
"[T]here are "circumstances in which a court may consider, or even raise sua sponte, 
arguments ignored or left undeveloped by counsel in the first round of briefing." 
Anderson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 422 F.3d 1155, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005.) In United 
Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that appellant UTU 
did not abandon an issue concerning statutory interpretation even though its initial 
arguments were "sketchy". Questions of law are entitled to de novo review and the 
record at the trial court was thoroughly argued. "[I]t is necessary to correct 
misconceptions of statutory meaning at the earliest opportunity for the benefit of all who 
4 
must operate under a statutes purview." Id. at 827-828. Further, Rule 24(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly directs an appellant to "answer any new matter 
set forth in the opposing brief." See also Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 545 (Utah 2000). 
B. Mr. Daniels did not abandon or waive the conditional tolling issue. 
GWB did not address the tolling issue; however, it ws not waived by Mr. Daniels. 
[a] corollary to issue number one above is that if this Court determine that it is not 
necessary for a plaintiff to have discovered the cause in fact prior to the funning of the 
statue of limitations, Mr. Daniels should have been allowed to instruct the jury that the 
statute is tolled if they found that the radiation oncology physicians from the U of U 
(Drs. Watson & Patton) misrepresented the cause of his anterior abdominal injuries 
(Appellant's Brief p. 30). 
Mr. Daniels initially argued that such an omission of an instruction on tolling 
would be "plain error".3 Should it be held unnecessary to be apprised of the cause in fact 
for commencement of "discovery", then misleading statements made by those other than 
potential defendant health care providers should be allowed to toll the statute. 
However this is not the current law. "[Generally, fraudulent concealment of a cause of 
action by a person other than defendant will not toll the statute of limitation." McDougal 
v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179-180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Thus if this Court finds it is 
unnecessary for the trial court to have instructed that the jury must determine whether 
Mr. Daniels suspected negligence in the HDRB procedure, and specifically find this on 
the verdict, then the representations made by Drs. Watson and Patton, physician-agents of 
the U. of U., that radiation had no part in Mr. Daniels' anterior abdominal injuries should 
3
 Mr. Daniels submitted a tolling instruction which was excluded by the trial court. 
(R. 6265:7 and 6266:398 & 387 lines 16-19.) 
5 
have been considered by the jury as tolling the time during which Mr. Daniels should 
have discovered negligence (R. 6266 p. 345 & p. 405:14-23, & p. 268:3-17.) 
C. The doctrine of plain error should be invoked should this Court find Mr. 
Daniels waived his objections to the jury instructions and/or special verdict. 
51(d) allows an exception for appellate review of unpreserved defects injury 
instructions to avoid manifest injustice.4 Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005), 
held the analytical approach to manifest injustice has three parts: "the demonstration of 
error; a qualitative showing that the error was plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial 
court; and evidence that the error affected the substantial rights of a party." Id. at 337. 
Mr. Daniels' case is distinguishable from this Court's holding in Coleman ex rel 
Schefski v. Stevens, 17 P.3d 1122, 1124 (Utah 2000). In Schefski, this Court found that 
only four of the ten issues raised in the appellant's (Coleman's) brief were adequately 
analyzed. Unlike Mr. Daniels' case, these issues were not preserved at the trial court. 
This Court denied Coleman's attempt to explore these issues further in his reply brief by 
arguing manifest injustice or plain error. In contrast, the arguments for including the 
HDRB as a cause in fact in order to start the running of the statute of limitations or 
knowledge of "legal injury" were argued at the trial court level and analyzed in Mr. 
Daniels' opening brief. In reply to GWB's claims that Mr. Daniels waived his right to 
object to the jury instructions (and special verdict) given by the trial court, Mr. Daniels 
merely argues in the alternative that should the Court find waiver, then it should apply the 
doctrine of manifest injustice to correctly resolve the issue. 
4
 Utah Rule Civil Pro. 51, set out in its entirety in Exhibit #3 to this Reply Addendum. 
6 
Mr. Daniels meets the tripartite requirements for applying the plain error doctrine: 
1) The demonstration of error: the trial court erred by failing to specify the cause in fact, 
(HDRB) in either the jury instructions or the special verdict. 2) A qualitative showing the 
error was plain, manifest, or obvious to the trial court: the trial court struggled with these 
instructions and in particular with Mr. Daniels' continued objection to the court's verdict 
(which did not reference HDRB) and implied that someday this issue might be decided 
on appeal.5 3) Evidence that the error affected the substantial rights of a party: without 
reference to any negligence attached to GWB's particular procedure, it is certain the jury 
determined Mr. Daniels suspected negligence related to the procedure by the U. of U. 
(the EXBRT). The HDRB was administered several weeks earlier and initially 
completed without obvious side effects. No evidence was admitted at the statute of 
limitations trial referencing HDRB as a cause of Mr. Daniels' severe and ongoing 
radiation injuries until Dr. Saffle said "[He had brachytherapy] and had the Holy Jesus 
burned out of him" (R. 1552:10-15, R. 6266 p. 431:1-9) to his residents within earshot of 
Mr. Daniels.6 It was only afterward that Dr. Mintz told Mr. Daniels "The courts will 
have to add up the radiation and see who is at fault." (R. 6265 p. 206: 6-16, R. 4173-76.) 
This Court has previously determined that a trial court's error giving instructions 
and a verdict omitting the elements of a crime was harmful. State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867 
(Utah 2008), is a criminal case where the defendant was prosecuted for murder. In Low 
the Court applied the doctrine of plain error and found that the trial court failed to instruct 
5
 R. 6267, at 499: 4-6; copy included in Exhibit # 1 to this Reply Addendum 
6
 See Exhibit #4 to this Reply Addendum. 
7 
the jury on two affirmative defenses. The Court found an absence of affirmative defenses 
to be a necessary element of a murder conviction, that the trial court did not require the 
jury to find all the elements of murder and that the trial "court's error was harmful 
because we do not know whether the jury convicted Low for manslaughter based on the 
extreme emotional distress instruction or on the imperfect self-defense instruction." Id. at 
879. The Court also found the verdict form to be lacking in that it: 
.. .did not require the jury to specify whether it was convicting Low for 
imperfect self-defense manslaughter or extreme emotional distress 
manslaughter. There is a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Low of 
extreme emotional distress manslaughter. Had the district court not erroneously 
instructed the jury on this form of manslaughter, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that Low may not have been convicted at all. It is this "reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome" that makes the error harmful, (citation omitted) and 
satisfies the third prong of the plain error standard. 
Id., at p. 880. Similarly, in this case the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an 
essential element of the cause of action, thereby committing harmful error. 
D. Because Mr. Daniels did not waive his objections to the jury instructions and 
special verdict given, he should not be charged with inviting error. 
GWB cites State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 11, 186 P.3d 1023, 
which declined to apply the doctrine of manifest injustice to consider incorrect jury 
instructions because defendant failed to object, and thus invited the error. However this 
case is distinguishable from Mr. Daniels' case on its facts. The Court's rationale behind 
preserving objections to jury instructions for the record is "discourag[ing] parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court" and "forti[fying] our long-established policy that 
the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." However 
appellant's counsel in Chavez "affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he ... had 
8 
no objection to the [remaining] jury instruction^]." Id. at 1027. Mr. Daniels should not 
be charged with invited error because he did not waive his objection that the cause in 
fact—the HDRB—was a necessary component of the "negligence". Additionally, in the 
Daniels the trial court had ample opportunity to give the correct version of the law. 
GWB claims Collins v. Wilson, 984 P.2d 960 (Utah 1999) supports their argument 
that because Mr. Daniels may have suspected negligence as a result of the EXBRT, the 
statute of limitations against GWB should have begun to run at that time (Resp. Br. at 21-
22.) However, patient Collins had specific suspicions regarding the only procedure at 
issue in Collins, Dr. Wilson's surgery. Id. at 966. 
There was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Daniels suspected negligence involving 
the HDRB until well after May 6, 2001. GWB cites Utah Code §78B-3~404(1) (formerly 
78-14-4); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 
471,474 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); and Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), for the 
proposition that a plaintiff need only be aware of "an injury and that the injury may be 
attributable to negligence in order to trigger the statute of limitations." (Resp. Br. at 23-
24). However, none of these cases stand for the rule that GWB offers: that negligence 
need not include knowledge or suspicion of the cause in fact. 
[T]o adopt a construction of [§78B-3-404] that encourages a person who 
experiences an injury, dysfunction or ailment, and has no knowledge of its 
cause to file a lawsuit against a health care provider to prevent a statute of 
limitations from running is not consistent with the unarguably sound 
proposition that unfounded claims should be strongly discouraged 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. "[T]he crucial question is whether the plaintiff was aware of 
the facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause 
9 
of action against the health care provider. Those facts include the existence of an 
injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence." Deschamps, 784 P.2d at 474. 
(Italic emphasis original; bold emphasis added.) 
Thus, the patient needs to be aware of the cause in fact which would lead 
him to conclude he could have a cause of action against the health care provider, 
not a health care provider. GWB claims that the "critical portions" of instruction 
#23 given by the trial court "directly track the statutory language and subsequent 
interpretation of the statute." (Resp. Br. at 23.) This is incorrect because nowhere 
do the instructions or special verdict reference GWB's procedure, the HDRB. 
McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), held the limitations 
period for a medical malpractice action is triggered at the moment of discovery of legal 
injury and is not tolled until the identity of the tortfeasor is discovered or should have 
been discovered. McDougal's holding is either in error, or should be limited to its facts 
and not interpreted to mean that a patient need have no suspicion of the allegedly 
negligent procedure—cause in fact—in order to commence the statute of limitations. 
GWB cites Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984) (Resp. Br. at 24-
25.) But Hargget states "the crucial question is whether the plaintiff was aware of the 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause of action 
Hove v. McMaster, is irrelevant. Hove involved a nurse/patient's claim found barred 
by the statute of limitations. She had been trained re: symptoms of a nerve injury, and a 
consulting physician told her that her symptoms could be complications from the dental 
injection, the sole procedure at issue. 
10 
against the health care provider. Those facts include the existence of an injury, its cause 
and the possibility of negligence". Id. at 155 (Bold emphasis added; italics in original). 
In Mr. Daniels' trial, both the instructions and verdict were inaccurate and "there 
[was] 'not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
result.'" Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d 252, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). With no reference in 
either the instructions or verdict to the HDRB, it would have been impossible for the jury 
to determine whether Mr. Daniels was aware that it was the negligent administration of 
the HDRB, GWB's procedure, that was the cause of his injuries. 
2. Cases cited by GWB to support admission of a superseded pleading are from a 
time when code pleading was used and thus are inapplicable to the issue of evidence 
that Mr. Daniels had sued the U of U and SLR. 
GWB argues the standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. "An 
appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's discretion unless it appears that an 
injustice resulted." State v. McCardell 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). Whether the standard 
is "correctness" or abuse of discretion, in this case "an injustice resulted" since evidence 
of the previously dismissed defendants added to juror confusion when coupled with the 
total failure to mention HDRB in either the jury instructions or special verdict. 
GWB also cites the cases of Toone v. J.P. O'Neill Const Co., 121 P. 10, 18 (Utah 
1912), and Winn v. Romney, 222 P. 709 (1923), as support for its argument that the trial 
court properly allowed into evidence Mr. Daniels' original complaint against the U of U 
and SLR, defendants who had been dismissed by the time of the trial on the statute of 
limitations. However both these cases appear to have been decided when Utah required 
the party sign and attest under oath to the accuracy of the facts pleaded. Both cases 
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involve a factual dispute where the apparently verified answers were offered to impeach 
the defendants. In Toone the admission was allowed, but held harmless by the Supreme 
Court. In Winn, it was not allowed. The concurring opinion in Toone references the use 
of a verified answer. Toone, 121 P.2d at 18. In Winn, the Supreme Court reasoned 
against using an original answer, even if verified, as an admission in trial. 
Pleadings are usually framed by attorneys, and clients ordinarily, though 
sometimes imprudently, attach their signatures to pleadings proposed by 
their counsel without careful scrutiny as to their actual contents...counsel 
oftentimes, especially in the early pleadings of a case, misconceive the real 
cause of action or defense... For these reasons it would be unfair to always 
treat statements or denials in a pleading as binding admissions when 
offered as evidence in the case. 
Id. at 713. The one case cited by GWB dated after the apparent use of verified answers is 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982), which did not involve the admission of 
allegations within a prior pleading, whether factual or legal, and is therefore irrelevant. 
None of the cases cited by GWB relate to evidence of an original pleading under notice 
pleading and are thus inapplicable, even under an abuse of discretion standard. 
3. The "substantial connection" test should not be required where the witness is a 
member of the same mutual insurance exchange as the defendant and directly 
contradicts his deposition testimony on a key issue, without explanation. 
Alternatively, if the Court adopts the "substantial connection" test, Mr. Daniels 
should be allowed to question Dr. Mintz, et al., regarding his connection to UMIA. 
Mr. Daniels opposed GWB's motion in limine to exclude the reference to 
insurance, specifically objecting on the basis that he should be able to introduce evidence 
of Dr. Mintz5 membership in UMIA to show bias. Later during the trial, Dr. Mintz 
directly contradicted his deposition testimony on the key fact of when he told Mr. Daniels 
he suspected radiation as being the cause of his abdominal injuries. This contradiction 
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was made without explanation (R. 6265 p. 202:23-p. 207:4, p. 213:12-p. 215:15.) At that 
point counsel should have been allowed to introduce evidence of bias through Dr. 
Mintz's membership in UMIA, or, in the alternative, should have been able to question 
Dr. Mintz in camera regarding his relationship with UMIA, and if there was a 
"substantial connection", use that information in cross examination to show bias. 
It appears that the "substantial connection test", though not specifically adopted by 
this Court, is the general rule in other jurisdictions. However, if this Court adopts that 
standard, there should be two exceptions: 
1) where the physician-witness is a member of the same reciprocal insurance 
exchange as defendants, and during trial contradicts his deposition on a key issue, 
without explanation, evidence of the membership, without more, should be allowed as 
impeachment; or in the alternative, 2) should the Court remand for retrial, Mr. Daniels 
should be allowed to question Dr. Mintz (and any other physician witnesses) in camera 
regarding their connection with UMIA. If this questioning reveals a "substantial 
connection", evidence of such should be allowed as impeachment to show bias. 
4. The level of proof at the summary judgment stage is not "clear and convincing 
evidence". Rather, Mr. Daniels needed only to show that there was a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether he would be entitled to punitive damages. Gross 
negligence is one cause of action which could warrant punitive damages. 
A. Utah law allows punitive damages if gross negligence is proven. 
GWB incorrectly argues that Utah law does not allow for punitive damages upon 
proof of gross negligence, citing Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), and Robinson Ins. & Real Estate Inc. v. 
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Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 366 F. Supp. 307 (D.C. Ark. 1973). "Gross negligence 
is the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that 
shows utter indifference to the consequences that may result." (Resp. Br. at 35; Atkin, 709 
P.2d at 335.) However, this language is dicta. This Court has previously determined that 
"[w]hile simple negligence will not support punitive damages, negligence manifesting a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward the rights of others will.59 Diversified 
Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63 P.3d 686, 699 (Utah 2002). Thus, the standard for gross 
negligence is whether the conduct manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward 
Mr. Daniels' rights. "The well-established common law standard for awarding punitive 
damages is gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined as "a 'wanton or reckless 
disregard for the safety of other persons."' Id. at 359; see also University Med. Ctr., Inc. 
v. Beglin, 2009 WL 102800 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009). In UMC the Kentucky Court upheld 
instructions and a jury verdict finding gross negligence in a medical malpractice context 
where the hospital acted recklessly with regard to the plaintiffs safety. Id. at 4-5. 
There is no legitimate comparison of Atkins and Robinson to Mr. Daniels' case. 
The former involve simple clerical errors in the publication of a telephone directory. 
Such actions are far removed from knowingly conducting an experimental application of 
high dose radiation brachytherapy without a patient's informed consent. 
GWB's cases cited do not stand for the propositions they offer. Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), states "A defendants conduct must 
be malicious or in reckless disregard for the rights of others, although actual intent to 
cause injury is not necessary" Id. at 1186 -87 (emphasis added). Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
14 
Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003), is not helpful. The Smith Court, after "[hjaving reviewed 
the record in the light most favorable to the Smiths[,]" goes on to uphold a finding that 
the actions in question "diplay[ed] an intentional disregard of the Smiths' rights and of its 
fiduciary obligations and [the trial court correctly] allowed the jury to evaluate the 
evidence and determine whether punitive damages were merited." Id. at 1071. 
B. In opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment, Mr. Daniels submitted 
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether GWB's actions 
were in reckless disregard of his rights and safety, all that is required to defeat summary 
judgment. 
GWB argues that Mr. Daniels' Amended Complaint failed to allege any fact upon 
which a finder of fact could properly base an award of punitive damages against 
defendants. (Resp. Br. at 34). However, Mr. Daniels' First Amended Complaint, the 
complaint against which the motion for partial summary judgment was brought, contains 
facts supporting a cause of action for gross negligence. Arguably, an experimental 
procedure performed without a patient's informed consent constitutes gross negligence 
that could warrant punitive damages. There are two genuine issues of fact material to this 
claim for punitive damages: 1) whether the treatment rendered by GWB was 
experimental; and 2) assuming the answer to question number one is affirmative, whether 
Mr. Daniels gave informed consent to the treatment.9 
If the procedure is found to be experimental and if he did not give his consent, the 
trier of fact could also conclude that the performance of an experimental high dose 
8
 Reply Addendum #7, cause of action for gross negligence in the Amended Complaint. 
9
 GWB incorrectly states Mr. Daniels had a stage IV tumor; however, it was stage II, no 
metastasis or even lymph node involvement was seen. This was admitted by Dr. Richard 
Schwartz, GWB's expert surgeon. (R. 6450). 
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radiation procedure on a patient without informed consent is grossly negligent and 
arguably done with a conscious disregard for his rights and safety. Such a finding by the 
jury could in fact support the imposition of punitive damages. 
GWB brought a motion for partial summary judgment, which means that it had the 
burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Daniels is 
entitled to punitive damages and that GWB was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
In opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment, Mr. Daniels produced 
substantial evidence showing GWB's reckless disregard for his rights and safety, thereby 
supporting a cause of action for gross negligence, and sufficient to withstand a motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue. Furthermore, should the Court allow Mr. 
Daniels' causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment, proof 
of these causes of action could also support punitive damages. 
5. Striking Dr. Kadish's corrections to his deposition transcript and disclosure of 
supplemental opinions pursuant to Rule 26(e) should be reviewed under the 
correctness standard, not the abuse of discretion standard. 
GWB argues the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, (Resp. Br. at 3.) GWB argues the deposition changes and supplements 
"attempted to change plaintiffs theory of the case" (Resp. Br. at 36.) However, in Mr. 
Daniels' case the trial court's ruling was not in a trial or as a result of a motion in limine. 
Instead, the trial court granted a defense motion to strike these timely-made deposition 
corrections and the supplemental rule 26(e)(1) disclosure re: Dr. Kadish's opinion that 
the HDRB "substantially and significantly increased the likelihood of injury[.]" (R. 2305) 
This supplement was served over a year before the statute of limitations trial (R. 2308.) 
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The court struck timely corrections to Dr. Kadish' deposition transcript and a 
supplemental Rule 26(e)(1) opinion. This supplemental opinion did not change 
Plaintiffs theory of the case; it was a clarification, or at most an expansion of prior 
opinions, consistent with those opinions. Furthermore, it was made pursuant to an 
agreement between counsel made in deposition that any changes or expansions to Dr. 
Radish's opinions would be provided to GWB's counsel. (R.3565:15-16.) 
The ruling on GWB's motion to strike was contrary to Utah law. "Experts are 
called into court to give their expert opinions, and they must be allowed to explain the 
foundation for that opinion." Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1200 (Utah 1999). 
In deposition, Dr. Kadish testified that it was a breach of the radiation oncology 
(brachytherapy is one type of therapeutic radiation administered by radiation oncologists) 
standard of care not to perform pre-operative EXBRT to shrink his tumor and then excise 
any residual tumor (R. 3508 at 42:10-21); that GWB had a duty to provide informed 
consent but GWB did not disclose the alternatives of treatment (R. 3505 at 29:17-30:7); 
Mr. Daniels received too much radiation via HDRB (R. 3508:44). Dr. Kadish also 
testified in deposition that too much radiation destroys normal tissue resulting in necrosis 
(R. 3537:159) that the HDRB dose rate was very high (R. 3510:52), HDR is a "dangerous 
instrument" (R. 3510:52), if the dose is too high you "do a lot of damage in a hurry" (R. 
3511:53), was "too hot" (R. 3525:112) and resulted in fistulization (a hole burned in the 
back of the bladder) necrosis of the rectal stump and renal complications (R. 3507:37-
39.) He further testified that application of HDRB in this type case was "marginal maybe 
experimental" (R. 3519:85.) The standard amount of radiation for a patient like Mr. 
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Daniels is 5040 cGy and with that amount you don't get serious risk of injury, (fistulae) 
only minor irritations, (e.g. fatigue, nausea, diarrhea, rectal irritation) (R. 3521:95-96.)10 
Mr. Daniels objected when at the deposition GWB asked whether he had given all 
of his opinions and pursuant to a discussion between counsel agreed that: 
Mr. Wright: "if in fact any additional information is sent to you, Dr. 
Kadish, and if you in fact intend to change, expand— 
Ms. Burningham: "I'll let you know, Bobby." 
Mr. Wright: —any opinions that you've rendered in this matter that you let 
Ms. Burningham know and I would expect that she'd let me know; is that 
fair?" 
Ms. Burningham: "Sure Bobby—" (R. 3565:15-16). 
Rule 26 mandates in pertinent part that: 
A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures 
under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the 
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or 
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other 
parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision 
(a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to information contained in the report and 
to information provided through a deposition of the expert. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) (emphasis added). The trial court's interpretation of the 
rules of civil procedure presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Nunleyv. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1090 (Utah 1999). 
The primary purpose of expert testimony disclosure is to give the opposition 
notice of the opinions expected to be rendered by the expert at trial. Discovery rules 
were intended to make this procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating 
Exhibit #5, Dr. Kadish's opinions, and agreement of counsel re: additional opinions. 
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any undue rigidities or technicalities and to remove the elements of surprise and 
accordingly should be liberally construed. Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, (Utah 1967). 
The purpose of the discovery rules is to facilitate fair trials with full disclosure of all 
relevant testimony and evidence. Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Indeed, the default time for disclosing a list of trial witnesses is thirty days before 
trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(c). Mr. Daniels made every effort to comport with the 
spirit of the discovery disclosure mandated in submitting corrections to Dr. Kadish's 
deposition transcript and serving a supplemental rule 26(e)(1) disclosure. Since reports 
required under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(b) were waived, Dr. Kadish had not fully set 
forth all his opinions. Instead, the questions asked by GWB at Dr. Kadish9 depositions 
appeared to have been designed to circumscribe those opinions. In order to clarify his 
prior opinion that the amount of HDRB radiation was too hot and created a substantial 
and significant risk of injury to Mr. Daniels, the supplemental Rule 26 disclosure 
included the elucidation that the HDRB caused a "substantial and significant risk". 
Although this opinion was inherent in the original opinion given that Mr. Daniels had 
been given too much radiation, the language used in the supplemental disclosure more 
clearly states the effect of using HDRB (whether alone or in combination with EXBRT). 
The trial court did not rule on whether the supplemental opinions by Dr. Kadish 
would be excluded at trial. (R. at 4299-4300, 4680-81.) Thus, it did not exclude his 
testimony at a trial or in a motion in limine (requiring appellate review based upon the 
abuse of discretion standard), but the motion to strike was made over a year prior to any 
trial. Additionally all deposition corrections and the 26(e)(1) supplemental disclosure 
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were made and served on defense counsel within 35-43 days of Dr. Kadish's second 
deposition and before a trial date had been set. Neither these deposition corrections, nor 
the opinions in the supplemental Rule 26(e)(1) disclosure unduly prejudiced GWB. 
6. A fiduciary relationship between physician and patient has been recognized in 
Utah. A cause of action for breach of that duty is not necessarily duplicative of a 
cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent 
Nixdorf does not limit the scope of a physician's fiduciary duty to facts involving 
the patient's physical condition. "The scope of the duty is defined by the materiality of 
the information in the decisional process of an ordinary individual. If a reasonable 
person in the position of the plaintiff would consider the information important in 
choosing a course of treatment then the information is material and disclosure required." 
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980); see also Unthankv. U.S., 732 F.2d 
1517, 1521 (Utah Ct. App. 1984). 
Society has placed physicians in an elevated position of trust, and, therefore, the 
physician is obligated to exercise utmost good faith." Hoopes v. Harnmargren, 725 P.2d 
238, 242 (Nev. 1986). The duties of good faith and loyalty are in addition to the 
fiduciary duty of full disclosure. While it could be argued that the duty of full disclosure 
may be co-extensive with that required under Utah's informed consent statute (but there 
appear to be some exceptions to full disclosure in the informed consent statute), the 
duties of loyalty and good faith are not specified in the informed consent statute and thus 
not part of an action for failure to provide informed consent. 
Citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2151 (2000), GWB 
argues that "the traditional notions of a fiduciary do not easily translate into the 
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physician-patient relationship." (Resp. Br. at 38.) However, Pegram applies only to the 
duty of loyalty (one of three generally recognized fiduciary duties) in the context of a 
trustee's duty to its beneficiary. Loyalty is emphasized and it is that duty which was 
breached by GWB in trying an experimental procedure at the behest of Dr. Mintz, and 
thus breaching their duty of loyalty to Mr. Daniels. GWB seems to argue that a financial 
duty is more important than the duty of a physician toward his patient where the patient's 
health and well being are at risk. This is not a compelling argument. 
GWB argues "Utah courts have rejected the notion that a physician must advise his 
or her patient of 'every material, conceivable risk.'" (Resp. Br. at 38.) However, Ficklin 
v. MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Utah 1976) merely held that an expert's testimony 
regarding the practice in a medical community of warning patients of dangers of a 
particular surgery was admissible in a medical malpractice action informed consent case. 
However, this language was dictum. Additionally, Ficklin was decided prior to the 
informed consent statue in effect in January of 2001, adopted in 1976/77 (Prior Laws: 
Laws 1976, c. 23, § 5). Utah Code §78-14-5 (currently §78B-3-406). 
GWB cites Bingham ConsoL Co. v. Groesbeck, 105 P.3d 365, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004), in support of its argument that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is 
duplicative of the already pleaded cause of action for lack of informed consent. (Resp. 
Br. at 39.) However, in Bingham the appellate court merely upheld the lower court's 
consolidation of the defendant's independent suit for compensatory damages into a single 
appraisal proceeding. These were two separate actions. Thus, the ruling in Bingham is 
inapplicable here, where the issue is alternative theories pleaded in one complaint. 
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Cobbs v. Grant 8 Cal.3d 229 (Cal. 1972) cited by GWB, (Resp. Br. at 40,) 
actually stands for the proposition that the physician has a duty of reasonable disclosure 
of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently 
and/or potentially involved in each. The California Supreme Court warned that "Any 
defense, of course, must be consistent with what has been termed the 'fiducial qualities' 
of the physician-patient relationship." Id. at 246. 
7. Denial of Leave to amend to add a cause of action for fraudulent concealment was 
an abuse of discretion by the trial court since facts alleging fraudulent concealment 
had been alleged in Mr. Daniels' Amended Complaint, already filed. 
The right to amend should be granted liberally. Utah R. Civ. P. 15. Denial of 
leave to amend is analyzed under an abuse of discretion standard. Kelly v. Utah Power & 
Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) merely holds that "awareness of an action 
against other parties does not require a defendant to prepare a defense in anticipation of 
plaintiffs decision at some future time to join defendant as a party." Id. at 1190-91. 
Deciding whether to grant leave to amend is a fact-sensitive question. However, 
in this case, GWB was aware that Mr. Daniels intended to raise the issue of fraudulent 
omission as a defense to the defense of written informed consent cause of action in the 
Amended Complaint (R.4253.) Refusal to allow an amendment adding a direct cause of 
action with the same factual allegations would seem to be manifestly unjust. 
The trial court found the motion to amend untimely because Mr. Daniels had "all he 
needed to know for a cause of action for fraudulent concealment by September of 2006" 
and yet moved to amend in July of 2007. However, the fraudulent concealment cause of 
action is identical to the defense found in §78B-3-406 (4) (formerly §78-14-5): 
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(4) The written consent shall be a defense to an action against a health care provider 
based upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the 
person giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and 
convincing proof that the execution of the written consent was induced by the 
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to 
state material facts. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-406(4). 
Defendants would not have been prejudiced by the trial court allowing the cause 
of action for fraudulent concealment since this evidence was already necessary to rebut 
their anticipated defense to Mr. Daniels' second cause of action for lack of informed 
consent as pleaded in the Amended Complaint.11 Thus GWB has been on notice that Mr. 
Daniels intended to offer evidence of fraudulent omission to state material facts from at 
least the Motion to File Amended Complaint made in 2006. The addition of a fourth 
cause of action for the same type of omissions is not prejudicial, but merely more clearly 
covers the parameters of the possible theories upon which Mr. Daniels could recover his 
damages. The trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny an amendment to a 
complaint at trial. "Even an amendment which gives rise to a separate cause of action is 
permitted if recovery is being sought "'on the same general set of facts/" and if the 
amendment is not prejudicial to the party against whom it is offered." Glaser v. 
Meyers, 137 Cal. App. 3d 770, 776-777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). Additionally as of the date 
the motion to amend was filed, no trial date had been set. Thus, GWB had notice of the 
alleged facts giving rise to the proposed cause of action for fraudulent concealment since 
11
 Attached to the Reply Addendum as Exhibit #7 is another copy of the Amended 
Complaint which governed this case. 
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the allowed filing of the Amended Complaint and therefore would not have been unfairly 
prejudiced by the court allowing the separate cause of action for fraudulent concealment. 
Conclusion 
Appellant Ralph L. Daniels respectfully requests that the Court do the following: 
1. Reverse the verdict on the statute of limitations defense and remand for retrial 
with instructions that the jury and special verdict require that Mr. Daniels suspected 
negligence related to the HDRB procedure before May 6, 2001 in order to find that his 
claim was filed too late; 
2. On re-trial of the statute of limitations issue and the merits, instruct the trial 
court that evidence of Mr. Daniels' original complaint (and allegations contained therein) 
are inadmissible, even for impeachment, because the references to the dismissed 
defendants, the U. of U. and SLR, are more prejudicial than probative under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403; 
3. Allow Mr. Daniels to introduce evidence that Dr. Mintz is insured by UMIA. 
Alternatively, allow Mr. Daniels to question Dr. Mintz (and Dr. Allen) regarding their 
relationship with UMIA, and if their answers meet the "substantial connection" test, 
allow such evidence as impeachment to show bias of these physician-witnesses; and 
4. Reverse the trial court's partial summary judgment denying Mr. Daniels' claim 
for punitive damages and on remand, allow that issue to go to the jury. Hold that in a 
case where an experimental procedure with the potential of serious and substantial injury 
(whether the procedure is administered alone or in combination with another, known and 
planned procedure) is performed without the patient's informed consent, it constitutes a 
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reckless disregard of the rights of that patient amounting to gross negligence, which can 
support a claim for punitive damages; 
5. Reverse the trial court's ruling striking Dr. Kadish's deposition corrections and 
all Dr. Kadish's supplemental opinions set forth in his Rule 26(e)(1) disclosures. Hold 
that Utah Rules Civ. Proc. 26(1 )(e) applies where written reports are waived and that 
such disclosures are allowed up to the first trial setting. Alternatively, reverse these 
rulings based upon a waiver theory as a result of the agreement between counsel in the 
Sept. 18,2006 deposition; 
6. Reverse the trial court's order striking the cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty, holding that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is not 
necessarily duplicative of a cause of action for lack of informed consent in the physician-
patient context where there are issues of the breach of the duties of loyalty or full 
disclosure or good faith; 
7. Reverse the trial court's denial of leave to add a cause of action for fraudulent 
concealment to the already filed Amended Complaint; and 
8. Reinstate Mr. Daniels' prayer for punitive damages appended to his causes of 
action for gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment. 
s^ Dated this day of February, 2009. 
fingham /^~~~\ 
Attdrnefr for Appellant Ralph L. Daniels 
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1 THE COURT: Oh, haven't you seen that? Well, it looks 
2 like that. 
3 MR. ORITT: Okay. 
4 I THE COURT: Counsel, why -- and maybe -- I'm just 
5 wondering if in the opening we stick primarily to the facts in 
6 the case and keep you from arguing much law. Why does that 
7 decision have to be made now7 Can't we defer that %til we 
8 actually get to the instructions9 
9 MR. NAEGLE: Well, I mean you could, but I think it 
10 would be hard for the jury to get its hands around the facts 
11 because they need to start thinking about applying the law to the 
12 facts, and you know, my judgment from the case law is that we 
13 simply need to say that Mr. Daniels was aware by May 6th, 2001 of 
14 facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may 
15 have a claim. 
16 THE COURT: That's the law, essentially. Do you 
17 disagree with that, Ms. Burmngham 7 
18 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, yes, in --
19 THE COURT: I mean that language is essentially from the 
20 cases that --
21 MR. NAEGLE: That's all I want to be able to say to the 
22 jury. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: Only that it is not specific enough 
25 because the case law does specify that he needs to know the cause 
-6-
1 in fact, basically, or the cause of the negligence or the legal 
2 cause. 
3 THE COURT: My inclination at this point would be to 
4 permit the defendant to argue that he didn't have to know the 
5 specific cause of his problem, that it's enough that a reasonable 
6 person with those some facts would believe that they had been 
7 injured as a result of someone's negligence. 
8 MR. NAEGLE: Correct. 
9 THE COURT: And that's my inclination as of now. 
10 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, I would just ask, then, 
11 that you defer actually ruling on this until we've had a chance 
12 to read this brief in opposition to our special verdict. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I will. I won't decide on the jury 
14 instructions and the special verdict forms yet, but I'll allow 
15 Counsel for the defense to make that argument. That's my 
16 inclination at this point. I think that's consistent with Utah 
17 law as we've used it all along in this case, so that would be my 
18 I inclination. 
19 MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Now I --
21 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor --
22 THE COURT: Oh, excuse me. Did you have something else 
23 I to raise? 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes. In light of that and taking my 
25 opening statement, we intend to offer evidence as to number one, 
-7-
1 there may have been suspicions about external beam at some point, 
2 but then at another point it was about brachytherapy, and those 
3 are two different times. We think that's relevant. In addition, 
4 the -- if it's just did he have a cause of action, then -- again, 
5 this would be a jury instruction issue, but what agents of the 
6 University of Utah told him then would be relevant as far as 
7 tolling goes. That again is a special verdict jury instruction 
8 argument that I don't think we're ready to make at this point, 
9 but I think we should be allowed to offer evidence on all those 
10 things. 
11 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, the McDougal case is pretty 
12 clear in stating that you do not need to know the actor, the 
13 person, the doctor, the entity that caused your specific claim. 
14 You just need to have -- the reasonable person needs to know --
15 to become aware of facts that would lead him to believe or to 
16 I conclude that he may have a cause of action, not against Gamma 
17 West or Dr. Hayes, but against someone. I mean McDougal couldn't 
18 be clearer on that. I -- what plaintiff's Counsel is attempting 
19 to get you to do, I think, is to say that the date doesn't begin 
20 to run until we knew that Dr. John Hayes and Gamma West were the 
21 culprits. The case is very clear that says you don't have to 
22 know that. You simply have to become aware of facts. 
23 THE COURT: Counsel, I'll give you the last word. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yeah. If he's going to argue that --

























McDougal dealt with a claimant who came into the ER and had a 
shoulder evaluation. When he sued the ER physician he mistakenly 
named the wrong ER physician, but he certainly was aware of what 
specific act or examination caused this negligence or started the 
statute to run, and that is very distinguishable from what we 
have in this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll tell you what I'll do. I 
think -- I'm sure somewhere in even material I've received 
recently -- I have the McDougal case -- but just in case, Counsel 
would want to be -- would be willing to provide that? 
MR. WRIGHT: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I hesitate to keep the jury waiting too 
long, although I understand this is a very important point. So 
what I'll do is --
MR. WRIGHT: I've highlighted the portion that is --
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'll take a look at this. 
The -- Marlene, have you been -- is -- our jury clerk has given 
the questionnaire to (inaudible) and Marlene, did she tell you 
that they're ready? 
JURY CLERK: Yes. 
THE COURT: And have you made those copies? 
JURY CLERK: Yes. Oh, from them? 
THE COURT: Their questionnaires. 
JURY CLERK: No. Do you want me to run down and --
THE COURT: Yeah. So what we'll do is I'll ask my clerk 
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1 case so you can't discuss it amongst yourselves yet, but don't 
2 have any contact with any of the participants in the trial. It's 
3 almost 1 o'clock. I'm guessing we're going to be here, Counsel, 
4 I another 15 or 20 minutes. Let's have the jury come back at 10 
5 minutes after 2, if you would, and we'll resume the trial at that 
6 time. Thank you. 
7 I (Jury excused for noon recess) 
8 I THE COURT: Thank you. You can be seated. There were a 
9 couple of other things -- one other thing I thought of, and then 
10 Mr. Oritt, you indicated there may be some other business 
11 (inaudible). 
12 Mr. Naegle, you had inquired at the very beginning 
13 this morning about the -- my intention concerning the legal 
14 instructions that we'll give eventually on the issue of the 
15 statute of limitations and whether or not the defendant could 
16 argue in opening arguments about the need to identify a 
17 particular wrongdoer or tortfeasor, and that that requirement not 
18 be necessary under Utah law. 
19 I I've had a chance since we spoke to read both the 
20 Dearden case and the McDougal vs. Weed case. So do you have 
21 anything else to say with respect to that issue9 
22 MR. NAEGLE: No, your Honor. I wasn't really going to 
23 make a statement in my opening that you have -- they did or did 
24 I not have to identify a specific person, but I think the McDougal 



























this fact that you don't have to name an actor. 
THE COURT: Okay. What was your concern, then? I must 
have misunderstood. 
MR. NAEGLE: Well, my concern only was that I would be 
able to discuss in my opening statement that Mr. Daniels by 
November 6th, 2001, if he was aware of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that he may have a claim. 
THE COURT: I think you could safely do that. Thank 
you. I think we're okay there. 
Mr. Oritt, you had something else you wanted to raise. 
MR. ORITT: Go ahead. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Just to clarify, your Honor -- I'm 
sorry. Am I going to be able to argue this verdict later or --
THE COURT: Well, we'll have to get to that later. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. So I just want to make a record 
that it will be later when you will hear argument on that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. We'll have to hear you later. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
THE COURT: I did read the Dearden case and the Weed 
case, and they seem to stand for that proposition, but we'll get 
to the special verdict forms at some point later on. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Let me just clarify, your Honor, that 
in -- we intend, unless you rule to the contrary, to offer 
evidence that at some point Mr. Daniels may have thought external 



























thought was the source of the problem. I think we should be able 
to put evidence on. 
THE COURT: I'll let you -- I'll make -- produce the 
evidence, and then I'll entertain objections as we go along. I 
don't know that I --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: -- can entertain every possible objection at 
this point. We'll just have to let the objections be made --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: -- during the course of the trial. 
MR. NAEGLE: I assume that you're not going to say in 
your opening that the law is that he has to identify the actor. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: No, I'm not going to say anything about 
the law other than potentially that the Court will instruct you 
on what legal cause means at the end of the trial, if that's all 
right. 
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. 
Mr. Wright? 
MR. WRIGHT: Two things, your Honor. I should have 
mentioned this before, but it looks like Ralph's staying power 
was better than I thought. I wonder if you think it's 
appropriate if you might tell the jury that because of his 
situation he may leave the courtroom occasionally and come back 
for the facilities. Do you think you need to tell the jury that 
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1 THE COURT: I don't think so. Well, I'd be happy to 
2 tell them if you want me to, but I -- unless you're concerned the 
3 jury would think he's being rude or disinterested or something. 
4 Is that your concern? 
5 MR. WRIGHT: That's the only concern that they'd wonder, 
6 "Well, how come he's leaving? It's his case." 
7 THE COURT: I'm hesitant to point anything out about 
8 Mr. Daniels that might suggest to them that he has a serious 
9 illness of some kind, but what did you want to say, Counsel? 
10 MR. ORITT: No, just the same concern, Judge. 
11 Dr. Hayes has a very important meeting at 5 and would need to 
12 leave at 4:30 to attend that meeting, so --
13 THE COURT: I sup --
14 MR. ORITT: -- I just wanted to let the Court know he'll 
15 be excused at 4:30, if that's okay. 
16 THE COURT: I suppose I could point out, Mr. Oritt, that 
17 there may be need for witnesses or others to leave the courtroom 
18 I from time to time to use the restroom or -- because they have 
19 other appointments, if you'll remind me I'll be happy to say 
20 that. 
21 MR. WRIGHT: That would be great. 
22 MR. ORITT: That's fine. 
23 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, just for clarification one more 
24 time, I -- it sounded like Ms. Burningham was going to argue in 
25 opening legal cause, and in a statute of limitation setting, 
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1 legal cause is really relevance, what -- it's whether he or a 
2 reasonable person would know, that he suffered an injury or 
3 disorder, and that a reasonable person would know that -- he or 
4 a reasonable person would know that that may be the result of 
5 I negligence. There is no requirement that he know the legal 
6 cause, that he know brachy -- Gamma West did it versus University 
7 of Utah versus Salt Lake Regional. It sounds like Ms. Burningham 
8 I is going to try to tell the jury that the -- that what it is is 
9 you have to identify an actor, or the legal cause of an injury. 
10 That's not what the case law says. 
11 THE COURT: Ms. Burningham? 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: May I just briefly respond, your Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Sure. 
14 MS. BURNINGHAM: The word is "legal injury." I'm 
15 citing -- in support of the arguments, defendants cite the case 
16 of McDougal vs. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, which merely held that, 
17 quote, "The medical malpractice statute of limitations is tied 
18 only to the discovery of plaintiff's legal injury." I believe I 
19 can use that phrase. 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MS. BURNINGHAM: And I would do that instead of 
22 "legal cause," and not to the discovery of the tortfeasor's 
23 identity. In argument -- I'll argue this later, but legal 
24 injury encompasses, in my opinion, cause in fact and legal 
25 I cause. I will just say legal injury at this point. 
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1 THE COURT: I guess it's going to be a battle royale 
2 I when we get to it --
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: -- but it sounds like we can avoid that, at 
5 least during the opening. Are you comfortable, Counsel, with 
6 what she's said? 
7 MR. WRIGHT: As long as she just -- as long as she does 
8 not attempt to take your place and define what legal injury is to 
9 I the jury. 
10 THE COURT: Yeah. I'd ask you not to do that, 
11 I especially in opening. In closing that would be appropriate, but 
12 not in opening. 
13 MS. BURNINGHAM: I will not, your Honor. I will just 
14 I say that, "The Court will instruct you on the definition of legal 
15 injury at the end." That's all. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. 
17 MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: And we certainly will do that. 
19 Mr. Oritt? 
20 MR. ORITT: I just want to hand to the other side, your 
21 Honor, if I may, these are small versions of our blow-ups that 
22 Kay may want to use in opening, in case they want to take a look 
23 at them --
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: I'm (inaudible). 



























talk about (inaudible). 
MR. NAEGLE: These are just demonstrative evidence in --
MS. BURNINGHAM: It's just -- yes. 
MR. ORITT: Just --
MR. NAEGLE: We have a time line as well that we would 
probably use, so --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. Can we see that? 
MR. NAEGLE: Yeah. We'll let you see that --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Can we see that now? 
MR. NAEGLE: -- during the break. I'll give it to 
you -- before the break? Do we need to rule on it now? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: No, I just want -- we gave you ours, so 
we want to see yours. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Oritt? 
MR. ORITT: Not from us, your Honor. I think we've 
covered — 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's have you come back right at 2 
so we can be all ready to go at 2:10 when the jury gets back, and 
we'll start with defense opening at that time. Did you have a 
question, Mr. Oritt? 
MR. ORITT: Oh, no, I was just -- no, just standing. I 
thought you were sitting up. Sorry, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. We'll see you back then. 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you. 
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1 I (Noon recess) 
2 THE COURT: For the record, the jurors have all 
3 returned, and we appreciate it. Everyone else is here as well. 
4 Members of the jury, we're going to hear in just a moment from 
5 the attorneys, who are going to open the case and explain their 
6 respective positions on the case. 
7 I The notepads that you've been given, you're free to use 
8 and take those -- take notes with those. We'll instruct you a 
9 little bit later on how you can use them, however. Suffice it to 
10 say that those notes should be reused by you just to refresh your 
11 own recollection. They're not an official record -- no one of 
12 I your notes would be an official record in the case, but you're 
13 certainly, as I say, welcome to take notes and use those notes 
14 I whenever it's necessary to refresh your recollection. 
15 Now Counsel, before we allow the defense to begin with 
16 its opening, I'd propose that we read the statement of the case. 
17 Any objection to that? 
18 MR. NAEGLE: No objection. 
19 MS. BURNINGHAM: No, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, I'll 
21 read this statement. This is just to kind of give you a little 
22 idea -- a little context about the case, because as I said 
23 before, it is a little unusual. Counsel will fill in a lot of 
24 the holes, though, during their opening statements here. Both 
25 Counsel have agreed to this particular statement. 
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1 Members of the jury, this trial will be different from 
2 most trials. Typically, a civil jury is asked to decide whether 
3 a party has been negligent or not, and if so, whether damages 
4 should be awarded. In this trial, however, you will only be 
5 asked to decide whether Mr. Daniels, who is the plaintiff in 
6 this case, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Hayes and Gamma West 
7 Brachytherapy, who are the defendants in this case, in a timely 
8 manner. 
9 At the end of this trial I will give you a more detailed 
10 instruction about the Utah state laws that we call statutes of 
11 limitation. For now, you simply need to understand that in civil 
12 I proceedings every claim, regardless of the nature of the claim, 
13 must be brought within a certain period of time or that claim is 
14 forever barred. 
15 In this case Mr. Daniels has sued Dr. Hayes and Gamma 
16 West Brachytherapy, claiming that the medical care that they 
17 rendered was done in a manner that fell below the acceptable 
18 medical standard of care. 
19 Dr. Hayes and Gamma West Brachytherapy have denied those 
20 allegations, and in addition, are claiming that Mr. Daniels 
21 failed to file his claim against them in a timely manner, and 
22 therefore his claim is barred. 
23 You as a jury will determine whether or not Mr. Daniels 
24 filed his claim in a timely manner. Dr. Hayes and Gamma West 



























with the statute of limitations. Your only purpose here today, 
ladies and gentlemen, is -- of the jury -- is to determine 
whether Mr. Daniels filed his complaint against those -- an 
individual and an entity, Dr. Hayes and Gamma West Brachytherapy 
in a timely manner. 
You will not consider whether the care and treatment 
provided by Dr. Hayes or Gamma West Brachytherapy was 
appropriate, or whether that care caused any of Mr. Daniels' 
claimed injuries. Neither will you render a verdict on those 
questions. 
Because this trial will only address the issue of 
whether the complaint was filed in a timely manner, Dr. Hayes 
will present his case first, followed by Mr. Daniels, and I'll 
add as well that the defendants in this case bear the burden of 
proof, and we'll talk to you more about that eventually as well. 
Counsel, if you wish, you may begin with your opening 
statement. 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
OPENING STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL 
MR. NAEGLE: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 
Again, my name is George Naegle. I have the privilege, along 
with Mr. Robert Wright, of representing Dr. John Hayes, who sits 
at Counsel table with us. Dr. Hayes is a radiation oncologist. 
That means that principally, for the most part, he works with 
patients who have been diagnosed with cancer. 
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1 Mr. Wright is a few years younger than me, so he's more on top 
2 of this. 
3 I THE COURT: Let's see. Let me return Exhibit --
4 I proposed Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 back to you, Ms. Burningham, and 
5 then you can I guess just use a marker or something to redact 
6 those parts of that that we won't be using. 
7 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yeah. 
8 THE COURT: Now in terms of the instructions, what I've 
9 tried to do is taking stock instructions that you've stipulated 
10 to -- not all of them. I've omitted some of them, and also using 
11 defense and plaintiff's instructions. I don't have the special 
12 verdict forms included yet. I thought that I would, but I 
13 haven't had a chance to finish that. Let me just preface what 
14 I've done by saying this first, and then I'll let you both make 
15 your exceptions to these. If I agree we can take some time and 
16 fix them. 
17 The first concern I had is some of the instructions 
18 submitted by both sides talked about what the jury could consider 
19 in terms of things that may be relevant. I'm reluctant to do 
20 that because it seems to me those things can be argued to the 
21 jury, for example, but on the other hand, unless there's a reason 
22 to do it -- if we need to give a cautionary instruction for some 
23 reason -- I'm hesitant to tell the jury, "This is one thing you 
24 can look at, and this is another thing that you can look at." 



























Court. That's something you can argue and you can tell them 
they can look at, but I don't know why I need to tell them that 
they can look at that, unless as I say, there's some special 
cautionary instruction that we would give them and ask them to be 
careful about. 
The other thing, and this is sort of the nut of the 
dispute that we've been having for the last couple of days. I 
have gone back and reread several cases that I think were helpful 
in resolving the issue. The first that I've taken a look at 
again here just today is the DeChamps case vs. Pulley. Another 
important case was the McDougal vs. Weed case. 
The case that the defense had cited involving Dearden I 
thought was of marginal relevance, just because all that the 
Federal Court there seems to be talking about is the first prong 
of this two-pronged test, and that is when did you discover the 
injury, not that it was a legal injury. There was some language 
there that was interesting. Also Riser. 
My conclusion in reading all of that is this, that in 
McDougal vs. Weed, probably the most important of the series, we 
have a situation where a person was injured through the course of 
an operation. Originally this -- the plaintiff in that case 
thought that he was injured by one doctor. He was told later on 
that it was another doctor, and the Supreme Court said, "Well, it 
doesn't really matter which of the two doctors provided the 
treatment. It's just important that you knew that you had an 
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1 injury of some kind, and that it was an injury that was possibly 
2 due to malpractice or negligence." 
3 Ms. Burningham, you had said, "Well, but that's a 
4 different situation. We have only one course of treatment there, 
5 I two possible providers," and the Supreme Court is saying it 
6 doesn't make any difference that one did it as opposed to the 
7 other because it was just one treatment. 
8 That to me seems fairly similar to the situation we have 
9 here. We have two courses of treatment, it's true, in this case, 
10 one being external beam radiation, and the other brachytherapy. 
11 The plaintiff's theory from the beginning was that either or both 
12 jointly caused the problems that he was experiencing. It seems 
13 to me that the language of McDougal is persuasive and binding on 
14 me in this case. Therefore, I've used the language essentially 
15 from McDougal in the instructions that I've provided I've taken 
16 defense instructions mostly, but modified them a little bit so 
17 that the language would comport with the language both in 
18 McDougal and the other case I just mentioned, DeChamps. 
19 So that's the reason I put -- used the instructions that 
20 I have. I think that I've covered everything m that packet that 
21 we would need, except the verdict forms. Let me hear first from 
22 the defense, inasmuch as you have the burden. If there are 
23 exceptions that you'd like to make, we'll let you put them on 
24 the record now. Go ahead. Mr. Hobbs, I understand you'll be 
25 responding. 
-384-
1 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, I'm sorry, before he 
2 starts, could you just clarify which instructions you're 
3 referring to, because when I got the defendant's special 
4 instructions there was no title of them and no number, and I'm 
5 not sure --
6 I THE COURT: I've numbered in the upper right hand corner 
7 I just a temporary number, obviously just because there may be 
8 changes. The instructions that I've just been referring to would 
9 start with --
10 MR. NAEGLE: No. 23, I think, your Honor. 
11 MR. HOBBS: No. 21. 
12 THE COURT: No. 23? 
13 MR. HOBBS: No. 21. 
14 MR. ORITT: No. 21, I think. 
15 MS. BURNINGHAM: No. 21. 
16 THE COURT: No. 21, 22, 23 and 24, those four 
17 I instructions. 
18 MS. BURNINGHAM: All right. Thank you, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Hobbs. 
20 MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, with regard to the stipulated 
21 jury instructions and the -- just the general admonitions to the 
22 jury, we don't have an objection with regard to those, and those 
23 would be numbers 1 through -- they skip. I'm sorry. It looks 
24 like No. 1 through 20-A, and then 25 through 29. 



























MR. HOBBS: Could we agree on those first? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: I'm sorry, you're talking about the 
stipulated? I thought we were talking about the special ones 
now. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm just asking Mr. --
MR. HOBBS: Well, I'm wondering if we can just get rid 
of this. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I need to look at them. I'm 
sorry. I don't --
MR. HOBBS: Okay. Well, let me go then to No. 21 that 
the Court has provided. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. HOBBS: We don't have an objection to that 
instruction. Number 22, we don't have an objection to that 
instruction. Number 23, the only change that I would suggest to 
the Court -- and this was included in our original submission to 
the Court, is that on the second sentence or the fourth line down 
states, "Should know that physical injury has been sustained." 
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MR. HOBBS: -- instead, "Discovery of an injury occurs 
when a plaintiff knows or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should know that he has suffered an injury, and that this injury 
was or may be attributable -- was caused by or may be 
attributable to negligence." 
THE COURT: Now how -- why is that important to you, 
Counsel? 
MR. HOBBS: That's from the language of the statute. 
THE COURT: Oh, that's the language of the statute. I 
see. 
MR. HOBBS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well — 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well --
MR. HOBBS: And the Foil test. 
THE COURT: Ms. Burningham, do you object to making 
that -- well, we'll give you a chance to object to all of them in 
just a minute. Okay. So I understand. 
MR. HOBBS: So those are my two suggestions on that 
instruction. 
THE COURT: Okay, so change that second sentence. 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. What else? What about No. 24? 
MR. HOBBS: We don't have an objection to that 
instruction, your Honor. Then the excluded instructions that we 



























submitted, I'm sure -- I think this is in order, but it begins 
with, "The threshold knowledge an injured party must have to know 
or reasonably should know of an injury is knowledge that he is 
suffering a disorder." 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. HOBBS: And then the reference is Dearden. The 
importance of this instruction, your Honor, is exactly what we've 
just been talking about here is the healing of the injury. I 
suspect that plaintiff's going to argue that he could not have 
reasonably known of an injury because the injury healed. This 
instruction goes to the law that a plaintiff doesn't need to know 
the permanent nature of the symptoms, whether they heal or not, 
or even the extent of the injury. I think that's important law 
that the jury needs to be instructed on if we're going to be 
talking about this. 
The second instruction that the Court has excluded is 
the tolling instruction. I don't know if we need to talk about 
tolling of the statute of limitations or instruct the jury on 
that, so we'd have no objection to the exclusion of that. 
The third instruction that the Court has excluded deals 
with Tracey Daniels' knowledge and imputation of her knowledge to 
Ralph Daniels. I am aware of the Court's hesitancy in reading 
that instruction to the jury. Let me just add, though, that I 
think that hesitancy comes from the law that the Court can't rule 



























do I have to tell them that? It's -- again, it's sort of a 
common sense argument, and that is that Mr. Daniels didn't expect 
anything like this. When it cropped up, it would have been 
reasonable for him to think that something went wrong in his 
treatment, and to be on inquiry notice, so to speak, that there 
was something wrong and it started the running of the statute. 
But again, why do I have to tell the jury that? 
MR. HOBBS: I think that the Court is probably right on 
that. Just that Collins vs. Wilson, which we haven't discussed 
at length here, and which I suspect we will be discussing at 
length on the special verdict form, supports that notion. In 
Collins, the Court specifically found that the reasonable 
expectations of the plaintiff were about the surgery in that 
case, supported the fact that he reasonably should have known of 
his legal injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you have other exceptions? 
MR. HOBBS: I believe that's it with regard to 
defendant's proposed instructions. I do have exceptions to 
plaintiff s . 
THE COURT: Well, what I'm asking you, though, 
Mr. Hobbs, I've given you a packet and you're saying that there 
are some things that I didn't put in there you think I should 
have, and you've mentioned those. 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
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in and go from there. 
your Honor. Number one, 
t have that in front 
, but 
plain 
of me. I 
in the 1 
asked 1 
I don't have those. There was the 1 
tiff suffered a disorder. That is 
dicta from Dearden. I think that's unnecessary and not the law 
and duplicative, and I don't think that should be included. I 
mean disorders --
THE COURT: Now which one are you referring to again? 
I'm sorry. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, he mentioned some special 
instruction about has the plaintiff -- if the plaintiff suffered 
a disorder, and maybe you've already dealt with that. I guess 
you have. I'm sorry. I guess you decided. 
THE COURT: No, I haven't dealt with it. Well, I 
omitted it. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes. 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Hobbs thinks it should go in. 
2 MS. BURNINGHAM: I'm thinking it should be omitted 
3 because it's going to confuse the jury. What's a disorder versus 
4 an injury? What -- I mean that just is confusing. 
5 THE COURT: Do you think that it's an incorrect 
6 statement of the law? It's the one that begins, "The threshold 
7 knowledge of an injured party must have to know or reasonably 
8 should know if an injury is knowledge that he's suffering a 
9 disorder." That's language from Dearden, as you said. 
10 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, and I think that was dicta, and I 
11 I think that is confusing because disorder -- we use disorder and 
12 then we use injury, and the statute -- the case law -- the 
13 consistent case law, the good case law uses injury, underlying 
14 injury, legal injury, and disorder is just some random word used 
15 by the Court in dicta, in my opinion. 
16 THE COURT: So even though you acknowledge that it's 
17 language from Dearden, it's the word "disorder" that you object 
18 I to. If I were to change the word "disorder" to injury and make 
19 it consistent with the language of the other instructions, which 
20 understanding it's a little different than the word used in 
21 Dearden, would you object to that instruction? 
22 MS. BURNINGHAM: I think it -- I think it has to be 
23 legal injury. I don't think anywhere it can just be injury, it's 
24 I got to be legal injury. 



























and that's pretty clear, if I'm not mistaken. Let's see, maybe I 
am. Let me double check that. 
MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, maybe I can short circuit this. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. HOBBS: I don't have an objection to excluding that 
first sentence from that instruction, or changing the language 
from "disorder" to consistent terms, "legal injury." 
THE COURT: Yeah. Dearden dealt with just the first 
task, and that is whether or not the person had suffered a 
disorder -- they used that word. They weren't as concerned with 
the second prong, which was the legal injury or the negligence. 
So again, Ms. Burningham, if we were to change "disorder" to 
injury, but give the instruction otherwise, would you object? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, I would, your Honor, because if 
you read that entire instruction, it's very confusing because the 
last sentence says, "Indeed, the injured party need not know the 
full extent or nature, extent, severity or permanency of an 
injury to have knowledge of a legal injury necessary to commence 
the running of the statute of limitations." 
So first it's confusing the two prongs. First it just 
talks about injury, then it talks about legal injury, and it 
mentions negligence nowhere. I think that's just an extra thing 
that is put on top of what we already have that's going to be 
confusing to the jury when it's clear there has to be two prongs. 
THE COURT: I agree with you, Counsel. I won't give 
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1 that instruction because even though it's legally correct, it's 
2 not clear in the body of the instruction that it's dealing only 
3 with the first of the two-part test or standard. A jury -- I'm 
4 concerned in reading this instruction -- could think that all we 
5 need to find to start the running of the statute is that he was 
6 injured, period, without understanding that both prongs would 
7 I have to satisfied to start the running. So Counsel, I agree with 
8 you, and I will omit that instruction, noting, of course, that 
9 the defense has asked for its submission to the jury. 
10 MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, if this instruction could be 
11 clarified to just discuss the first prong of the Foil test, could 
12 we have the language regarding the extent, permanent -- the 
13 permanent nature of the injury, that the jury doesn't need to 
14 consider that? 
15 THE COURT: Why don't you rework it, if you'd like --
16 MR. HOBBS: I will. 
17 THE COURT: And if you can do it quickly you can 
18 resubmit it, but as it's written, I agree with Ms. Burningham. 
19 It would confuse the jury. 
20 Ms. Burningham, the other exception that they took was 
21 to an instruction that I had included in the packet. They wanted 
22 to change --
23 MS. BURNINGHAM: Where is that? 
24 THE COURT: I think it was No. 23, the second sentence 
25 that begins, "Instead," comma, "discovery of an injury occurs 
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1 when a plaintiff knows or should know," and Mr. Hobbs had asked 
2 I that we rework that so it changes a little bit. Did you follow 
3 his objection? 
4 MS. BURNINGHAM: No, not really. Okay. This is No. 23, 
5 and I'm looking at that (inaudible). 
6 THE COURT: Number 23 numbered in the upper right hand 
7 corner. 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. Okay. I've got it. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Hobbs, why don't you tell us again the 
10 way you'd have me read -- write that. 
11 MR. HOBBS: Certainly. I'd ask the Court rework the 
12 second sentence to read instead, "Discovery of an injury occurs 
13 when a plaintiff knows or through the use of reasonable diligence 
14 I should know that he has suffered an injury, and that this injury 
15 was caused by or may be attributable to negligence." 
16 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I don't have a problem with "was 
17 caused by," but "may be attributable" --
18 MR. HOBBS: That's directly from case law, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Ms. Burningham, do you -- any other concern 
20 about that one? 
21 MS. BURNINGHAM: No, just the "may be attributable." 
22 I'm not sure which case that's from. I don't think that's Foil. 
23 THE COURT: The word "attributable," I don't recall it 
24 in one of the cases, but I obviously could have missed it. 



























MR. HOBBS: Yeah, I can. 
THE COURT: The language in DeChamps talking about 
quoting another case, the Harget case, talks about the injury --
MR. HOBBS: I'm sorry, it's from Chatman, your Honor. 
Chatman vs. Primary Children's Hospital. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: That was quoted by Collins vs. Wilson in 
paragraph 19 of that case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: The direct quote is, "Discovery of legal 
injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical injury 
and knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable to 
negligence." 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll -- I note the objection again 
from the plaintiff, but it sounds like that it's straight from 
the case, and I'll amend instruction No. 23 to include that 
language. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, and your Honor, I'd only say for 
the record that I'm not sure when those cases -- the dates of 
those cases, and how they compare to the exact wording in the 
statute. I don't know that that's in the statute, the Med Mail 
statute that says -- I don't believe it says that, but I could be 
wrong. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Oh, the tolling. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: -- I mean there's a tolling 
instruction. 
THE COURT: That's right. That was the other one. He 
indicated he --
MR. HOBBS: The tolling instruction, I don't -- I don't 
think we have an objection to that exclusion. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: And then Tracey Daniels' imputation --
THE COURT: Well, I've ruled --



























THE COURT: -- on that one. 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: And then the permanency in nature, I do have 
a reworking of that, if you would like to hear it. 
THE COURT: That's the one that we just dealt with, 
the --
MR. HOBBS: It's the threshold knowledge. 
THE COURT: Yeah, threshold knowledge. 
MR. HOBBS: You asked me --
THE COURT: You've already reworked it? 
MR. HOBBS: -- to rework it. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. HOBBS: "In order to be aware of an injury, an 
injured party need to be aware of the extent of his injury, the 
actual malady suffered, or the permanent nature of his symptoms. 
Indeed, the injured party need not know the full nature, extent, 
severity or permanency of an injury." 
MS. BURNINGHAM: I don't think that's at issue in this 
case. I think it's irrelevant. I mean it's not a --
MR. HOBBS: Certainly it's at issue. 
THE COURT: Well, let her finish. Counsel. Go ahead, 
Ms. Burningham. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: It's not -- there's not a permanency 
issue in this case. I don't see it. 
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1 MR. HOBBS: Well, your Honor, the instruction also talks 
2 I about nature, extent, severity. Those are all issues in this 
3 case about what Ralph Daniels knew or reasonably should have 
4 known about his injury and whether that injury was or may be 
5 attributable to negligence. 
6 THE COURT: Here's what I'll do, Mr. Hobbs and 
7 Ms. Burningham on that. Let me -- if you've written it up 
8 already, Mr. Hobbs, why don't you give that to my clerk who is 
9 here, and I'll have her type it in the same format. Then we can 
10 have it in front of us to look at when we talk about this again 
11 in just a few minutes, hopefully. Plus I'll ask her to rework 
12 that one instruction as you had asked. Amanda, did you 
13 understand how --
14 COURT CLERK: Yeah. I'm (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: Do you have the instruction still? 
16 COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: I can give it to you right here. It's this 
18 one that's on the top, but did you understand how we were going 
19 I to rework that second sentence? 
20 COURT CLERK: I did it. I've rewritten it. 
21 THE COURT: Oh, you've rewritten it. Okay. 
22 COURT CLERK: (Inaudible) print it off? 
23 THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you print that off. Let's --
24 I'm anxious to get going again, though, because the jury is there 
25 wondering what we're doing. 
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1 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, I haven't had a chance to 
2 I respond to No. 21 through 24 that Mr. Hobbs --
3 J THE COURT: I know. I know. I understand that. We'll 
4 have to come back and do that maybe at the next recess. 
5 1 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Let's -- I think I've dealt with all 
7 of the defense concerns except the one that you're going to write 
8 up and my clerk will retype. So we'll have to come back to that, 
9 too, along with the other exceptions that the plaintiff would 
10 like to take to these instructions. All right. Let's bring the 
11 jury back in, if we could. 
12 COURT BAILIFF: Please rise for the jury. 
13 (Jury returned to courtroom) 
14 COURT BAILIFF: The Court is back in session. You may 
15 be seated. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Deputy. For the 
17 record, the jurors are back. We appreciate your patience, 
18 members of the jury. We thought we'd be ready to resume at about 
19 1:30, and obviously we aren't. In fact, just so that you'll have 
20 kind of a heads up, we're still -- there's still some business 
21 that we're going to have to discuss at a later recess. All of 
22 the time that you spent sitting there should -- isn't wasted, 
23 just so you'll understand that. We're busy talking about 
24 instructions and other things that we need to deal with. So we 



























defendant's take to the instructions that I had put in the 
packet, and asked that a few more be given. I've dealt with all 
of them except the reworking of one of the defense instructions. 
The clerk has attempted to retype that, and we'll talk about that 
just as soon as we can when she gets here. 
But now let's give the plaintiff an opportunity. Either 
Mr. Oritt or Ms. Burningham, whoever, will address them. I'd 
like you to just put on the record, please, your exceptions to 
the instructions that I've given. If you think there's some 
there that shouldn't be, we'll talk about those. If there are 
other instructions that you think ought to be included, I'll 
consider that as well. Go ahead. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you, your Honor. Beginning with 
No. 21. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: The complete second paragraph I 
think is inappropriate. This paragraph would only apply to a 
case that -- where the injury is the triggering -- or the actual 
act of the defendant is the triggering fact. Here it's discover 
or should have discovered, and I think this language -- you read 
the last sentence, "If any of these acts or occurrences took 
place on or before May 6th then a claim based on that act or 
occurrence is barred by the statute." I think that's really 
confusing and wouldn't apply in this case, your Honor. 
It seems to say that the brachytherapy took place in 
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1 I January, and because it was done by January 26th then that act or 
2 occurrence, which of course occurred before May 20 -- May 6th, 
3 2001, would preclude plaintiff from recovering, and I don't think 
4 that's what the law is or what your Honor intended. 
5 THE COURT: How would you rework that, then, if you 
6 were -- that last sentence or two sentences to make them legally 
7 correct? Any suggestion? 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, it should just be if plaintiff 
9 discovered or reasonably should have discovered his legal injury 
10 on or before -- or before May 6th then a claim, but it's not the 
11 act, I don't think. I think that's really confusing. You may 
12 have that discovered as legal injury in some other instruction, 
13 like No. 23, I think, and so I just don't think the second 
14 paragraph is even necessary. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hobbs? 
16 MR. HOBBS: The acts or occurrences are simply the facts 
17 that plaintiff must be aware of that would lead an ordinary 
18 person, which is stated in instruction No. 23 to conclude a claim 
19 for negligence may exist. 
20 I don't think we've defined for the jury the two prongs 
21 of what a legal injury is, so I can see Ms. Birmingham's concern 
22 about the confusion. 
23 THE COURT: So would you object, then, if we omit that 
24 last full paragraph on No. 21? 
25 MR. HOBBS: Well, I would object unless there is an 
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1 instruction that instructs the jury -- oh, I see No. 22. 
2 THE COURT: I want to make sure they understand 
3 I everything that they need to consider. 
4 MR. HOBBS: Yeah. 
5 THE COURT: If we've not told them about something that 
6 you both think is critical, then let's fix that. 
7 MR. HOBBS: I think what we could do, your Honor, is 
8 take the first sentence of the second paragraph of No. 21, and 
9 put it at the beginning of the instruction No. 22. 
10 THE COURT: So the first sentence of the second 
11 paragraph in No. 21, "The statute of limitations that applies to 
12 I plaintiff's claim for medical malpractice provides that the claim 
13 must be brought within a specified amount of time after the 
14 plaintiff discovered his legal injury." Move that over to No. 22 
15 and make it the first sentence there? 
16 MR. HOBBS: Yes, and then the second sentence of that 
17 first paragraph would then read, "You must determine whether 
18 I plaintiff knew or should have known through the use of reasonable 
1 9 diligence." 
20 THE COURT: Just leave it as it is? 
21 MR. HOBBS: Right. 
22 MS. BURNINGHAM: And delete the last sentence on 
23 paragraph 2, Counsel? 
24 THE COURT: The last two sentences? 
25 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yeah, last two sentences. 
-438-
1 MR. HOBBS: Yeah. We'd take that last paragraph out. 
2 THE COURT: And use only the first sentence? 
3 MR. HOBBS: And use the first sentence, bring it over to 
4 the very beginning of instruction No. 22. 
5 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's fine with me, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MS. BURNINGHAM: As long as I understand it right and we 
8 I can read it back on the record to make sure we're on the same 
9 page. 
10 THE COURT: Well, we'll get it retyped so that you can 
11 both look at it. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
13 MR. HOBBS: Does that make sense, your Honor? Do you 
14 understand? 
15 THE COURT: Well, I understand exactly what you're 
16 I proposing. 
17 MR. HOBBS: Great. 
18 THE COURT: Yes, I do. We really haven't explained that 
19 there are two prongs and so forth, so if you both agree and are 
20 comfortable with that change, then I'm happy to make that. Okay. 
21 So we'11 do that. 
22 Ms. Burningham, what other exceptions would you take? 
23 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, your Honor, No. 23, my problem is 
24 there is nothing that we have here that talks about cause, and 




























if you have that in front of you, or if you have MUJI you could 
access. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: But what it states is, "All that is 
necessary is the patient be aware of facts that would lead an 
ordinary person using reasonable diligence to conclude that a 
claim for negligence may exist" -- and this is the key -- "those 
facts include the existence of a physical injury, its cause, and 
the possibility of negligence." We don't have anywhere in these 
instructions that you prepared, your Honor, I don't think, cause. 
I think cause in fact is important that --
MR. HOBBS: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Let her finish, Counsel. 
MR. 
MS. 
HOBBS: I'm sorry. Go ahead. 
BURNINGHAM: And that's why we submitted the 
proposed plaintiff's special instruction on cause in fact, and 
that details 
MR. 
what is the cause in fact. 
HOBBS: Your Honor, the word "cause" or "caused" 






BURNINGHAM: Which one? 
HOBBS: The instruction you're talking about. 
NAEGLE: No. 23. 
BURNINGHAM: Oh, No. 23? 
HOBBS: No. 23. In the second sentence it states, 



























through the use of reasonable diligence should know that he 
suffered an injury and that this injury was caused by 
negligence." Then going on to the --
THE COURT: Well, we had it worded that way, probably, 
but then we changed it to say, "And that this injury is or may be 
attributable to negligence." 
MR. HOBBS: "Was caused by or may be attributable to 
negligence." 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Oh, when she fixed it, then, she didn't fix 
that --
MR. HOBBS: She didn't fix, "caused by." I would 
include that in there, "caused by or may be attributable to 
negligence." The second reference is in the fourth sentence, 
"Instead, all that is necessary is that the plaintiff recognize 
the possibility that the injury was caused by negligence." 
THE COURT: Are you looking at No. 23? 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Oh, yes. Okay. "Instead, all that is 
necessary is that the plaintiff recognize the possibility that 
the injury was caused by negligence." 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
THE COURT: So if we were to add the word "caused" back 
to it after, would you feel comfortable with that instruction 






























If I may, your Honor --
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MS. BURNINGHAM: I'd like to make a record. I think 
there are two types of cause, and I think it's extremely 
important that the jury be instructed on both. One is cause in 
fact, the other is legal cause. Those are two different things. 
Your Honor, this may be a law school lesson, but I think it's 
very important. The jury needs to know that in order to discover 
negligence, plaintiff has to know both the cause in fact, what 
caused these injuries. Was it the brachytherapy, or was the 
external beam, or was it both. What was the legal cause, meaning 
was it in the scheme of things in Paul's graph and proximate 
cause, was it the legal cause as well? 
Was it negligence? We have not defined negligence 
anywhere in these instructions. The jury is left to their own 
sources to come up with what is negligence, and yet negligence 
has a special definition under the law. I think it needs to have 
and they need to be instructed on both cause in fact and legal 
cause, and I believe that 6.37 includes that. I think the case 
law requires that. 
If I can just read from the favorite case that we've 
kind of been citing by the defense, which is the McDougal case, 
McDougal cited the Utah Supreme Court case of Jensen vs. IHC, 944 
P.2d 327 at 337, Utah, 1997, reversed and remanded on other 



























begins to run when quote" -- and I have this in brackets --
"plaintiff discovers or should have reasonably discovered" -- and 
this is exact verbatim from McDougal quoting --
THE COURT: Where are you reading? Let me see it. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, this is in my brief, but I've 
got --
THE COURT: Oh, in your brief. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: -- McDougal here, and it's page 177 of 
McDougal. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: I've got it right here. If you go up 
to the top of the printout of the McDougal case where it's 
quoting Jensen, I can show you, your Honor, if I can approach if 
that will help. 
THE COURT: I've got it here. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: I think it's -- it's page 5 on my 
Westlaw printout of 7. 
THE COURT: Okay. I've got it. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. It's up at the top. The Court 
in McDougal quoting Jensen states, and I quote, "Only begins to 
run when the plaintiff" -- and I've got this in brackets --
"discovers or should have reasonably discovered" -- and this is 
the language -- "the underlying injury and its origins in medical 
malpractice," McDougal at 177. 



























on that same page -- well, actually, it's on 178 of the case. 
This is under head note 1, your Honor, in the middle of the page. 
"Accordingly" -- and this is the holding in McDougal -- "we hold 
that the medical malpractice statute of limitations is tied only 
to the discovery of the plaintiff's legal injury, and not to the 
discovery of the tortfeasor's identity, but it has to be to the 
discovery of the plaintiff's legal injury." Again, we've got 
cause in fact, legal cause. I think the jury has not been 
instructed adequately on those two components, and those are 
basic elements of negligence. 
THE COURT: There certainly isn't any definition of 
negligence in the instructions. The word "negligence," although, 
is used in at least one of the instructions -- No. 23, for 
example, uses the word "negligence." So Mr. Hobbs, would you 
object if we defined negligence? 
MR. HOBBS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, the standard established by 
(inaudible) progeny nowhere includes the definition of legal 
cause or cause in fact. No case ever discusses those two 
concepts in relating or regarding or referring to negligence. 
There are a few cases I'd like to refer the Court to. 
THE COURT: Hang on just a minute. 
(Court confers with court bailiff) 
THE COURT: Why don't we take just a quick recess. I'd 
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1 like my clerk to be here so that when we agree on a change we can 
2 I make it. So give me just a few minutes and we'll be in recess. 
3 We'll come right back. 
4 I (Short recess taken) 
5 (Court on the record in chambers) 
6 THE COURT: I think we're ready to go now and we should 
7 be on the record. So when we left off, Ms. Burningham, you were 
8 I telling us your objections to instruction No. 21. Well, we need 
9 to back up a little bit because we did revise No. 23, and there 
10 was some language that Mr. Hobbs, you said was left out that 
11 needed to be added. 
12 MR. HOBBS: I haven't seen the revised No. 23, but --
13 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
14 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yeah, neither have I. 
15 (Counsel confer with one another) 
16 MR. HOBBS: Well, originally it was that the injury was 
17 caused by or may be attributable to negligence. 
18 THE COURT: And that this -- this injury was caused by 
19 or may be attributable -- was caused by or may be attributable to 
20 negligence. Okay. Then Ms. Burningham, you go ahead. What were 
21 you saying on (inaudible)? 
22 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, are you sure we're on the 
23 record? 
24 THE COURT: We are on the record. 



























I'm going to read from the statute 78-14-4 of the Utah Code. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Section 1, "No malpractice action 
against a healthcare provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever occurs -- first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence." Then it goes on with some exceptions. 
It doesn't use the word, "may suspect," or "may" whatever the 
language you have in No. 23. "May" -- I don't think -- "May" 
means allowed. Maybe you mean "might" or -- it just seems like 
that's wrong. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you're taking exception to No. 23. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes. 
THE COURT: And your exception is? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: That it shouldn't be -- well, I'm 
trying to see the revised one. I don't have that. I'm sorry, 
your Honor. My exception is, "should know that he suffered 
physical injury, and that this injury was caused by negligence." 
It should be not is or may be attributable; I'm taking exception 
to that language, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The language there -- I can see 
it now, actually, is used in the McDougal case on page 3 of the 



























limitations period is tied to the patient's discovery of his or 
her injury," and then it talks about Foil. It says, "Thus, the 
two year provision does not commence to run until the injured 
person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury, 
and that the injury was caused by negligent action." Then, 
"Discovery of legal injury encompasses both the awareness of 
physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may be 
attributable to negligence," quoting from Chatman vs. Primary 
Children's Hospital. So that's language from McDougal and also 
the Chatman case. 
MR. HOBBS: Your Honor --
MS. 
holding, I d 
The holding 
only to the 
discovery of 
THE 
BURNINGHAM: I would only say that that's not the 
on't think, of McDougal. I think that's dictum. 
is, "We hold the medical malpractice statute is tied 
discovery of the plaintiff's legal injury, not to 
the tortfeasor's injury," for the record. 1 
COURT: We'll note your exception, but I'll include 








cited with approval in McDougal. Okay. What else do 
BURNINGHAM: A couple more, your Honor. I think we 
negligence not being anywhere defined in the -- I 
COURT: Yeah, the word "negligence" is -- 1 
BURNINGHAM: -- instructions. J 


























- 4 4 7 -
needed to d e f i n e i t . You s a i d no, you though t? 
MR. HOBBS: We d o n ' t . 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, under DeChamps at page 474 -- I 
have copies if the --
THE COURT: I've got DeChamps here. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Can I see it, please? Thank you. What 
page? 
MR. HOBBS: At 474. Starting with the paragraph that 
states under Foil and its progeny, and if you're looking at the 
Westlaw --
THE COURT: I am. 
MR. HOBBS: Okay. It's the top of the second column, 
first full paragraph. 
THE COURT: On the page -- I see the Utah Supreme Court 
in Foil vs. Dallinger considering the discovery of injury. 
MR. HOBBS: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) do you have an extra copy of 
that? 
MR. HOBBS: I don't have an extra copy, but here 
in this case the plaintiff was proffering the standard that 
Ms. Burningham is that you need a legal conclusion of negligence, 
that is duty (inaudible) proximate cause and damages, and that 
the plaintiff couldn't discover her legal injury until she had 



























THE COURT: Okay. The language I think you're referring 
to is the Court's quoting from Harget, is that right, where it 
says, "Under Foil and its progeny a legal determination of 
negligence is not necessary to start the statute"? 
MR. HOBBS: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: "Rather the crucial question is whether the 
plaintiff was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude that he may have a cause of action against the 
healthcare provider. Those facts include the existence of an 
injury and the possibility" --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Its cause. 
MR. HOBBS: Its cause. 
THE COURT: "Its cause and the possibility of 
negligence." 
MR. HOBBS: Right. You notice they say its cause and 
then the possibility of negligence. We're not talking about 
the legal determination of proximate cause in this case, and to 
insert that kind of element into this case, I think, goes beyond 
what we're talking about in this trial, which is what Ralph 
Daniels knew or reasonably should have know, not what the legal 
determination of his claim for medical malpractice against 
defendants is in this case. 
THE COURT: In terms of just defining the word 
"negligence." Now since we use it in the instruction, isn't it 



























the use of the word "attributable to negligence," or that phrase, 
rather, and also "does not need to have certain knowledge of 
negligence," they're going to wonder what negligence is? 
MR. HOBBS: That's going to prejudice defendants, your 
Honor. That's going to insert the elements of negligence, the 
standard of care and duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, 
damages, evidence of which this jury hasn't even heard of. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: That's not the standard that Foil 
establishes. It's not the standard that any of the cases 
following Foil state. In fact, nowhere in the case law does it 
discuss or hold that you need to define negligence for the jury 
in order for a lay person to have suspicions of negligence. It 
only frames the issue in terms of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that they may have a cause of 
action against a healthcare provider. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Burningham? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, your Honor, I think it's 
ridiculous to -- and not saying anything against you or Counsel, 
but to give the jury instructions that include the term 
"negligence" as a term of legal art and not to define it, and if 
you look at the statute -- well, let's just look at this language 
you just read, your Honor. The last sentence says, "Those facts 
include the existence of an injury, its cause" -- as in cause in 
fact, I would offer -- "and the possibility of negligence." 
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1 I Cause in fact and legal cause, those right there, 
2 quoting Foil in this case -- DeChamps, or whatever -- they're 
3 talking about two separate things. It's not cause and negligence 
4 I is not the same thing. I just don't know how a jury can decide 
5 what's negligence because one person's interpretation of 
6 negligence might be what we saw from this juror that came in on 
7 voir dire. Mr. -- he was an Asian or something -- I'm sorry, 
8 but --
9 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
10 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yeah. Yeah. He said, "Well, I think 
11 if they try their best," and that's not negligence or 
12 malpractice. There's bound to be horrible confusion amongst the 
13 jurors in a deliberation on what is negligence, and that will 
14 prejudice the plaintiff way more than the defense. 
15 MR. HOBBS: To the contrary, that's going to confuse the 
16 jury even more if you require them to think that they need to 
17 establish standard of care, breach of standard, proximate cause 
18 and damages, and they've not heard any evidence on that. 
19 THE COURT: Well, they haven't, but I'm still wondering 
20 how -- if we use the word "negligence" in the instructions -- and 
21 they do --
22 MR. HOBBS: I'm wondering how you would define 
23 negligence without using those elements. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, let's look at the statute. It 
25 doesn't use negligence in there. It just says, "Alleged act, 
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1 omission, neglect or occurrence." 
2 MR. HOBBS: Neglect. 
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: And that's different than negligence. 
4 MR. HOBBS: Yes. What Ms. Burningham is reading from is 
5 the statute. 
6 THE COURT: Yes. 
7 MR. HOBBS: But she's not -- she's not taking into 
8 consideration Foil and the case law that have interpreted what 
9 injury is as that statute has used injury. The case law has come 
10 up with a very specialized area of law that defines injury as 
11 legal injury for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Let 
12 me give you a few examples about where I'm going with this. 
13 In Harget vs. Limberg, the holding in that case was that 
14 the plaintiff didn't need to consult with an attorney in order to 
15 learn the legal significance of the facts to support a claim for 
16 negligence. Also in DeChamps, plaintiff doesn't need to provide 
17 (inaudible) with expert opinion to support a cause of action 
18 against a defendant. You don't need to have a physician confirm 
19 or connect the dots for the plaintiff. Back to McDougal, even 
20 the identity of the tortfeasor plaintiff doesn't need to know. 
21 If we're talking about proximate cause, certainly you'd 
22 need to know the identity of a tortfeasor in order to establish 
23 legal causes Ms. Burningham is proffering, and that's just not 
24 the law. 
25 I THE COURT: But in the -- and Ms. Burningham, what 
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1 I he says about negligence, if we're using the definition of 
2 negligence that you had included in your special instruction 
3 No. 5, negligence is defined for purposes of this trial failure 
4 I of the defendants to exercise that degree of care that other 
5 qualifying physicians in the same specialty would ordinarily 
6 exercise under the same circumstances. There's been nothing like 
7 that. How would this jury have any idea whether other physicians 
8 in the same specialty might exercise a different degree of care 
9 unless we try the whole case and let them hear everything, and we 
10 haven't done that. 
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: Exactly, and Mr. and Mrs. Daniels have 
12 never had any idea from any of the physicians that what happened 
13 was below the standard of care. It wasn't negligence. I mean 
14 how can we tell the jury to decide negligence when Mr. and 
15 Mrs. Daniels didn't get any chance to decide negligence. I mean 
16 it's like in a vacuum. I mean it's --
17 MR. HOBBS: But Utah case law doesn't require a 
18 I plaintiff to know -- make a legal determination of negligence. 
19 The cases that I've cited to you, Harget, DeChamps, Hove, Collins 
20 vs. Wilson, Floyd vs. Western Surgical, all of those cases state 
21 that it's just simply the facts that a plaintiff is aware of and 
22 a reasonable suspicion of negligence. 
23 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay, but there you use negligence, and 
24 the possibility citing again directly from DeChamps, citing Foil, 
25 I and the possibility of negligence. What is negligence? 
-453-
1 Negligence is cause in fact and breach, all that stuff. I mean 
2 that's the problem. 
3 MR. HOBBS: Well, then let's call in the experts. 
4 MS. BURNINGHAM: No. 
5 MR. HOBBS: Let's set out the standard of care. 
6 MS. BURNINGHAM: No. 
7 MR. HOBBS: Let's establish the breach, the proximate 
8 cause of your client's injuries and the damages. 
9 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's why we're making a motion for a 
10 directed verdict because we don't think you guys have done that, 
11 and you need to do that as part of your affirmative defense. 
12 MR. HOBBS: That is absolutely not okay. 
13 THE COURT: Well, okay. Okay. We're going to have to 
14 cut this short. So Ms. Burningham, besides that one -- those 
15 exceptions that you've mentioned, what else would you except to? 
16 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I have (inaudible). Number one 
17 is we need to have MUJI 2.23 or something like that, which is --
18 this case has been terminated as to defendant's University of 
19 Utah and Salt Lake Regional. "You should not concern yourself 
20 with the reasons for the dismissal of these defendants, but 
21 should consider the issues," da, ta, ta, ta, ta. I think the 
22 jury needs to be cautioned not to consider all these extraneous 
23 information that came in about the U and Salt Lake Regional. 
24 MR. HOBBS: That's certainly not relevant --
25 MS. BURNINGHAM: And I (inaudible). 
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1 MR. HOBBS: -- to -- certainly that's relevant to what 
2 Ralph and Tracey Daniels knew, what their intentions were 
3 bringing claims against not only Gamma West but the U. 
4 MS. BURNINGHAM: No, that's --
5 MR. HOBBS: And Salt Lake Regional Medical Center. 
6 THE COURT: Well, let me see (inaudible) instruction 
7 again. 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I had one more specific, but you 
9 can see -- I'll hand you them both, your Honor. 
10 MR. HOBBS: That instruction goes to liability 
11 (inaudible). 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, but — 
13 MR. HOBBS: That's not what we're doing. 
14 MS. BURNINGHAM: I think it applies (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: Anything else, and then I'll make my 
16 decision and we'll go forward here. We're not going to reopen 
17 the case. We're not going to talk about standard of care and 
18 what another doctor may have done with -- we're just not going to 
19 do it, so what other concerns do we have? 
20 MS. BURNINGHAM: Let's see. I have it noted here. 
21 Okay, No. 23. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, again, that's just the same 
24 argument we made on negligence. Same thing. It has negligence 
25 in that instruction, and there's negligence in No. 24. So 
-455-
1 I just think it's really hard to -- and there's negligence in 
2 No. 22, your Honor. I just don't see how the jury is going to 
3 I reasonably --
4 THE COURT: Well, give me an alternative, then. Give me 
5 a suggestion as to how you think we should deal with it without 
6 having to tell the jury things that have not even been discussed 
7 at all in the trial. 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: I would say wrongdoing by the 
9 defendant. 
10 THE COURT: Instead of --
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: On (inaudible) yes, wrongdoing by the 
12 defendants. 
13 MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, the case law repeatedly uses the 
14 word "negligence." It's never used "wrongdoing by the 
15 defendants." 
16 THE COURT: Aren't we in a catch-22, Counsel, because 
17 really, honestly, you're (inaudible). The jury is going to say 
18 what is negligence? How do we know that this is negligence? We 
19 haven't given them that answer. I mean I can see them writing a 
20 note at some point -- sending out a letter and saying, "Can you 
21 tell us what negligence means?" What do we do? How do we deal 
22 with that? 
23 MR. HOBBS: Certainly. The case law -- we ask them to 
24 step into the shoes of Ralph Daniels. What we know from the case 



























determination of negligence in order to start this statute of 
limitations running. 
THE COURT: Well, he didn't have to have a legal 
definition of negligence, but he had to know that his injury was 
as a result of something, right? It has to be more than just 
that he knew he was injured. He has to know that the injury was 
caused by something more. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, if I may hand you my cause 
in fact, No. 4 --
MR. HOBBS: The case law. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: -- definition, that might help. 
MR. HOBBS: The case law doesn't go any further than 
using the word "negligence." I would submit, your Honor, if you 
go beyond that would be reversible error. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: But your Honor, the case law does talk 
about cause separate from negligence, and I submit not to have 
cause --
MR. HOBBS: Which we've used in the instructions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you have anything else, Counsel? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Only that I would like you to look at 
my cause instruction. 
THE COURT: I've got it. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
THE COURT: I've got it right here in front of me. 
MR. HOBBS: We did object to that instruction, your 
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1 Honor, as well. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Well, here's what I'll do, unless 
3 there's something else you want to put on the record. I'm going 
4 to take a look at it. I'll then try to repair it and make it --
5 and do my best to put it together so that it's understandable, 
6 and then let you see a final copy of it, and then we'll instruct 
7 the jury. It's 3:30. So we need to move if we're going to 
8 finish today. Do either of you -- do any of you have any concern 
9 about that? Do you want to --
10 MR. ORITT: Well, your Honor, actually before we get to 
11 that, as Kay mentioned, with annotations from (inaudible) we do 
12 have a motion for a directed verdict we'd like to make. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. ORITT: I'm going to be doing it. It will take five 
15 minutes, maybe. 
16 MR. NAEGLE: Your Honor, directed verdict is usually 
17 made after the close of my case in chief, and it wasn't. It was 
18 untimely. 
19 MR. ORITT: Well, I don't think --
20 MR. WRIGHT: It's untimely. 
21 MR. ORITT: -- that's what the rule says. The rule says 
22 at the close of (inaudible) evidence, which is rebuttal. They 
23 chose not to call anybody; that's the close of their evidence. I 
24 think you can make it either time being their case in chief or --
25 THE COURT: We'll talk about it in just a few minutes. 
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1 Let me take a minute and try to put the instructions together and 
2 then we'll go from there. 
3 I MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, I do have copies of those cases 
4 I mentioned (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: Which ones? 
6 MR. HOBBS: Floyd, DeChamps, (inaudible) you don't have 
7 Floyd, and you don't have Harget vs. Limberg. 
8 THE COURT: I've got the quotation from Harget, but I'll 
9 take those (inaudible) okay. Thank you. I'll keep this here. 
10 Thank you very much. 
11 (Counsel confer with one another) 
12 THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Amanda. I'm really at a 
13 loss as to what to do. I can see them wondering what negligence 
14 means. 
15 COURT CLERK: Right. I think that she's wrong in trying 
16 to swap out the word "from wrongdoing." I think that that puts 
17 her in a worse position because wrongdoing, at least to me, 
18 I implies an intentional act. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, it does. 
20 COURT CLERK: And I think that that's not where she 
21 wants to go with it. I --
22 THE COURT: Well, it puts the --
23 COURT CLERK: -- well, we were talking — 
24 THE COURT: -- defendants in a terrible position because 



























something wrong, which --
COURT CLERK: Right. 
THE COURT: -- suggests that they never started. 
COURT CLERK: Yeah. While they were talking I wrote 
down you could instruct them something about negligence and say 
something like, "You were" -- I mean explain to them that they're 
not giving -- they're not (inaudible) okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
COURT CLERK: Could you give sort of an instruction on 
negligence like injury -- injury caused by improper treatment, et 
cetera, give a sort of primer on it, and then give them a second 
instruction that says, "You're not instructed to determine 
whether the physicians were legally negligent at this time." 
We haven't been presented with evidence regarding whether or 
not they actually were, just --
THE COURT: But say what about -- what was the --
COURT CLERK: I mean you'd have to give them sort of a 
watered down instruction on what negligence is. You were 
injured. Your injury was caused by the actions of the other 
party. 
THE COURT: Hang on a just a second. I'm going to do 
this. I'm going to --
(Short recess taken) 
(Back on the record in open court) 
COURT CLERK: This Court is now in session. You may 
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1 remain seated. 
2 I THE COURT: Are we still on the record, Marlene? 
3 COURT CLERK: We are. 
4 THE COURT: We're just about ready, but the jury has all 
5 asked if they could go home, and frankly, I don't blame them. 
6 It's no fault of anyone in particular, but it's 4 o'clock. It 
7 would take us a half an hour, at least, to instruct, half an hour 
8 or more to argue. They wouldn't even begin deliberation until 
9 probably after 5 o'clock. So do any of you object strenuously if 
10 we do that? 
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: No, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Counsel? I know you were anxious to finish, 
13 but do you mind if we do that? 
14 MR. NAEGLE: Your call, Judge. 
15 ' THE COURT: The reason -- another reason, too, is that 
16 if we force them against their will to stay here, who knows what 
17 will happen. 
18 MR. ORITT: Right. 
19 THE COURT: How fast they'll deliberate and which of you 
20 might be penalized or be the object of their frustration, so I 
21 think that's what we'll do. We'll have them come back at 9 
22 o'clock. Bring them back in, though, Deputy, so we can admonish 
23 them again, and then we'll hopefully be able to finish everything 
24 tonight here so that all we need to do is instruct and argue 




























MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, while we're waiting for 
them, can I say something? I did not in the rush that we were in 
in the chambers get a chance to address any of my special 
instructions. 
THE COURT: We'll do that after they leave. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise for the jury. 
(Jury enters courtroom) 
COURT BAILIFF: Please be seated. 
THE COURT: For the record, the jury is back. Members 
of the jury, I apologize again for keeping you waiting. We're 
not quite yet ready yet with the instructions, and I know that 
you're anxious to leave here. So the bailiff had indicated that 
some of you, at least, had asked if you couldn't just go home for 
the day. So that's what we'll do. 
We'll have you come back at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning, 
and by then we will be ready to read those instructions and then 
hear the attorney's closing statements, and finish the trial in 
this case. So remember, please, my admonitions again. Don't 
discuss the case amongst yourselves, have no contact with any of 
the parties or participants at all. Don't do your own research, 
don't attempt to look this up. Don't discuss it with your family 
or friends, neighbors, acquaintances. You can do that just as 
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1 That instruction as it's worded there was included in the 
2 stipulated -- the amended stipulated instructions. 
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's fine, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: So you're not objecting to it now, are you, 
5 Mr. Hobbs? 
6 MR. HOBBS: Well, I'm reading what she submitted with 
7 I the motion as opposed to the stipulated instruction. I'm fine 
8 with the -- No. 20. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. So is Ms. Burningham? 
10 MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, you. Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Great. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: Then No. 2, discovery of injury. 
13 That's a key phrase. I think we need an instruction on that, and 
14 I think my instruction states the law accurately, but -- and 
15 actually it was a revised instruction. That's the plan of the 
16 original one. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. The -- part of that instruction, 
18 Counsel, is given in substance in other instructions about the 
19 need to discover the legal injury. The part that concerned me 
20 and the reason I didn't include it was on the first page where it 
21 talks about that Mr. Daniels must have learned that he was 
22 injured by radiation and the administration of brachytherapy 
23 being the legal cause of his injuries, I don't agree. We've --
24 I -- we've discussed that, but just so that you'll be aware, 
25 I that's why I rejected that instruction. 
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1 MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you, your Honor. Then No. 3 is 
2 constructive notice of injury. I think that the evidence 
3 requires that this instruction be given because -- well, 
4 there's an alternative. I think either that we have an 
5 instruction that we tell the jury that there's no evidence that 
6 Mrs. -- Mr. Daniels read any of the records, and so they should 
7 be not even allowed into evidence, or that we give the jury an 
8 instruction on constructive knowledge because they're saying, 
9 "Well, in the records it says this. In the records it says 
10 this," and yet there's no evidence that he ever got those 
11 records. Dr. Mintz testified during the entire time until he 
12 was transferred to the University of Utah, he never got those 
13 records. So I don't see why we can't have constructive notice. 
14 THE COURT: Well, the reason that I didn't include 
15 Plaintiff's special instruction No. 3 is because -- and it's for 
16 the same reason that I talked about earlier with respect to some 
17 of the defendant's instructions, and that is it's certainly true 
18 that if Mr. Daniels didn't see those medical records then he 
19 can't be charged with the information that's in there. 
20 MS. BURNINGHAM: Right. 
21 THE COURT: That's something that the plaintiff would --
22 and I'm sure will argue to the jury, but I don't know why I need 
23 to tell the jury that. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: All right. 
25 THE COURT: It's a common sense argument that you can 
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1 make, because the other instructions make it clear that it's what 
2 Mr. Daniels knew that counts, not what was in those separate 
3 documents. So that's why I didn't give it. It's not incorrect, 
4 but it just doesn't seem to me that it's something we need to 
5 give. 
6 MS. BURNINGHAM: All right. Your Honor, should I 
7 defer -- No. 5 and 6 are cause in fact and legal cause 
8 respectively, and I don't know what you've determined to be the 
9 appropriate term in your instructions instead of negligence, or 
10 if you've decided anything on that ground. Maybe we can defer 
11 that until I -- you tell us what you've decided. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MS. BURNINGHAM: And just go to No. 6. 
14 MR. HOBBS: I'm sorry, just to be clear, your Honor, I'm 
15 not sure it was clear that we object to the cause in fact 
16 instruction on the basis that it also incorporates a legal 
17 determination of negligence. 
18 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
19 THE COURT: You're talking about Plaintiff's special 
20 I instruction No. 5? 
21 MR. HOBBS: Whatever cause in fact is. 
22 MS. BURNINGHAM: No. 4 is --
23 THE COURT: Oh, No. 4. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: No. 4 it cause in fact and No. 5 is 
25 legal cause, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. We'll have to come back to that one 
2 because I think I understand the course I'm going to take, but --
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
4 THE COURT: -- go ahead. 
5 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. So No. 6 is risks of radiation, 
6 and I assume, your Honor, that you're saying that can be made 
7 through argument as well, side effects vis-a-vis an injury caused 
8 by negligence. 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. Counsel, anything else with respect 
10 to those, and then I'm going to tell you what I've decided, and 
11 then we'll make a final packet. I'll have it available for you 
12 tomorrow. Go ahead. 
13 MS. BURNINGHAM: There's a couple more. There's 
14 agency --
15 MR. HOBBS: I'm sorry, are --
16 MS. BURNINGHAM: Oh, I'm sorry, were you --
17 MR. HOBBS: -- we giving up on risk of radiation 
18 instruction or --
19 MS. BURNINGHAM: I don't know. 
20 MR. HOBBS: Do you agree that that's not to be 
21 submitted? 
22 MS. BURNINGHAM: No, I was waiting for Judge Reese's 
23 response, and I guess I didn't (inaudible) response. 
24 THE COURT: Well, okay, here's what I'll do. 
25 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
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1 I THE COURT: I guess that's what I need to do then is --
2 my intent -- and from what we discussed in the office, I'm 
3 concerned about the fact that we haven't defined negligence. I 
4 can imagine that it's possible as the jury deliberates, because 
5 that word is used in the instructions, I believe it's No. 23 and 
6 No. 24 --
7 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. There's one more as well, your 
8 Honor. 
9 THE COURT: At least No. 23 and 24, that they're going 
10 to have a question about what it means. But if we define it, and 
11 I it is a term of art, there's a lot of information the jury is not 
12 going to have, and it opens a can of worms that I just don't know 
13 what to do about, frankly. 
14 If we were to define negligence and require both 
15 I parties to deal with the issue of negligence -- wrongdoing by the 
16 doctors, breach of care, legal causation, or proximate causation, 
17 we may as well have combined the trial and tried it all at once, 
18 I and clearly the statute -- the law contemplates severing the 
19 trials and talking -- or dealing only with the statute of 
20 limitations issue, which is what we've chosen to do. 
21 So I don't intend to define negligence. I don't know 
22 how we can do it and make sense of -- and let the jury make any 
23 sense of what we've -- what they've heard in the last two days. 
24 So that's my inclination. Now Ms. Burningham, go ahead and 
25 address that, if you want to, make a record for what you want 
-478-
1 to say. 
2 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I would just wonder what you're 
3 going to say, and I think it's three jury instructions instead of 
4 negligence, do you have that -- or will that be tomorrow that we 
5 will have that, or --
6 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to offer anything other 
7 than the word "negligence" and use it as it's used in this 
8 packet. I don't intend to define it. The -- I looked through 
9 the cases to see if I could find a suitable synonym or another 
10 phrase that might work. There's nothing that I can see in the 
11 cases. Wrongdoing is not a synonym that implies some sort of 
12 intentional misconduct, and I just can't find a suitable 
13 alternative for the word "negligence." 
14 As I said, if we define it, then there are -- there's a 
15 lot of information the jury would need to understand what 
16 negligence is, and they haven't heard it and they won't hear it, 
17 at least not at this trial. Maybe they will eventually, but not 
18 at this trial. I agree there's a problem, but I just don't know 
19 how to do it. 
20 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, thank you. All I'd say was 
21 that I think that's the crux of the matter, and the reason why 
22 the defense hasn't made their case because you need to define 
23 negligence for the jury, otherwise --
24 THE COURT: That's the big issue. 
25 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's the big issue. I think cause 
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1 and cause in fact does it, but I'll go on to risks of radiation. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: Just -- did you want to tell us why 
4 you decided not to give risks of radiation, that we can make 
5 that as an argument? I assume that would be your reason. That's 
6 No. 7 -- 6, I'm sorry. 
7 I THE COURT: Is there something more you wanted to say 
8 about why you think that it should be received? 
9 MS. BURNINGHAM: No. No. So just to make clear, you've 
10 ruled that that won't be --
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, yes. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. Then agency, I guess you assume 
13 I that that's not necessary. I mean they're going to apply this 
14 law as to both defendants; is that right? It doesn't matter that 
15 Dr. Hayes --
16 THE COURT: I'm not sure what you're referring to when 
17 you say agency. 
18 MS. BURNINGHAM: It's No. 7. 
19 THE COURT: I don't even have a No. 7. 
20 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I'm just worried -- my concern is 
21 that Dr. Hayes was the employee of Gamma West, and I guess their 
22 decision will apply to both defendants; is that correct? I mean 
23 can we just assume that or stipulate that as a matter of law? 
24 MR. HOBBS: We're not stipulating to that, your Honor, 
25 but in any case, I think it's cumulative of the other 
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1 your Honor. I just -- I think he initially agreed, and the 
2 dispute was on January versus all of 2001. 
3 THE COURT: In terms of the --
4 MR. HOBBS: Is it a MUJI instruction, did you say? 
5 MS. BURNINGHAM: I thought so, because I think you 
6 suggested it, and then I -- I had never seen it before, and I had 
7 a problem with the January limitation. 
8 MR. HOBBS: I don't know if the jury needs to be 
9 instructed on how they are to view the evidence. I -- the dates 
10 are what they are. 
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, I'll make that in argument, your 
12 Honor. It's fine. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. I don't see it. I'm going back 
14 through the stipulated instructions revised, the ones that I 
15 pulled out that I thought were -- that were duplicitous, and I 
16 don't see anything like that, and I don't remember seeing that 
17 from anything that was submitted in either the first set of 
18 stipulated instructions or the second. I don't see it. 
19 MS. BIRMINGHAM: Okay. That's fine, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. My intent, then, would be to 
21 give all of the instructions that were included in your packet 
22 with the modification that we talked about in my office to 
23 No. 23, I believe it is, that would add the words in that second 
24 full sentence -- well, I'll read the second sentence. "Instead, 
25 discovery of an injury occurs when a plaintiff knows or through 
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1 the use of reasonable diligence should know that he suffered a 
2 physical injury, and that this injury was caused by or may be 
3 attributable to negligence." I think that comes directly from 
4 one of the cases we've talked about, so I've made that change, 
5 but otherwise I think everything would be the same as we have 
6 discussed, including no definition of negligence, and as a -- and 
7 because of that, no talk about causation, legal or otherwise. 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, so if I may ask, so I 
9 assume that precludes in closing us to address what negligence 
10 means. Can we do that? We certainly should be able to say, 
11 "This is what negligence is," because --
12 MR. HOBBS: Again, your Honor, we object on the same 
13 grounds. She can't go in the back door to try to get in an 
14 instruction or advice to the jury when the Court's not allowed 
15 it. 
16 THE COURT: Well, but, Counsel, it just goes to my --
17 because what are we going to say? When we argue the instructions 
18 to the jury, the word "negligence" is used. You've used it. The 
19 cases use it. How are we going to talk about it? 
20 MS. BURNINGHAM: This is bizarre, your Honor. 
21 MR. NAEGLE: Your Honor, why don't we wait for a 
22 question from the jury? Maybe this is -- we're making a mountain 
23 out of a molehill and they're not going to even address that. If 
24 they have a question, bring it out to us and let's address it. 
25 THE COURT: But what is -- what can the plaintiff say, 
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1 then, in her closing about negligence, a word used several times 
2 in the instructions. 
3 MR. NAEGLE: Well, I would venture to see where she's 
4 going to stop her definition of negligence, because it's 
5 obviously going to have to include standard of care, what another 
6 doctor would have done under the same circumstances, what doses 
7 were given, and what time periods. Where does she stop? 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Where do I begin? I mean --
9 THE COURT: I would sustain an objection to talking 
10 about negligence to that degree. I think that's what I have to 
11 I do to be consistent. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: I just want to make sure I don't step 
13 on anyone's toes here, your Honor. So I can use the word 
14 "negligence," but I can't define it in any way in closing? 
15 THE COURT: Counsel, what's your thought there? 
16 MR. NAEGLE: She can use it the same way I can use it 
17 and say that, you know, the definition of — what starts the 
18 statute of limitations running is this, and the last thing is 
19 that they have knowledge or has become aware that this may -- was 
20 I or may have been caused by negligence period. 
21 MS. BURNINGHAM: We're using negligence to define 
22 negligence. This is bizarre. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: This really is, and --



























don't know how to do it without -- if we tell the jury all of 
those things or define negligence, then there's a lot of 
information they're going to need to decide whether there was 
negligence, so --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, I just want to make one 
more thing on the record --
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: -- for appeal or whatever. I just 
think the decisions 
incorrect, and this 
be changed because i 
THE COURT: 
leave it. I'll have 
tomorrow. We'll sta 
argue to the jury. 
and the way they're interpreted are 
is not how the law is, and if it is it should 
t's very, very incorrect. 
Okay. Thank you. Well, with that we'll 
a final packet of instructions on your desk 
rt immediately with the instructions and then 







included as well. 
MR. HOBBS: 
MR. WRIGHT: 
Yeah, I was going to ask about the special 
I'll have the special verdict form included 
Thank you. 1 
I'll use the -- I'll have the verdict form 
Thank you. 1 
Thank you, your Honor. 1 
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1 MS. BURNINGHAM: Thank you, your Honor. Which -- yeah, 
2 which one? Is it going to be a combo or what? I mean you don't 
3 know which one? 
4 THE COURT: I'll have it there, and then I guess we can 
5 take a few minutes, if you want to object to it. We can talk 
6 about that -- that one issue tomorrow morning. 
7 | MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll adjourn until just a few 
9 minutes before 9 tomorrow morning. 
10 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, your Honor. 
11 MR. ORITT: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 I (Second day of trial concluded) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on January 17, 2008) 
THE COURT: Are we on the record, Marlene? 
COURT CLERK: We are. 
THE COURT: Counsel, after our discussion last night, I 
was concerned, as you know, that we hadn't defined negligence. 
It seems to me that it has to. I know that Mr. Naegle, you 
disagreed and thought that we ought to just leave it to the jury 
to use what they may understand the word "negligence" to mean, 
and then not deal with it unless they ask a question, but I'm 
concerned about doing that. 
So the way I thought to address it was to add to the 
instructions a No. 24-B. There's No. 24-A. It just got 
misnumbered, but it tells -- it uses the definition of the word 
"negligence" that the plaintiff had provided. However, it tells 
the jury they don't have to themselves decide whether -- what 
the -- how the plaintiff was treated was negligence, but they 
have to decide whether or not the plaintiff himself was aware of 
sufficient facts that would allow him to believe that he may have 
been treated negligently. 
I use the phrase, "that he may have had a claim for 
negligence," the last few words of instruction 24-B because it 
ties into the instruction that I've already decided to give in 
No. 23, which says in the second to the last sentence, "This 
means that the plaintiff must be aware of facts that would lead 
-493-
1 an ordinary person using reasonable diligence to conclude that a 
2 claim for negligence may exist." So I tried to tie those two 
3 I instructions together. 
4 I don't believe the law -- isn't the law in the State of 
5 Utah that the jury at a trial like this has to decide that the 
6 defendant was negligent, but they have to understand what the 
7 word "negligent" is -- means in order to fulfill their 
8 responsibilities. So I've given you a packet with that 
9 instruction included, also the instruction approved last evening 
10 that the plaintiff had asked for. I've used the special verdict 
11 form provided by the defense. Counsel, we need to get going, but 
12 is there anything else either of you would like to say, any final 
13 exceptions you'd like to make? Any glaring errors? Mr. Hobbs? 
14 MR. HOBBS: Yes, your Honor, just for the record we're 
15 I going to object to instruction 24-B. There's been no evidence 
16 provided to the jury regarding negligence as it's defined here. 
17 I understand the Court's tried to be very vague as to the 
18 definition of negligence, but I think it's prejudicial. It's 
19 I going to confuse the jury as to what their duty may be. 
20 If we're going to go with this instruction, however, 
21 your Honor, I think the last sentence should be amended. That 
22 sentence reads, "But you must still decide if the plaintiff was 
23 or should have been aware of sufficient facts to conclude that he 
24 may have a claim -- may have had a claim for negligence." 



























MR. HOBBS: May I suggest that it read, "You must still 
decide if the plaintiff was or should have reasonably been aware 
of sufficient facts on or before May 6th, 2001, to conclude that 
he may have had a claim for negligence." 
THE COURT: So you'd like the date added? 
MR. HOBBS: Yes, and I know that that last sentence is 
somewhat cumulative of the other instruction or part of the other 
instruction. Whether we just simply exclude that last sentence 
or not, I don't know which is the best course. 
THE COURT: Now the jury is told in two separate 
instructions at least -- No. 21 and 22 -- that the operative date 
is May the 6th. 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that if any of the acts or occurrences 
took place that Mr. Daniels knew or should have know about before 
May 6th, then the -- they should find in effect for the defense. 
Do you think we need to tell them a third time? 
MR. HOBBS: Well, I don't know if they need to be told a 
third time. Maybe this last sentence is duplicative or 
cumulative of other instruction. If they're told that he should 
have been aware of sufficient facts to conclude that he may have 
had a claim for negligence on this instruction, they may without 
a time frame, I --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: I don't know what they'll think. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, thank you, Counsel. I'll note your 
2 exception, but I think that it's clear from the other 
3 instructions. We ask the jury to look at them and construe them 
4 all together, and -- so I think it should be clear. 
5 MR. NAEGLE: And I assume that this instruction does not 
6 give plaintiff's Counsel con -- the right to go into what 
7 negligence means any more than what your instruction has said? 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, other than the definition. All of the 
9 jury -- I make it clear to the jury that they don't have to 
10 themselves believe that the defendant's conduct is negligent, but 
11 just what did Mr. Daniels know about their conduct. In other 
12 words, the main thrust of the plaintiff's argument, or part of 
13 it, at least, seems to be that we knew about an injury, more or 
14 less -- just paraphrasing -- but we didn't know that it was 
15 because someone had been negligent, and I think we have to tell 
16 them what negligence is. So yes, you're right, I would agree. 
17 MR. NAEGLE: Okay. So we're both --
18 THE COURT: Negligence is what we've defined it to be, 
19 but the jury themselves doesn't have to be convinced that there 
20 was a breach of the standard of care, there was causation. 
21 MR. NAEGLE: I don't want Ms. Burningham to go into, you 
22 know, breach of standard of care means this, causation means 
23 this. 
24 MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, I will not use breach of 


























THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Or (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: Yes, I agree, Ms. Naegle, that would be the 
case . 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. HOBBS: Your Honor, I'm sorry, if you'll indulge me. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. HOBBS: I have a concern with the second sentence. 
The second sentence states that, "You, the jury, have not been 
presented with any evidence regarding whether the defendants' 
actions were negligent; therefore, that issue it not before you 
at this time." I'm worried that going onto the last sentence 
that the jury may then be confused that they need to find that 
Mr. Daniels was or may -- reasonably should have been aware of 
a claim against these defendants rather than any party, any 
healthcare provider, which is the law under McDougal, that they 
needed to identify Gamma West Brachytherapy and/or Dr. Hayes, 
and/or their therapy. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm just not quite sure I understand 
the concern there. What I tried to do is tell them, "You haven't 
heard whether the defendants were negligent or not. We've 
haven't tried to -- we haven't gone into that issue, but" --
well, okay. Counsel, anything else? 



























second and third sentence is constructed goes against McDougal 
in that it instructs the jury that they may have to find that 
Mr. Daniels knew or reasonably should have known of a claim 
against these defendants . 
THE COURT: Well, but again, if you read the 
instructions in their entirety and construe them as a whole, we 
make it clear -- let's see, it's in No. 24, I believe, "An 
injured person need not determine the identity of the person 
responsible for his injury to determine that he has been injured 
and that the injury was possibly tied to negligence. 
MR. HOBBS: Well --
THE COURT: Counsel, again, I'll note your exception, 
but I think that instruction takes care of it for you. 
Anything else, Ms. Burningham? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, your Honor. I would just say that 
that is -- I'm pleased with that instruction. I'd rather have 
had the ones that we proffered, but I think that all of his 
worries are taken care of by your instruction that says you don't 
need to know the identity of the party, so --
THE COURT: I agree. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you have any of your own -- other last 
exceptions you want to put on the record before we --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, just on the special verdict form, 



























THE COURT: Go ahead and put them on the record now. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. Yeah. 
THE COURT: I looked at yours again, gone -- went over 
it carefully this morning, and I felt that this was the one 
that's most in line with the law. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay. Let me -- is this the one he 
gave us? 
MR. ORITT: Well, I don't know. I haven't seen it. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Do we have your special verdict form, 
your Honor? I'm trying to --
MR. WRIGHT: Yes, we do. 
MR. NAEGLE: It's the last page of the --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Oh, okay. I --
THE COURT: Very last page. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Let me just look at that. I'm sorry, 
your Honor. I just quickly read that, your Honor, and I think 
that's okay, but again, my objections -- I mean in light of what 
we've discussed, my objections for the record are that in our 
special verdict -- and I think this is the law -- we specifically 
identify that he has to know about Gamma West Brachytherapy's 
role in the negligence. I don't think that the case we've been 
talking about, the one that holds that you don't have to know the 
identity of the tortfeasor can be extended to include you don't 
have to know what the cause in fact of the malpractice was, and 




























THE COURT: I mean that's been your objection all 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, 
THE COURT: -- and I understand it, and it's an 
interesting legal issue, and maybe someday it will be settled for 
us definitively, but the --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes. 
MR. HOBBS: I think it has been settled for us 
definitively, your Honor, under Collins vs. Wilson. There the 
Court said you don't need to know the specific event. That's --
in Collins the plaintiff in that case was also asking for a 
special verdict form that identified the event, and that's not 
the law. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOBBS: I think your Honor --
THE COURT: Well, thank you. Ms. Burningham, did you 
have anything else to put on the record? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: No, thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Now Counsel, we'll bring the 
jury back. I'll read these instructions to them, and I don't 
have any problem at all, if I read them wrong -- in a way that 
you think is erroneous or if the numbering is off from the one 
that I've got versus the one that you have, or something -- we've 
done our best to put them together, but if you see a glaring 
error, I don't have a problem if you raise your hand and approach 
Tab 2 
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to ask him, but you don't remember that he debrided -- do 
what the word "debnde" means9 
Yes, I do. 
Okay. You don't believe he debrided the wound9 
No, he did not. 
Or deroofed the wound9 
No, he did not. 
Okay. Now you stopped the radiation treatments as soon 
injury occurred, didn't you9 
I didn't. 
How -- do you remember signing an affidavit a couple of 
this case? 1 
Yes, I did. 
Do you remember in one of those affidavits you indicated 
stopped the radiation treatment9 1 
A. I stopped it, but I wasn't in charge of the radiation. 
Q. It's true, however, that when this injury occurred, when 
you started to feel these vibrations or tmglings -- whatever you 
want to call them -- and that this injury occurred, you called 
the University of Utah when you were receiving these external 
beam radiation treatments and told them about this problem, 
didn't you9 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Mr. Daniels, let me show you Defendant's Exhibit No. 21 



























MR. ORITT: Your Honor, before we go any further with 
this, I think this is part of the motion -- order in limine. 
THE COURT: Right. It certainly is. Counsel, do you 
want to approach for a minute? 
MR. NAEGLE: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
(Side bar conference. Microphone turned off, Counsel 
are whispering and portions are inaudible) 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) it is, Mr. Oritt, but didn't 
we agree that if there was some reason to bring it in for 
impeachment that would be permissible (inaudible)? 
MR. ORITT: I am. I'm concerned about (inaudible). My 
concern is this. For -- yeah, okay. Impeachment is one thing, 
but I know that they have blow-ups and they want to show the jury 
(inaudible) I don't believe it's admissible as evidence. 
Impeachment to show it and to read from it is one thing, but 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yeah, I don't know that I would want the 
whole thing coming in because it does show -- it does have 
information that I wouldn't want the jury to know about, but to 
use it to impeach him (inaudible). I suppose if he absolutely 
denies it and you can't -- after being presented with it, that 
might be a different issue, but they can certainly cross examine 
(inaudible) using this document. 
MR. ORITT: Okay. My concern, though, is it -- also 



























a determination of what's coming in. 
MR. NAEGLE: I won't use it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor, only -- I would just for 
the record indicate that this is not a verified complaint. 
MR. NAEGLE: Whatever that means. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 
{Back on the record in open court) 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: Mr. Daniels, I'd like you to look at 
paragraph 15. This is a complaint -- the original complaint tha 
you and your wife filed in this case; is it not? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. All right. I want you to just read to yourself 
paragraph 15 for a moment. 
A. (Witness reads document). 
Q. Are you finished? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Daniels, isn't it true that you sued the University 
of --
MR. ORITT: Objection. Your Honor, if this is used 
for impeachment that's one thing, but the paragraph that he just 
had to refresh his recollection has nothing to do with the 



























THE COURT: Yeah. I'll sustain the objection. The 
original question was didn't you contact the university and stop 
or after you felt this didn't you contact them. If there's 
something in here that would --
MR. NAEGLE: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: -- refresh his recollection on that issue I 
would permit you to cross examine it. 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: Mr. Daniels, isn't it true that in 
paragraph 15 of this complaint it indicates that you in fact 
contacted the University of Utah and complained to them about the 
external beam radiation treatments that you were receiving during 
the first course of treatments, that would be the February and 











I talked to Dr. Patton first after his treatment. I did 
them. 
Okay. That would be during the February/March 2001 time 
Yes. 
You complained to him, apparently, about these 1 
ts? 
Just about that sensation on my left hip. 1 
Okay. He did not alter or discontinue the treatments? 



























Q. Okay. That, you felt, was in error? 
A. What do you mean by that? 
Q. You sued them because they did not alter or stop the 
treatments. 
MR. ORITT: Objection. It's vague as to time. It's a 
continuing attempt to get in information that has been ordered to 
be kept out, I believe, unless for impeachment and it's not 
impeachment. 
MR. NAEGLE: Your Honor, it is impeachment. 
THE COURT: Well, let's have you approach again, 
Counsel. 
(Side bar conference. Microphone turned off, Counsel 
are whispering and portions are inaudible) 
MR. ORITT: Look -- well, first of all, clearly 
they're doing everything they can to get in the fact they sued 
the university. Now as far as impeachment, he said, "You 
contacted the university and complained," and that Ralph 
explained he talked to Patton, he said he had this feeling and 
Patton didn't do anything. That's it. Where's the impeachment? 
Where is the relevance of the fact that subsequently he sued the 
university down the road, not during this time. 
MR. NAEGLE: This is knowledge (inaudible) knew about in 
February and March of 2001, which is the very guts of this case, 
that he called the university and complained about the external 
beam radiation in February and March of 2001, and then sued them 
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1 because they did not do anything about his complaints in February 
2 and March of 2001. 
3 MR. ORITT: The only complaint that he has testified 
4 to — not even a complaint -- was that he had this sensation, 
5 what does it mean, basically, and Patton said -- which we'll find 
6 out later -- Patton said, "It's nothing. You shouldn't -- you 
7 can't feel anything," period. Then two years, three years later, 
8 whatever, there's a lawsuit. I mean they're trying to bootstrap 
9 (inaudible) it's irrelevant and it's prejudicial. 
10 THE COURT: One of the concerns -- well, the concern we 
11 had was (inaudible) the evidence that the university was sued and 
12 then (inaudible) and that (inaudible) jury -- concerned the jury 
13 because why was it dismissed. 
14 MR. ORITT: Exactly. 
15 THE COURT: Was it the same issue that we have here. 
16 Just to know that he was upset with their treatment and 
17 eventually brought suit because of their treatment, would that be 
18 prejudicial? 
19 MR. ORITT: Well, first off, the way it's being couched, 
20 I mean saying that he complained when he just testified he talked 
21 to Patton about it. Now he's using (inaudible) complaint saying 
22 in response his complaints (inaudible). He just -- when George 
23 I asked him, "Did you complain to him," he said, "I don't 
24 (inaudible) that." He didn't even ask him what Patton said back. 



























so the bootstrapping is, "Okay, so there's a complaint here." 
Then we have a complaint later on where he references his 
complaints. That is not doing anything. Okay. So I understand 
what he's saying, but you know --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Your Honor -- go ahead. 
MR. NAEGLE: The bottom line, however, is that this is 
knowledge he had sufficient to make the call and complain in 
February and March. The whole issue in this case is when did he 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, but — yeah, in that part (inaudible) 
but why is it important for them to know that he sued the 
university? 
MR. NAEGLE: Because he followed up on his knowledge in 

















With a lawsuit. 
Okay. I'll (inaudible). 
The problem is --
re make -- now he' 
and the 
s making 
I understand that, that's 
so much more where people are sayin 
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MR. ORITT: -- it's prejudicial because it's not telling 
the story right, and that's why we (inaudible) keep the complaint 
out. 
THE COURT: I'll let them ask him about the suit. I 
won't let you introduce the evidence -- the complaint, go into 
why it was dismissed. Those are the issues that I'm most 
concerned about. Okay. You can ask him -- you can ask him if in 
fact he did sue the University of Utah, and then you're stuck 
with his answer. 
(Back on the record in open court) 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: Mr. Daniels, let me just ask you another 
could of questions and then I'll -- let's move on. If this 
complaint is accurate, you had knowledge in February and March of 
2001 sufficient to cause you to call the University of Utah -- to 
talk to Dr. Patton at the University of Utah and complain to him 
about this injury; isn't that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as a result you ended up filing a lawsuit against 
them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. Now Dr. Allen actually in this appointment 
that you had with him then said, "I suggest you go see someone 

























A. Late March, right. 
Q. You also knew this was, I mean, not normal. Earlier in 
that same deposition you indicated so. Do you agree that you 
clearly knew this was not normal? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But at that point your testimony is that you had no 
thought or indication that there may be a connection between the 
external beam radiation and Ralph's condition because you never 
asked Dr. Mintz about it and you never asked Dr. Allen about it, 
and they never told -- talked to you about it? 
A. Correct. I didn't think --
Q. Pardon me? 
A. I just didn't think anything -- you know, I just knew 
something was wrong with him. 
Q. Did you -- Ralph told us in his deposi -- in his 
testimony earlier that he had called Dr. Patton at the University 
of Utah during this -- the time period when he could start to 
feel the radiation treatments and he had this breakdown. Were 
you part of that conversation? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he talk to you later about the conversation that he 
had? 
A. He told me he had called -- talked to Dr. Patton. 
Q. Okay. Eventually you and your husband both brought a 



























beam radiation treatment, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Maybe this would be the appropriate time. 
Counsel had asked that I take judicial notice and advise the jury 
that this lawsuit was filed in --
MS. BURNINGHAM: December 1st, 2003, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The lawsuit was filed in December 1st, 2003. 
I'll take notice of that fact and inform the jury of that 
stipulated date. Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: You also jointly sued them, you and your 
husband sued the University of Utah because they failed to 
acknowledge and change or discontinue external beam treatment in 
response to Mr. Daniels' complaint during the first course of 
therapy. The first course of therapy was February and March of 
2001, right? 
A. His first course of ther --
Q. Of external. 
A. Of external was in March, yes. 
Q. February and March. 
THE COURT: It's kind of a compound question, Counsel. 
Why don't you break that down so she can answer it separately. 
Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: The first course of treatment for 
external beam radiation started in February and went through 
March? 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. So that would be the first course, right? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. And your complaint against the University of Utah states 
5 that they failed to acknowledge and change or discontinue the 
6 external beam treatment in response to Ralph's complaint during 
7 the first -- to them during the first course of radiation 
8 treatment, right? 
9 A. I don't remember that. 
10 Q. You don't remember --
11 A. (Inaudible) I don't remember that exact wording, no. 
12 Q. Understood, but that was the basis -- that was basically 
13 the complaint that you filed against the University of Utah was 
14 that they excessively radiated Ralph and that they failed to 
15 alter or change external beam radiation treatment in response 
16 I to his complaints in February and March of 2001, right? 
17 A. All I remember was the radiation. I don't remember all 
18 the other wording you've put in that. 
19 I Q. Okay. Do you deny that that's the complaint that you've 
20 filed? 
21 A. No, I don't deny it. I don't remember all the wording. 
22 Q. Okay. Let's go back to when Dr. Mintz took you from --
23 took you and Ralph from his office to Salt Lake Regional Medical 
24 Center to debride the wound. Ralph stayed in for a day or two or 
25 three? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. You were dissatisfied with the conditions there at Salt 
3 Lake Regional Medical Center? 
4 A. Somewhat that day, yes, that time. 
5 Q. You thought the conditions were unsanitary and made his 
6 I wound worse? 
7 A. They were unsanitary, yes. 
8 Q. Okay. Did you also think that they made the wound 
9 worse? 
10 A. I didn't know that. 
11 Q. All right. Did you suggest that in a lawsuit against 
12 Salt Lake Regional Medical Center? 
13 A. The first time he was in there? 
14 Q. Yes. 
15 A. No, not the first time he was there. 
16 Q. Okay. Were the conditions the same the first time as 
17 the second time he was there? 
18 A. We were in so many times, you've got to tell me which --
19 Q. Well, I'm talking about the March 21st, 22nd, 23rd. 
20 A. They were not clean then. 
21 Q. Okay. Similarly, they were not clean when he was 
22 readmitted? 
23 A. Correct. 
24 Q. Now it is true, Mrs. Daniels, that you suspected that 
25 I his injury was caused by external beam radiation by mid March, 
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1 didn't you? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. You took photographs to document his wound in mid March, 
4 didn't you? 
5 A. Mid March or late March. 
6 Q. You were extremely concerned about Ralph's deterioration 
7 and his health. You thought he was going to die in the mid 
8 March, late March time period? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. You were very dissatisfied with the care that you 
11 received at Salt Lake Regional Center in mid March? 
12 A. I wasn't extremely dissatisfied then, no, but wasn't 
13 happy with it. 
14 Q. You were not happy that University of Utah didn't alter 
15 or stop the radiation treatments after Ralph complained to them 
16 in February and March about those treatments? 
17 A. No, I don't remember ever --
18 Q. Well, that's in your complaint. 
19 A. Okay. 
20 THE COURT: I'm sorry, did you answer? 
21 THE WITNESS: I don't remember ever saying I was 
22 dissatisfied with them. 
23 Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: Well, you were a plaintiff at that point 
24 in this lawsuit. You're not a plaintiff now, right? 



























Q. You were a plaintiff when you and Ralph sued the 
University of Utah Medical Center for excessive radiation 
treatments and for failure to alter or stop the radiation 
treatments in response to Ralph's complaints in February and 
March of 2001. You were a plaintiff then, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. That was your complaint? 
A. Okay. 
Q. I mean you don't deny that? 
A. I just do not remember. 
Q. Ralph then went back and continued the radiation 
treatments. His doctors at the University of Utah, I suppose, 
unless you correct me, told him to go back for treatments; is 
that true? 
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I'm sorry. Was it the doctors at 









told Ralph to go back, to recommence 
day stopping of those treatments? 
No, I 
em, so I 
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believe it was -- Dr. Mintz had had a 
don't know actually who decided. 
































A. Somebody called him, uh-huh, and set up the appointment. 
Q. Then on May 3rd Ralph goes back and talks to Dr. Mintz 
about some more feelings he's having in his left hip area. Were 
you at that appointment with Dr. Mintz? 
A. I probably was, because I went every time. 
Q. What was Ralph complaining of to Dr. Mintz? 
A. On May 3 r d? 
Q. Y e s , on May 3 r d . 
A. Probably anything, a tingling, I -- or a vibration in --
but I don't recall. 
Q . I'm sorry. 
A. I don't recall May 3rd. 
Q. Was there any treatment that Dr. Mintz gave at that 
appointment that you can recall? 
A. I can't even remember May 3rd. There was so many -- I 
don't know which one. We saw so many. 
Q. When is the first time that Dr. Mintz told you that he 
thought that this problem Ralph was having may be related to 
radiation treatment? 
A. It was in 2002. We took him a turkey and he told us 
what he thought they would do. 
Q. Now you testified earlier -- haven't you testified 
prior to this that Dr. Mintz always -- that you always remember 
Dr. Mintz telling you this was caused by radiation? 




























MR. ORITT: Thank you. Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right. Ma'am, you can step down, 
did you have something else, Counsel? 
MR. NAEGLE: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: Okay. Excuse me. 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NAEGLE: 
Q. Yet apparently Ralph was calling the University of Utah, 
someone there, and is complaining about the treatment he's 
receiving in February and March because that's what you and Ralph 
sued them for, right? 
THE COURT: That's a cumbersome and maybe even a 
compound question, Counsel. Why don't you --
MR. NAEGLE: I'll break --
THE COURT: break it down. 
MR. NAEGLE: -- it down. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
Q. BY MR. NAEGLE: Yet you and Ralph sued the University of 
Utah, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where you were -- he was receiving the external beam, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because they did not act appropriately when Ralph called 
and complained to them about his treatment in February and March, 
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correct? 
A. They just told us that he could not feel it. 
Q. That's what your complaint says, correct? 
A. I would have to read my complaint. 
Q. Okay. Do you deny that that's what you and Ralph sued 
the University of Utah for? 
A. Yes. No, it is what we sued them for, radiation, but I 
can't tell you the exact words. 
MR. NAEGLE: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Now do you want to follow that up, Counsel? 
MR. ORITT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Daniels, you can step down. 
THE WITNESS: Do I just leave these here? 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE WITNESS: Do I leave these here? 
THE COURT: Yes, just leave that there. Thank you. 
Does the defendant -- or do the defendants, excuse me, wish to 
call another witness? 
MR. NAEGLE: We do not, your Honor. The defense rests. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel for the plaintiff, do 
you have a witness available? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Yes, we do. I believe we have both 
Dr. Watson and Dr. Allen, and they'll be both very short. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's -- you start with 
whichever one you'd like, then. 
- 4 2 5 -
1 A. Yes, that's what he says in his letter here. 
2 Q. Okay. Now Dr. Patton that you spoke with is one of the 
3 University of Utah doctors who were -- who was administering the 
4 high -- who was administering the external beam radiation doses 
5 that you eventually sued, right? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Sued because he failed to note or acknowledge and then 
8 alter or stop his treatment after Ralph complained to him in 
9 February and March about those treatments, that's why you sued 
10 him, correct? 
11 A. Yes, because of the radiation that he had received. 
12 Q. There's another piece of information that probably led 
13 you to believe in mid March that radiation was the likely cause 
14 of this breakdown is that Ralph was calling Dr. Patton or the 
15 hospital and saying, "Something's wrong here. What are you going 
16 to do about it," right? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. You didn't know anything about those conversations Ralph 
19 was having? 
20 A. I did. He said the tingling, but I didn't assume that 
21 led to the lawsuit. 
22 Q. Now you didn't believe Dr. Saffle when he told you 
23 that -- now what did he tell you? 
24 A. Which time? When? 
25 Q. When you heard him talking to residents. 
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*RULE 51. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY; OBJECTIONS 
(a) Preliminary instructions. After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the 
court may instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of 
proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the cause of action, and the definition of 
terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and 
agreed to by the court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors 
in comprehending the case. 
(b) Interim instructions. During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on 
the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. A party may 
request an interim instruction. 
(c) Final instructions. The court shall instruct the jury at the conclusion of the evidence as 
may be needed. 
(d) Request for instructions. Parties shall file requested jury instructions at the final pretrial 
conference or at any other time directed by the court. If a party relies on a statute, rule or 
case to support or object to a requested instruction, the party shall provide a citation to or a 
copy of the statute, rule or case. The court shall provide the parties with a copy of the 
approved instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. 
(e) Written instructions. Whenever practical, jury instructions should be in writing. At least 
one written copy shall provided to the jury. The court shall provide a written copy to any 
juror who requests one. 
(f) Objections to instructions. Objections to written instructions shall be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an 
opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error 
except to avoid a manifest injustice. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party shall 
identify the matter to which the objection is made and the grounds for the objection. 
(g) Arguments. Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has given 
the jury its final instructions. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if 
the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
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1 MR. NAEGLE: Now he's going to get into colostomy, 
2 I ileosotomy and where's he going to go from there? 
3 MR. ORITT: It's not going to go anywhere from there. 
4 THE COURT: If you're asking it just to show just so the 
5 jury understands why he's informally dressed because he has to 
6 and not because it's out of some disrespect, I'd permit it, but 
7 if we're going to go into a lot more about it --
8 MR. ORITT: No, no, no. That was the only reason. 
9 (Back on the record in open court) 
10 THE COURT: Okay. I'll overrule the objection. Go 
11 ahead, Counsel. 
12 Q. BY MR. ORITT: So Ralph, if you could just -- I just 
13 wonder if you'd explain to the jury why you're so informally 
14 dressed. 
15 A. Because I have a tube in my back and I have double bags 
16 in the front. 
17 Q. What's the benefit of the sweat pants? 
18 A. Well, there's some ease to the sweat pants where jeans 
19 or slacks -- the band waist, I can't bend and --
20 Q. All right. Thanks. Now Ralph, do you recall -- well, 
21 you heard Tracey's testimony about Dr. Saffle's comments? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Do you recall visiting with Dr. Saffle and Tracey 
24 sometime in April of 2002? 



























Q. Do you recall Dr. Saffle making comments about the 
brachytherapy? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What do you recall him saying? 
A. He says, "This man has had brachytherapy and they burned 
the holy Jesus out of him." 
Q. Was anyone else in the room besides you and Dr. Saffle 
and Tracey? 
A. Yes, there was student doctors at the university. 
MR. ORITT: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross examination? 
MR. NAEGLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NAEGLE: 
Q. Mr. Daniels, in that conversation with Dr. Saffle, you 










e facts, didn't you? 
Not at that one, no 
In fact, you did --
he was going to say 
That was later. 
Later? 
Yes. 
How much later? 
I don't know, a few 
-- that time. 
you indicated that Dr. Saffle told 
that it was an infection --
months when they got the paperwork 
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1 sigmoidoscope followed by bronchoscope. Although it 
2 was a bronchoscope, it was not inserted into his 
3 bronchus, and I have records of clinic notes dated 
4 March 19th, March 26th and June 4th, 2003. I have no 
5 record of having seen Mr. Daniels subsequent to that. 
6 Q Okay. Thank you. What I would like to do is 
7 first talk about the rectum and that area as opposed to 
8 the anterior abdomen, okay, so that we can focus on one 
9 area at a time. 
10 Do you recall ever stating to anyone during 
11 your treatment of Mr. Daniels or during your discussion 
12 of his case that this -- that he had the Holy Jesus 
13 burned -out of him or any-thing like t-hat?-
14 A I don't remember saying that, but that sounds 
15 like something I might say. 
16 Q Okay. Can you explain why you might have said 
17 that m this case? 
18 MR. WRIGHT: Objection, speculation. 
19 Q If you recall. 
20 A Well, I have presented Mr. Daniels to 
21 residents and students on a couple of occasions when he 
22 has visited me in clinic, and I have made the point 
23 that although his abdominal wall has been 
24 satisfactorily treated, his rectum is not, at least to 
25 me, a treatable problem because of the obvious fibrosis 
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR 24 
i 
and scar tissue and remaining infection that he has. 
Q And what did you mean by "burned." Did you — 
A Well, I believe that the problems that 
Mr. Daniels exhibits in his rectum and anus are a 
consequence of radiation therapy. 
Q Thank you. Mr. Vasquez, the resident or 
intern at the time of the sigmoidoscopy, testified that 
his rectum was so stenotic that it was very difficult 
to even perform this procedure and you had to — he had 
to use a very small instrument to try to access the 
anus; is that your recollection? 
A That's what it says in this note and that is 
consistent with my memory. 
Q And that stenosis would be part of the 
radiation effects; is that your opinion? 
A I believe so. 
Q So you saw stenosis, you saw fibrotic tissue 
in the rectum area; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And t h a t i s one of the t o x i c e f f e c t s of 
r ad ia t ion ; i s t h a t co r rec t? 
A I be l i eve so . 
Q Did you also note a fistula in the rectal 
area? 
A The fistula was demonstrated on the previous 
JEANETTE LUND, CSR, RPR 25 _ 
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7®Vf|?%|i|^pfivev DeVita, Hell man, Rosenberg, 
'6\i re^erneid ;to'";that for the same reason you just 
xplained to me? 
A. Correct. And the same th ing. They ta lk 
bout IORT and they ta lk about the benef i t of preop 
nemo radiation. 
Q. All r ight . Number s ix , same, the 
beloff, Armitage, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
(Exhibit No. 5 was marked.) 
Q. we' l l mark as Deposition Exhibit No. 5 
CR Practice Guideline on Informed Consent -
adiation Oncology, 2002. You referred to this as 
our opinions. And what was the signif icance of 
hat a r t ic le regarding your opinions? 
A. okay. This is from the American College 
>f Radiology and i t ' s sort of the bible in terms of 
tow to manage. And what th is ta lks about i s 
nformed consent, and par t icu la r ly informing the 
>atient of treatment a l te rnat ives . Nowhere in this 
*ecord that I see that th is pat ient was brought up 
:o the smorgasbord of treatment a l te rna t ives . 
Q. By any physician? 
A. By any physician, r igh t . 
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Q. So are you c r i t i c a l of a l l of his 
treating physicians on informed consent issues? 
A. Well, I wouldn't put i t in — I'm not — 
I would just leave the statement the patient did not 
have a fa i r discussion, apparently, of treatment 
alternatives. He was kind of hustled in th is was 
the treatment and that was tha t . 
Q. You haven't read Ralph Daniels' 
deposition, have you? 
A. I haven't. 
Q. So you don't know what he said about 
whether any physician, including the University of 
Utah physician, informed him of any r isk of 
treatment. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Wel l , object ion. 
Q. Do you, Dr. Kadish? 
A. wel l , I heard from attorney Burningham 
that Mr. Daniels informed her that he was not 
informed of al ternat ive treatments. 
Q. I would assume as an expert witness 
you're not going to rely on hearsay to form an 
opinion, are you? I would assume you would want to 
read the deposition t ranscr ipt which is evidence in 
the case. 
A. You are r ight that tha t ' s a verbal 
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1 opinion. On the other hand, I would attach some 
2 weight to i t . 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 MR. WRIGHT: I'm going to state for the 
5 record, Kay, i f he reviews any other transcript, 
6 including Ralph Daniels, I intend to preserve my 
7 r ight to reopen his deposition. 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's f ine . 
9 MR. WRIGHT: Because we are going to get 
10 a complete deposition upon a l l facts that he's 
11 revi ewed. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's f ine . There's 
13 just two depos, I bel ieve, that he hasn't reviewed 
14 and that was my mistake. 
15 Q. Let me ask you t h i s , Dr. Kadish. Do you 
16 believe that any treatment upon your review of the 
17 medical records that Dr. Hayes or Gamma west 
18 provided to Ralph Daniels in any respect was 
19 w i l l f u l , reckless or in any way that you would 
20 consider gross misconduct? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Do you know what punitive damages are7 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. There is an al legat ion in this case of 
25 punitive damages. Do you believe that any of the 
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1 treatment that Ralph Daniels had from Dr. Hayes or 
2 Gamma West in any way amount to reckless or wanton 
3 disregard for his safety or health? 
4 MS. BURNINGHAM: objection. Let me 
5 state my objection for the record. Insofar as we 
6 have — don't have complete evidence in this case 
7 you have s t i l l got to answer per the judge's order 
8 concerning interrogatory questions. He has not 
9 reviewed those. I 'm going to object that there is 
10 not a complete record subject to those answers that 
11 the court ordered that you provide. 
12 Also, th is ca l ls for a legal conclusion 
13 that I don't know that he's qual i f ied to make. 
14 Q. Go ahead and answer. 
15 A. My assumption is that the doctors who 
16 treated th is pat ient were well-meaning doctors. 
17 They were t ry ing to do what they thought was the 
18 r ight th ing. They may have made mistakes but I 
19 don't look upon these proceedings as discussing some 
20 sort of w i l l f u l , hor r ib le , criminal act iv i ty . 
21 Q. Al l r i g h t . So just based - -
22 understanding Kay's objection, based upon what 
23 you've reviewed, you've seen nothing upon your 
24 review that amounts to w i l l f u l , wanton misconduct or 
25 complete disregard for th is patient 's safety; is 
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that correct? 
A. wel l , I know — 
MS. BURNINGHAM: And compound. 
A. You're drawing me into legalese here 
about the charges and that. I really want to remain 
the doctor and talk about the medical aspect. I'd 
really like to push away from what we're calling it, 
okay? I do have some problems with the way this 
patient was treated and we all know that the patient 
was hurt, so there are some problems. 
I don't --I'm not -- I don't know the 
doctors and I haven't talked to the doctors and I 
usually approach these things with an assumption 
that doctors have taken an oath and they mean to do 
good. 
Q. Thank you. Are there any other texts, 
et cetera, that you have relied on in formulating 
your opinions other than what you've given me? Are 
there any other articles, publications, et cetera? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you understand that the State of 
Utah has a statute on informed consent? 
A. Most states do. 
Have you read Utah's statute? 
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1 Q. Okay. You were also asked for 
2 suggestions for request for production of documents. 
3 Did you give Ms. Burningham suggestions on documents 
4 that she should request from Gamma West? 
5 A. I believe I may have suggested that she 
6 get the isodose plan. 
7 Q. Okay. Did you ask Ms. Burningham to get 
8 any documents from the University of Utah? 
9 A. I believe I requested the radiation 
10 records. 
11 Q. All right. I would assume you met 
12 Ms. Burningham for the first time on this trip, the 
13 last day is yesterday? 
14 A. That is correct. 
15 Q. How many times have you talked to her on 
16 the phone? 
17 A. I can't give you a number. I would say 
18 we've talked maybe a dozen times. 
19 Q. And this may seem like a silly question 
20 but can you decipher what you discussed with her at 
21 various times? 
22 A. I could say we have been talking 
23 strictly business. 
24 Q. During the course of those discussions I 
25 would assume you have described your opinions to her 
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Q. so you would have no idea what it says. 
A. I would --
MS. BURNINGHAM: Don't guess. 
A. I don't know the language of the State 
of Utah's statute on informed consent, r igh t . 
Q. In my hand I 've got some correspondence 
from Ms. Burningham. We'l l mark th is stack as 
Exhibit 6. To your knowledge — I believe there is 
another piece in here that I d idn ' t include that 's 
included in your deposition not ice. But everything 
in the box would be copies of a l l correspondence 
that you've received from Ms. Burningham? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. 
(Exhibit No. 6 was marked.) 
Q. I note that there is an e-mail i n here 
that you were asked back in August of 2004 to 
examine Mr. Daniels. Obviously you have not done 
that . 
A. That is correct . 
Q. Did you ever opine that you would need 
to examine him? 
A. No. 
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1 and maybe even supplemented, extracted, et cetera, 
2 opinions, correct? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Okay. Dr. Kadish, let me ask this. 
5 When you were retained in this case, what were you 
6 asked to do? 
7 A. I believe that I was asked to review the 
8 case and to formulate an opinion about what I 
9 thought of how the pat ient was treated. 
10 Q. And were you asked to give opinions 
11 about how the pat ient was treated from an overall 
12 treatment approach or from a specific radiation 
13 oncology approach? 
14 A. Wel l , I don't remember that i t was so 
15 spelled out l i k e tha t . You know, radiation 
16 oncologists are doctors, f i r s t of a l l , then they're 
17 oncologists, then they ' re radiation oncologists and 
18 I take that very seriously. F i rs t of a l l , we're 
19 doctors. We're supposed to be helping people. 
20 Q. So you look at the whole case basically 
21 from a l l those aspects. 
22 A. Try to , yes. 
23 Q. Have you formulated opinions in this 
24 case? 
25 A. I have. 
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1 stenosis requiring a stent leading to the patient's 
2 having a buildup of n i t ra tes that may have to be 
3 resolved by a renal transplant. 
4 The pat ient also sustained some necrosis 
5 of the abdominal wall which we saw in those 
6 pictures. That 's , you know, a l i t t l e harder for us, 
7 for me to d i rec t l y associate with this high dose 
8 brachytherapy technique. Just the same, that's not 
9 what happens when somebody has external beam 
10 radiation or, you know, the kind of surgery the 
11 patient had. 
12 Q. What do you think caused it? 
13 A. I assume but I'm not — don't know, I'm 
14 assuming that between the external beam radiation 
15 and the fact that there may have been breakdown and 
16 necrosis in the top of the Hartman pouch, that there 
17 may have been tracking of infection. 
18 Q. Do you recognize Steve Mintz didn't do a 
19 bowel prep before he resected the tumor? 
20 A. I'm sorry, I did not. 
21 Q. I s i t logical to a reasonable degree of 
22 medical probabi l i ty that that whole wound infection 
23 was a consequence of the f a i l u r e to do a bowel prep7 
24 MS, BURNINGHAM: Objection. Lack of 
25 foundation, c a l l s for speculation. Beyond this 
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Q. What are they? can you just kind of 
»pell them out for me in thumbnail sketch? 
A. Sure. Well , number one, I think that 
the patient should have gotten preop chemo radiation 
vhich would have possibly reduced the size and 
sxtent of the tumor and, for a l l we know, obviated 
Che need for any additional treatment or made the 
Deed for any additional postoperative treatment 
unnecessary, and consequently spared the patient the 
long-term tox ic i t ies that he has sustained. 
Q. That's number one. I 
A. That's r ight . 
Q. Is there more? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Next one? 
A. Number two, I sure was impressed that 
there was a total lack of mul t id isc ip l inary 
consultation. 
Q. Before surgery. 
A. correct. 
Q. Number three. I s there another one? 
A. I thought that the pat ient was 
over radiated and developed a whole bunch of 
long-term serious complications including a 
rectovaginal f i s t u l a . 
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MS. BURNINGHAM:Vesical. 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Frank did that 
yesterday. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. Rectovaginal 
f is tu las are much more common things when we're 
doing implants in a woman with cervix cancer. 
Q. Fistulas are a commonly accepted risk of 
a l l radiation, aren ' t they? 
A. No, s i r . 
Q. They're not. 
A. The development of a f i s t u l a is a sign 
of something wrong. I t shouldn't be. You don't go 
into a procedure and say, By the way, you know, you 
have this risk of f i s t u l a . Yes, there 's a 
theoretical risk but a f i s t u l a is a giant no, no. 
First of a l l , i t ' s an occasion of suffering by the 
patient. I t ' s t e r r i b l e . F is tu l i za t ion means the 
patient received too much rad ia t ion . 
Q. what else do you believe that the 
overradiation caused? j 
A. I believe that there has been necrosis i 
in the rectal stump that was described by Dr. Saff le 
I think his name was. And there 's necrosis in the 
perineal wound. And there was l e f t ureteral 
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1 witness's area of expert ise. You can answer. 
2 A. There are a l l kinds of things that are 
3 caused by rad ia t ion . 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. Radiation and in fect ion , i f the patient 
6 had a nidus of i n f e c t i o n , a source of infection, 
7 radiation weakens the tissues and so on, so 
8 radiation opens the door to infect ion, when a 
9 patient has rectal cancer and they get postoperative 
10 radiation or preop rad ia t ion , they don't have that 
11 kind of th ing. 
12 Now, you're saying the patient didn't 
13 get a proper bowel prep. We a l l know that before 
14 you do bowel surgery you're supposed to have a bowel 
15 prep but I don't r e a l l y want to comment on that 
16 because I'm not a surgeon and somebody wi l l shot me 
17 down r ight away, what does that guy know about 
18 surgery. 
19 Q. Any other opinions? 
20 A. I think t h a t ' s enough. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. But — forgive me. Excuse me. I do 
23 feel also that the pat ient was deprived of an 
24 opportunity for proper informed consent. He didn't 
25 get a f u l l appreciation of the alternatives that 
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were -- alternatives of treatment. 
Q. Okay. My purpose here today to take 
your deposition is to make sure I understand 
basically two things, Dr. Kadish, and that is your 
opinions and the basis for your opinions. 
A. I see. 
Q. And that's obviously what I hope to 
accomplish today. You've given me four areas of 
opinions. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, five. The 
informed consent. 
MR. WRIGHT: well, I've got four. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: objection. Misstates 
his testimony. 
Q. The opinion you've just given to me, 
does that encompass all opinions you intend to 
render in this case as you sit here today? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: I'm going to object 
subject to the two depositions that they may be 
sharing stuff. Go ahead. 
A. I would say yes. 
Q. The second area of your opinion was the 
fact that he was overradiated, as I understand it. 
Are you opining, Dr. Kadish, that Dr. Hayes and/or 
anyone at Gamma West breached the applicable 
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1 Dr. Hayes if you don't know who made that decision, 
2 MS. BURNINGHAM: objection, weird 
3 logic. I mean obviously they went in and did it so 
4 they had to decide to do it. 
5 MR. WRIGHT: Kay, I'm asking him to tell 
6 me his opinions, not based on your objections but on 
7 the records he has received and reviewed. 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Okay, well, we will 
9 take a break right now. 
10 MR. WRIGHT: No, we're not. I've got a 
11 question pending. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: He answered it. 
13 Q. Can you tell me, Dr. Kadish, who made 
14 the decision not to do any preoperative chemotherapy 
15 or radiation before that tumor was resected? 
16 A. Okay. 
17 Q. Can you tell me who made that decision? 
18 MS. BURNINGHAM: Let him answer. He's 
19 thinking. 
20 A. You're implying that the surgeon made 
21 this decision but I have to t e l l you and you'll 
22 forgive me but Dr. Hayes, who applied the 
23 radiation - - just because the surgeon says they 
24 should come in there and apply the radiation doesn't 
25 mean that he should be applying the radiation. I 
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standard of care in the brachytherapy treatment 
given to Ralph Daniels? 
A. what I'm saying is the pat ient sustained 
an awful lot of post radiat ion, post surgical , post 
chemotherapy morbidity. And I ' v e already l i s ted the 
morbidity as I see i t through the medical record. 
This is off the charts in terms of what a patient 
should have to put up with in gett ing a course of 
radiation. 
Q. But that 's not my question. My question 
to you is was the dosage, the treatment plan that 
Dr. Hayes implemented for Ralph Daniels' high dose 
rate brachytherapy, was that a v io la t ion of any 
applicable standard of care? 
A. okay. The overriding consensus in the 
oncology community is to proceed with the kind of 
patient where you suspect advance disease with 
preoperative chemo radiat ion. To go in there and 
expect to hack i t out and do radiat ion r ight in 
there, without endeavoring to shrink i t down f i r s t , 
I think is bordering on malpractice, yes, I do. 
Q. But Dr. Kadish, you agree with me that 
you don't know who made that decision, correct? 
A. I don't know who made the decision. 
Q. So I would assume you're not fau l t ing 
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1 don't do i t jus t because the surgeon says to do i t . 
2 I do i t because i t ' s the r ight thing for the 
3 pat ient . 
4 Q. well, I'm going to go back to my other 
5 question. Can you tell me that Dr. Hayes breached 
6 any applicable standard of care regarding whether or 
7 not Ralph had preoperative radiation? Yes or no. 
8 A. well, I would say yes. 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And that's on the assumption that he had 
12 something to do with that decision, correct? 
13 A. He had something to do with it because 
14 he authorized the radiation. Dr. Mintz or anybody 
15 else is not authorized to administer radiation to a 
16 patient. Only the radiation oncologist can give 
17 radiation. So he consented to do it. 
18 Q. Do you have an opinion that Mr. Daniels 
19 received too much radiation via brachytherapy? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. How much too much? 
22 A. Al l I know is that the patient had much 
23 too much t o x i c i t y . 
24 Q. Do you have an opinion that the 
25 treatment plan as designed and implemented by 
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Hayes was v io la t ive just on the dosages and the 
actionation was v i o l a t i v e of any par t icu lar 
andard of care? 
A. Number one, th is was given — in the 
cord my sense was that the inspi ra t ion was that i t 
s l ike a prostate implant, except we weren't 
eating the prostate i t s e l f . I t was l i k e a 
ostate implant. Wel l , to my mind, th is is not 
k« a prostate implant. We're not putting 
idioactive seeds in the prostate or we're not 
itting tubes in the prostate and we're cohfining 
le radiation to the prostate gland. 
we're in the operative cavi ty , in the 
Ovis. And there ts a r i sk here the way i t was 
me that there's too much treatment and we know 
)bre*s too much treatment because he developed a 
ictovesical f i s t u l a which means he basical ly burned 
hole in the back of the bladder. 
Q. But are you implying that any standard 
P care was violated with the treatment of 
"achytherapy7 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection. Asked and 
iswered. He already said yes. 
MR. WRIGHT: NO, he d i d n ' t . 
Q. Are you implying that a v io la t ion of the 
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1 Q. Did you read that he tes t i f i ed he knew 
2 exactly the amount of radiat ion that brachytherapy 
3 had given7 
4 A. w e l l , i f he d id , i f that 's true — 
5 Q. That's what he said in his deposition7 
6 A. I understand. I understand. And I'm 
7 Sure he's a well-meaning and caring doctor, but the 
8 bottom l ine is when you add the chemotherapy, the 
9 external beam rad ia t ion , and the brachytherapy 
10 procedure, the pat ient suffered terr ib le toxici t ies, 
11 Q. So you're c r i t i c a l of the University of 
12 Utah as well then, correct 7 
13 MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection. Vague and 
14 ambiguous. You can answer. 
15 A. I would - - I 'm putting myself in their 
J.6 shoes and I think I would have said, Gee, you 
17 already put in a l o t of dose in there. I 've got to 
18 rethink what I 'm going to do here. I don't think 
19 J'm tjoing to do the conventional, the conventional 
20 treatment* 
21 Q. DO you bel ieve that Greg Patton and his 
22 team at the University of Utah violated an 
£3 applicable standard of Care regarding their external 
24 beam radiat ion treatment for Ralph Dam els'? 
25 A. I guess I 'm saying that I have a l i t t l e 
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fe^andard ofrrcare occurred? 
A. i'would say-so, yev* 
Q. what standard of care? who set the 
uidelines? 
A. i^would$ay that overall consensus in 
he oncology community is for advanced disease to 
se preop radiation and chemotherapy, not to 'launch 
n there and try to resect before trying to ^ shrink 
t down first. 
Q. Are you opining that the University of 
tah violated its standard of care in their 
reatment of Ralph Daniels7 
A. Well, the problem I see with the 
niversity of Utah is that they did not have very 
ood communication with the brachytherapy folks and 
saw very little evidence that there was much in 
he way of communication, I think they understood 
hat something was done. Maybe they knew what the 
lumbers were, but they went ahead and gave what 
fould be very standard postoperative radiation. So 
letween the brachytherapy procedure and the external 
team postoperative procedure there was an awful lot 
>f radiation. 
Q. Did you read Greg Pattonfs deposition7 
A. I did. 
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1 problem with the way they went about it. 
2 Q. was it a violation of the standard of 
3 tare7 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. HQ, 
6 A. Well, you know, *if you said to me did 
7 they violate the Ten commandments, I know what the 
8 Ten commandments are. They're chiseled in stone. 
9 Were we're talking about medical judgment and it's 
10 hard. I must say that the overriding principle of 
11 all of this is that if you have advanced disease, 
12 you have to shrink it down first. 
13 Now, having not done that, were they 
14 correct to proceed with external <beam radiation7 
15 Yeaht I think they were. 5houldrthey have modified 
16 their dose? Yeah, they, probably should have given 
17 less. But can we say — you krjoty, they made a 
18 judgment to o;iv$ the standard dose. Can we say they 
19 violated standard of care7 No, but I think we can 
20 object to the judgment. 
21 Qr. Did the radiation that the university of 
22 Utah gave Ralph Daniels cause any harm or toxicity7 
23 A. It was*additive to the radiation and the 
24 chemotherapy and probably translated into part, you 
25 know, contributed to his toxicity. 
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Q. Did the University of Utah radiation 
contribute to the f is tu la? j 
A. i t probably d id . 
Q. Did the University of Utah's radiat ion 
contribute to the necrosis of the rectal stump? 
A. i t probably d id . 
Q. Did the University of Utah radiat ion 
contribute to the uretal stenosis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did i t contribute to the renal problems 
you referred earl ier? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you t e l l me to what percentage i t 
did? 
A. No. The only thing I could — i f you 
wanted to know, I ' d say the dose of radiat ion, i f 
you divvied i t up proportionately, made the 
University of Utah's radiation higher. 
Q. Right. 
A. But you have to keep in mind that 
brachytherapy was given at a very high dose rate . 
Q. Did the chemotherapy contribute to Ralph 
Daniels' f i s tu la , in your opinion? 
A. I t probably did but - - but, at least on 
the surface, i t was most appropriate to give i t . 
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Q. Right. Did the chemotherapy contribute 
to the necrosis of the rectal stump, in your 
opinion? 
A. I t may have. 
Q. Did i t contribute to the necrotic 
uretal - - the uretal stenosis? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did i t contribute to the eventual renal 
issues that we talked about? 
A. I don't know the answer to tha t . 
Q. okay. Did the tumor i t s e l f , Dr. Kadish, 
contribute to the f i s t u l a that Ralph Daniels 
suffered, in your opinion? 
A. wel l , now you're asking a very d i f f i c u l t 
jathophysiologic question which I rea l ly can't 
inswer. 
Q. Okay. Can you t e l l me to a degree of 
ledical probability whether the tumor i t s e l f 
ontributed to any of the problems to which you have 
pined in this matter that Ralph Daniels suffered? 
A. Generally, when I consider a notion of a 
is tu la , the usual answer is there was too much 
adiation to normal t issue. 
Q. where was the f i s t u l a located? 
A. I t was located — 
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Q. As far as the bladder goes, I'm sorry. 
A. Posterior aspect of the bladder. 
Q. Did the tumor invade the posterior parts 
of the bladder? 
A. The tumor was on the surface of the 
posterior aspect of the bladder. 
Q. Did i t invade i t , to your understanding? 
A. Wel l , the bladder wasn't resected so we 
don't know how deep i t went. Al l I know is that the 
surgeon observed tumor on the surface in the 
posterior aspect of the bladder. 
Q. Can you opine to a reasonable degree of 
medical probabi l i ty , Dr. Kadish, what percentage of 
the brachytherapy versus external beam versus 
chemotherapy contributed to any of Ralph's damages? 
Can you break i t down percentage wise? Have you 
attempted to do that at a l l ? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: we l l , objection. 
Compound. He may not have done i t but he may be 
able to do i t . - • 
MR. WRIGHT: Wel l , this is one shot to 
take his deposition. 
Q. As you s i t here today, Dr. Kadish — 
A. Right. 
Q. - - have you or can you opine to a 
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reasonable degree of medical probability as to the 
percentage of causation that brachytherapy versus 
external beam versus chemotherapy - -
A. NO. 
Q. - - caused regarding Ralph Daniels' 
in jur ies that you w i l l opine about? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: objection. Compound in 
that there are mult iple in jur ies that he had 
mentioned so your question is compound as asked. 
MR. WRIGHT: I'm including them a l l . 
A. F i rs t of a l l I want to say that's a 
d i f f i c u l t question. I w i l l endeavor to answer i t 
honestly. I have worked with HDR. I t ' s a very 
dangerous instrument. I have great respect for i t . 
But we do external beam radiat ion. I t ' s a much 
gentler process because you're giving 900 or 1000 
centigrade a week to a patient and of course you're 
usually t rea t ing a wider area. In this case, the 
whole pe lv is . j 
When you use HDR you're giving a lot of | 
radiation in a short time and I don't know how well 1 
you're tuned up on th is but time dose relationships ! 
are very important in our f i e l d . 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. So with high dose rate applicators, i f 
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m dinger too long or i f the dose is too high 
>u'll do a lot of damage in a hurry. Now, can I 
>ase out precisely i t s add i t ive , but I do end up 
nnting to this one spot behind the bladder where 
le surgeon was worried that t h a t ' s where the tumor 
is l i ke ly to recur, t h a t ' s where the f i s t u l i z a t i o n 
)ok place, that 's where the high dose rate was. 
lat 's where the high dose was. 
And the physicist who reviewed th is case 
lid that in the posterior bladder we were in the 
inge of 8000 centigrade and when he applied the 
i lculation for biologic equivalent dose, he was 
/er 10000 centigrade. So t h a t ' s a dose that 
*stroys tissue and makes a hole. 
so I'm prepared, j u s t on the basis of 
le brachytherapy, to blame the brachytherapy for 
le f i s tu l i za t ion . And the reason I say that i s 
icause I 've experienced, I ' v e t reated a l o t of 
it ients with rectal cancer to the pelvis and we 
>n't get f i s t u l i z a t i o n with conventional treatment, j 
Q. Did you work on the case with Frank 
xcoli when he was deposed recently on a woman who 
id a nonresected tumor, external beam radiat ion 
iven only, and she developed a f i s t u l a ? 
A. I work with Frank Ascoli on these cases, 
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es. 
Q. Did you work that case? 
A. what was the name of the patient? 
Q. I don't know. He d i d n ' t know. He was 
eposed this year on a woman with a nonresected 
rimary rectal tumor, external radiat ion given only, 
nd the issue in case was a f i s t u l a . Did you work 
hat case7 
MS. BURNINGHAM: object ion. Misstates 
is testimony and ca l ls for speculation. Lack of 
oundation. incomplete statement. 
A. You know what, I 'm not remembering 
recisely what case i t i s and i t would be sheer 
peculation on my part to venture out in t h i s . I 
on't have the name of the case. 
Q. All r ight , w e ' l l take a quick break. 
efore 1 do, Dr. Kadish, have 1 covered a l l of your 
pinions now you've intended to render in th is case? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Asked and answered. 
A . i believe so. 
MR. WRIGHT: Let 's take a quick break. 
(Recess.) 
Q. Dr. Kadish, I 'm going to take a l i t t l e 
liversion and go back and cover a few things I 
•hould have covered at the f i r s t . I appreciate you 
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her use of TASA T - A - S - A ? 
A. I don't bel ieve th is i s a TASA case, no. 
Q. How did did she f ind you, do you know7 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Calls for speculation. 
A. I assume - - I have two ways people find 
me. One is ca l l ing expert — what is i t cal led. 
Q. expertpages.com. 
A. expertpages.com and the other is among 
something cal led the seak Directory. 
Q. And i t would have been one of those two 
ways she would have found you? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: W e l l , c a l l s f o r 
speculation. Lack of foundation. 
Q. vou s t i l l subscribe to TASA. TASA s t i l l / 
advocates your services? 
A. Yes, t h e y ' l l ca l l me once in a while. 
Q. And Seak also advocates your services7 
A. NO. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: YOU need to say no. 
A. TASA, expertpages and seak s-e-a-k. 
Q. Oh, I 'm sorry, Seak. And you are s t i l l 
l i s ted on expertpages.com. 
A. I bel ieve so. 
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Q. But to your knowledge th is is not being 
run through TASA, th is case. 
A. correct . 
Q. okay. I understand the way Frank Ascoli 
got involved in th is case is that you'd asked him 
to , a f ter you got contacted you asked Frank to go 
through and come up with some numbers as he 
t e s t i f i e d to yesterday, correct? 
A . That 's r i g h t . 
Q. Okay. Dr. Kadish, you're a radiation 
oncologist, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are not a physicist; is that 
correct? 
A. correct . 
Q. Have you ever been l i s ted in the 
directory for Best Doctors in America for 
brachytherapy? 
A. NO, 
Q. Are you a member of the American 
Brachytherapy society? 
A. I am not. 
Q. Are you a member of the American Society 
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A. I wasn't aware of that. 
Q. Okay. Let's talk about your 
understanding of the tumor that we're dealing with 
here. Again, you didn't know as you sit here today 
whether it was defined as a sigmoid colon tumor or 
rectal; is that correct? 
A. well, in the record it was called 
rectosigmoid, rectosigmoid, but the place where the 
major radiation went was not in the — above the 
perineal reflection, which is the usual standard 
place where the rectum starts and the sigmoid ends 
which was deep into the pelvis which leads me to 
believe it was rectal cancer. 
Q. what organs was this tumor attached to? 
A. it was attached to the posterior bladder 
wall and the prostate. 
Q. what about the mesentery? 
A. The mesentery, I'm not aware that it was 
attached to the mesentery. 
Q. what about the pelvic sidewalls? 
A. I believe there was some notion of being 
attached to the pelvic sidewall. 
Q. How large was the nonresected gross 
tumor volume? 
A. I'm sorry, I don't know the answer to 
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1 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, it misstates his 
2 testimony. 
3 A. I've never treated sigmoid colon cancer 
4 or rectal cancer? No. I've treated a lot of rectal 
5 cancer. I have not treated it or advocate treating 
6 it with this technique. I would advocate following, 
7 as I say, the overall consensus which was to use a 
8 preoperative radiation and chemotherapy. 
9 Q. Okay. A follow-up question. How many 
10 patients with sigmoid colon cancer that have invaded 
11 the pelvis, adhered to the bladder, to the prostate 
12 and to the pelvic sidewall have you treated? 
13 MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection. Incomplete 
14 hypothetical. You can answer. 
15 A. It's hard for me to say. It's hard. 
16 I'm sorry. I'm not able to tell you a precise 
17 number. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. Have I treated people with advanced 
20 disease high in the rectum? Yes, I have. 
21 Q. Have you reviewed or aware of any 
22 literature, Dr. Kadish, that indicates the 
23 disease-free survival rate in advance rectal or 
24 sigmoid cancer patients with positive margins is 
25 less than 10 percent at two years? 
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that. 
Q. And you did review, as you said, you did 
review Steve Mintz's operative report , correct? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How much of the tumor was left behind? 
in other words, how much of the residual tumor did 
ie leave, not able to get? 
A. I'm not remembering that. Maybe you 
vill help me out. 
Q. I believe he wrote that he resected 95 
:o 98 percent of it, which means 5 to 2 percent of 
it was left behind. Does that sound to be correct? 
A. Well, yes. The point is it was what's 
:alled R2 resection. In other words, gross disease 
/as left behind. 
Q. The stage of this initial tumor going 
n, do you recall whether it was T4 or T3? 
A. well, it was called T3 but apparently it 
fas T4 because it was stuck to adjacent structures. 
Q. And given its size, too, correct? 
A. NO. 
Q. Just on i t s adherence. 
A. Right. 
Q. And again, you never treated a patient 
i t h this presenting tumor, correct? 
Merit Reporters 
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1 A. Wel l , that sounds about r ight . 
2 Q. Are you aware of practice patterns with 
3 intraoperative radiat ion treatment doses that i t 
4 says tha t , the l i t e r a t u r e says these depend upon the 
5 status of surgical margins? 
6 A. Right. 
7 Q. Are you aware of the data that suggests 
8 that gross residual disease can receive up to 17.5 
9 gray of intraoperative radiation treatment in 
10 addition to 50 gray of external beam radiation 
11 treatment? 
12 A. w e l l , t h a t ' s very interest ing. I don't 
13 know where you're pul l ing that from but the point is 
14 that 's somebody's statement. In this case that 
15 worked out to be giant t o x i c i t y , in other words, I 
16 don't know where that comes from and somebody may 
17 have wr i t ten i t and that sounds wonderful. These 
18 isodose plans look lovely but the point is that the 
19 patient f i s t u l i z e d . 
20 Q. what's the rate of f is tulas with 
21 intraoperative radiat ion treatment based upon the 
22 data? 
23 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, incomplete 
24 hypothetica. Depends on the tumor. Depends on a 
25 lot of other things. 
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Q. Rectal tumors, what's the incident rate? 
A. I wouldn't venture a guess on tha t . 
Q. Would i t surprise you to know that the 
rature says i t ' s greater than 7 to 10 percent? 
A. w e l l — 1 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Wel l , again, with what 
itment7 Incomplete hypothet ical . 
MR. WRIGHT: I jus t said intraoperat ive 
lation therapy. 
A. The l i t e ra tu re for th is procedure is 
/ scanty, so I know there are very — th is is not 
tandard treatment. In f a c t , I would say i t ' s 
d of a marginal treatment, maybe an experimental 
atment. I t ' s not well documented. 
Q. You're aware of the dosimetry that 
Hayes prescribed for Mr. Daniels, the 2450 
tigrade, 350 over seven f rac t ions , correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're aware that be received 4500 
itigrade at the University of Utah v ia external 
im, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you able to f igure out the 
log ica l effect of doses of those treatments? 
A. I wasn't able to but I asked Mr. Ascoli 
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calculate that and he calculated i t . 
Q. Can you calculate that for me? 
A. NO. 
Q. Can you give me the formula how to 
lculate that? 
A. NO. 
Q. So i f I were to hand you a piece of 
iper and ask you to t e l l me how you calculate 
ological effective doses, you are unable to do 
lat? 
A. You have to understand that in radiat ion 
Kology we have physicists to do things that we 
actors don't do and tha t 's part of what they do. 
Q. Okay. But you were unable to do tha t . 
MS. BURNINGHAM: object ion. Asked and 
nswered. Harrassing the witness. Argumentative. 
e's answered that , Bobby. 
Q. You are unable to do tha t , correct? 
A. I don't know how to do i t , r igh t . 
Q. All r ight . 
A. Just l i ke I don't know how to run o f f 
hese plans. That's what physicists do. 
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Q. What i s ^ h a t ? 
A. I t has - - i t ' s an expression of the 
l ikel ihood of in ju ry . 
Q. What's the alpha beta rat io for the 
ep i the l ia l rader of the bladder? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: incomplete 
hypotheti c a l . 
Q. With intraoperat ive radiation treatment 
or brachytherapy. 
A. I'm sorry, I 'm not prepared to answer 
that . 
Q. Okay. Do you know i f the alpha beta 
ra t io d i f f e r s as you move into the bladder muscle 
wall? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: incomplete 
hypothetical. 
A. I'm not prepared to answer that. 
Q. Would i t surprise you, Dr. Kadish, to 
know that the alpha beta ra t io for the epithel ia l 
layer of the bladder d i f f e rs from the muscular wall 
of the bladder? 
A. Sure. 
Q. I t would surprise you to know that? 
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Q. Right. And i s n ' t that what the alpha 
beta ra t io is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I t is the calculat ion, i f you w i l l , of 
how tissues w i l l respond to radiation treatment, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And we can assume that an 
ep i the l ia l layer of an organ such as the bladder 
w i l l respond d i f f e r e n t l y than the inter ior muscle of 
the bladder, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so would you agree with me by 
calculating a biological e f fect ive dose that perhaps 
a physicist should use d i f fe rent alpha beta ratios 
to rea l ly determine what a biological effective dose 
to an organ is? 
A. Now, you are asking me a question that 
rea l ly involves a deep inquiry into the calculation 
of biological e f fec t ive dose and honestly, in a l l 
honesty, I am not able to launch into that 
discussion. 
Q. Okay. 
A. A l l I know i s that i f we take the , 
biological e f fec t ive dose away, just use the gross 
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numbers, in this region at the back of the bladder 
the dose was already at 8000 centigrade. So that 's 
a dose that 's already high enough to cause tissue 
necrosis. 
Q. Do you know what alpha beta ra t io 
Mr. Ascoli used to determine those numbers? 
A. I don't. He gave me the BED number 
i t s e l f . 
Q. And you are completely relying on 
Mr. Ascoli's calculations for your opinion. 
A. I rely on physicists a l l time in my 
work. That's the nature of our work. 
Q. would your opinions be subject to change 
i f Mr. Ascoli's calculations were wrong? 
A. I suppose he could be demonstrated 
error, yes, of course. 
Q. In this case, Dr. Kadish, do you think 
that the standard external beam radiat ion treatment 
that Mr. Daniels had, combined with only surgery and 
chemotherapy, was adequate to t r e a t his tumor? 
A. I don't think so, no. 
Q. You think that he needed both external 
beam and brachytherapy in addition to chemotherapy? 
A. No. I think that he probably needed 
preop radiation and chemotherapy, then he needed the 
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1 A. That I don't know. 
2 Q. Let me just ask --
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: Hey, hey, you need to 
4 give him time to respond, Bobby, really. You're 
5 rushing him. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. You are proposing, theoretically, a 
8 radical surgical approach before, as I keep saying 
9 here before, that in today's oncology world you 
10 would give it your best shot with preop measures to 
11 try to reduce the disease. 
12 Q. All right. And I understand a pelvic 
13 exoneration, bladder would have been completely 
14 removed, correct? 
15 A. That's right. 
16 Q. Prostate would have been removed? 
17 A. That's right. 
18 Q. He would have ended up basically with 
19 the same type of ileostomy as he has now, had a 
20 pelvic exoneration been done. 
21 A. Well, this discussion about a pelvic 
22 exoneration, to my mind doesn't even fit into this. 
23 Q. Do you think Ralph would have been a 
24 candidate in 2001 for intraoperative radiation 
25 treatment had it been available in Salt Lake at that 
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surgery, then he could have had some kind of extra 
treatment based on surgical findings, we don't know 
what those surgical findings would have been had he 
started this off with preoperative radiation. For 
instance, he could have had nothing left. He could 
have had residual disease as he had. We don't know. 
Q. How many surgeons do you know that you 
have worked with in the past, and you may not know 
this but if they were to present to -- if Ralph 
Daniels would have presented to them they would have 
done a total pelvic exoneration? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection. Calls for 
speculation. 
Q. Do you know what that is, a pelvic 
exoneration? 
A. Of course I do. 
Q. what is it? 
A. It's when all the organs in the pelvis 
are removed. 
Q. Have you soon it done with rectal or 
sigmoid cancers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think Ralph would have been a 
candidate for a pelvic exoneration? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Calls for speculation. 
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1 time? 
2 A. Possibly. 
3 Q. Okay. Are you aware of cases of 
4 advanced rectal or sigmoid colon cancer with 
5 involvement tha t ' s so extensive that intraoperative 
6 radiation i s n ' t possible or i s n ' t enough to 
7 adequately cover a l l the areas at risk? Are you 
8 aware there are cases out there? 
9 A. Of course there are such cases. 
10 Q. Okay. I think you mentioned this to me 
11 e a r l i e r , Dr. Kadish, about l i t e ra tu re that you are 
12 aware of that shows postoperative complications with 
13 radiation given as high as 50 percent; is that 
14 correct? 
15 A. I used the term 50 — I used the number 
16 50 percent to indicate the l ikelihood of local 
17 recurrence in patients who are treated primarily 
18 with surgery. 
19 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any data that 
20 gives percentages of complications due to 
21 intraoperative radiation treatment that was 
22 available in 2001? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. What does i t say? 
25 A. Wel l , i t ' s a high incidence, probably a 
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d of patients who develop pelvic neuropathies. 
not a strong advocate for IORT. It's again a 
le shot high dose going onto those pelvic nerves 
a lot of people get long-term pain from it. 
Q. Are you an advocate of high dose rate 
hytherapy? 
A. It's like anything else. When it's 
erly applied, it's a wonderful therapy, when 
improperly applied, it's no good. 
Q. Assuming your -- I'm going to ask you 
questions. First, let's assume that you would 
i been treating Ralph and you would have seen to 
:hat he had preoperative radiation. I would 
jme you would have done that by external beam. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And what radiation boost modality would 
have chosen to effectively treat this posterior 
state, posterior bladder, and pelvic sidewall and 
presacral region that we know the tumor was 
ading7 
A. well, I probably -- I would have either 
e to the — with the surgeon to the operating 
mi or at least asked the surgeon to apply surgical 
ps to the area of a gross residual disease, we 
I't know that he would have had gross residual 
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sease on any or all of those sites. 
Q. okay. But what modality, what treatment 
uld you have recommended? what would have been 
e treatment? 
A. Afterwards? 
Q. After the clips are in place and you 
n't know about residual disease but what would you 
ve recommended7 
MS. BU R N I N G H A M : well, assuming he had 
•sidual disease. 
A. Your theoretical case here involves the 
itient had preop chemo radiation, then they went to 
jrgery, and then the surgeon identified an area of 
ssidual disease and he clipped it, right? 
Q. Right. 
A. Is that where we are? 
Q. Right. 
A. I would have advocated additional 
xternal beam radiation directed at the clipped 
rea. 
Q. Okay. And this is before the tumor is 
esected, correct? 
A. No, no, no, no. After the resection. 
Q. Okay. I want to go back before the 
•esection, though. You've argued in this case he 
94 
Merit Reporters 
Linda Van Tassel7, CRR/RMR/RDR 



















































should have had preoperative, meaning preresection 
radiation, correct? 
A. And chemotherapy. 
Q. Okay. I want to know what you would 
have recommended. 
A. I would have recommended the kind of 
radiation that he eventually had as postop 
treatment. In other words, full pelvis treatment. 
Q. At 4500 centigrade. 
A. Something like that, yes. 
Q. over how many fractions? 
A. Usually for this kind of patient we're 
doing something like 5040, five thousand forty 
centigrade, 28 fractions at 180 centigrade per 
fraction. 
Q. What risks would you have told 
Mr. Daniels about that he could possibly suffer from 
that type of radiation, preoperatively7 
A. I would have told him that during the 
course of the treatment he may experience fatigue, 
he may experience nausea, and he may experience 
diarrhea and he may experience some rectal 
irritation and that, except for the fatigue, we have 
good medicine to medicate all of those things. 
Q. And are there other risks to organ 
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damage that you would have discussed with him? 
A. NO. 
Q. Are there other risks in 2001 with that 
description you just described to me to adjacent 
organs that would be commonly accepted? 
A. Well, the patient also could have had 
some urinary burning and we would medicate that as 
wel 1. 
Q. with your treatment would there have 
been a risk of a fistula? i 
A. Not with that dose of radiation, no. ' 
Q. Okay. You don't believe there would 
have been. 
A. I'm pretty certain about it. I'm pretty 
firm about it. I have no recollection of any 
patient getting preop radiation where they 
fistulized. 
Q. And you don't recall working on the case 
that Mr. Ascoli testified to yesterday where that 
exact same thing happened. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection. Incomplete 
hypothetical. Asked and answered. 
Q. And I ask you that because he said you 
were working on the case as well. 
A. I don't remember. 
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MS. BURNINGHAM: w e l l , misstates his 
testimony - - just a minute, Dr. Kadish. Misstates 
his testimony and cal ls for speculation. Go ahead. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. okay. Please l e t ' s not bring up a case 
that I don't even know the name of the case. I j 
can't discuss i t . I just can' t t a l k about i t . I 
don't know i t . 
Q. Okay, i f that treatment had been done 
with chemotherapy, and I would assume you would have 
l e f t the chemotherapy regimen up to the medical 
oncologist preoperative!y, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Then the tumor is resected and 95 to 98 
percent of the tumor was resected, leaving 5 to 2 
percent of the residual tumor behind in the pelvic 
sidewalls, what then would you have prescribed for 
Mr. Daniels? 
A. in both pelvic sidewalls? 
Q. Yes, s i r . 
A. is that what you're saying? 
Q. Yes, s i r . 
A. Tumor on both sides of the pe lv is . 
Q. Yes. 
A. i t sounds very un l ike ly . 
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Q. wel l , what would you have prescribed had 
that been the case? 
A. I probably would have designed treatment 
i f the surgeon would have clipped the area of 
residual disease I would have designed treatment 
probably for an extra 2000 centigrade. 
Q. By what mechanism? 
A. By external beam rad ia t ion . 
Q. So you would not have chosen to give any 
brachytherapy at a l l . 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Because you've never done brachytherapy 
in that situation, have you? 
A. Well, I haven't. And the reason I 
haven't is because I don't have nice control over 
where the dose is going. 
Q. Do you know the percentages, Dr. Kadish, 
of how common local recurrence and loca l ly advanced 
rectal or sigmoid cancer cases is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. what is i t ? 
A. I t would be 50 to 70 percent. 
Q. what's the current status of Ralph 
Daniels' cancer? 
A. So far as I understand i t , he is not 
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showing evidence of^active cancer now. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to what 
percentage he has at th is point for recurrence? 
He's f ive plus years out. 
A. Wel l , I'm going to assume that he's not 
coming back because we generally know that after 
f ive years, i f you're free of disease after f ive 
years, tha t 's tantamount to cure. 
Q. Right. Would you describe his chance of 
recurrence at th is point a f ter the treatment that he 
has had less than 5 percent? 
A. w e l l , less than 10 percent. 
Q. Do you have an opinion to a reasonable 
degree of medical probabi l i ty that he wi l l now 
survive this cancer? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Well , objection. Vague 
in that i t doesn't include surviving the 
complications of the treatment for cancer. 
Q. I'm ta lk ing about the cancer recurrence. 
A. The l ikel ihood of the cancer returning 
in this man is low - -
Q. Okay. 
A. — I acknowledge. 
Q. Do you a t t r i b u t e his lack of recurrence 
to the treatment he received? 
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A. I t has to be because he started with 
invasive cancer. 
Q. Do you a t t r ibu te the success of his 
cancer to the brachytherapy? 
A. Part of i t , yes. 
Q. Do you a t t r ibu te his cancer-free status 
due to the external beam? 
A. That's made a contribution, too. 
Q. Do you contribute part of his lack of 
recurrence of cancer-free to be partly to the 
chemotherapy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you believe that partly his lack 
of recurrence is due to the surgical resection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So, in other words, the treatment 
worked, d idn ' t i t . 
MS. BURNINGHAM: objection. 
A. NO. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Go ahead. 
A. I ' l l leave i t . In my view the goal of 
the radiation therapy, whenever we use i t , is to 
t rea t the patient and eliminate the malignant 
disease but spare the normal tissues. 
Q. would you agree with me that your f i r s t 
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oal in radiation oncology is to cure the patient? 
A. No. 
Q. Not to cure him. 
A. in other words, if you're going to trash 
ie patient, I wonder whether it's worthwhile, we 
ive lots patients who say, I'm not going to live 
lis way. So I don't think we should be too proud 
lat the patient is free of disease now since he's 
iken such a big hit. 
Q. Would you agree with me that 
Daniels' chance of recurrence when this was all 
>ne back in 2001 was in that 50 to 60 percent 
nge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. with this type of cancer, Dr. Kadish, 
e you aware of the data or the statistics showing 
at the percentage of potential complications in 
nctional outcome for an aggressive multimodality 
eatment for advanced rectal or sigmoid cancers 
e? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection, incomplete 
pothetical. Assuming facts that haven't been 
tablished and opinions that haven't been 
tablished. You can answer. 
A. Okay. I know that I have a very firm 
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1 Q. Sure. Do you know what the five-year 
2 survival rate was for those patients only treated 
3 postoperatively? 
4 MS. BURNINGHAM: incomplete 
5 hypotheti c a l . Go ahead. 
6 A. The f ive-year survival rate with 
7 patients with what stage of disease now? 
8 Q. T4 rectal or sigmoid colon cancer cases 
9 treated postoperatively - -
10 A. Five-year survival rate for T4 rectal 
11 cancers - -
12 Q. Yes. 
13 A. — treated with surgery and radiation 
14 and chemotherapy. 
15 Q. Yes. 
16 A. I would say it's 30 percent or less. 
17 Q. Less than 30 percent? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Mr. Daniels obviously beat those odds, 
20 d idn ' t he? 
21 A. He did . 
22 Q. Do you know what the studies say about 
23 with aggressive regimens such as I would assume 
24 brachy, external beam, chemo, surgery, whether or 
25 not they improve the f ive-year survival rate above 
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p on what we can count on in terms of long-term 
bidi ty from conventional treatment, when we're 
l ing with people with advanced disease, the 
elihood of long-term complications r ises . 
Q. Okay. 
A. But that 's just a statement about what 
long-term complications. 
Q. Do you know what conventional treatment, 
I think what we both — I consider conventional 
atment would be surgery, external beam radiation 
maybe chemotherapy. Is that a f a i r statement of 
/entional therapy? 
A. The standard of care today or back in 
as we l l , was preoperative chemo radiat ion. 
Q. Are you aware of l i t e r a t u r e that 
:ribes no preoperative chemotherapy or radiation 
surgery, radiation and then chemotherapy with 
type of cancer, are there studies out there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. in other words, to have somebody treated 
ope rat i vely was not some v io lent contradiction 
hat is the standard of care but I must say in 
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1 the 30 percent? 
2 MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection. Vague as to 
3 the what sequencing of the adjuvant treatment. 
4 incomplete hypothetical as to whether there's other 
5 involvement, e t cetera , et cetera. 
6 Q. Go ahead. 
7 A. Now I forgot the question. 
8 Q. Do you know by using aggressive 
9 multimodality treatments post surgically what the 
10 studies have said about how the 30 or less percent 
11 survival rate has been increased or improved. 
12 A. Well, it's improved. Not super 
13 dramatically but it has improved. 
14 Q. Are you aware of literature that's 
15 described the statistics, Dr. Kadish, of patients 
16 suffering with low anterior or with rectal cancer or 
17 sigmoid cancers, what percentage of these patients, 
18 regardless of their treatment, go back to normal 
19 lifestyle that they had preoperatively? 
20 MS. BURNINGHAM: incomplete 
21 hypothetical. 
22 A. Are we ta lk ing about people with 
23 advanced disease? 
24 Q. Yes, s i r . Like Ralph. 
25 A. what percentage of patients return to 
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normal l i fe? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, I can't give you that off the top 
of my head, I'm sorry. 
Q. Same category of patients. Are you 
aware of what percentage of patients experience 
radiation toxicity and/or things such as perineal 
pain after aggressive treatment? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Incomplete 
hypothetical. 
A. Perineal pain, it happens. 
Q. How about same category of patients once 
again that suffer urinary dysfunction. Any idea of 
the percentage? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Incomplete 
hypothetical. 
A. During radiation most patients who are 
getting pelvic radiation have some degree of urinary 
burning. After radiation I'm not sure that long 
term urinary side effects are more than about 10 
percent. 
Q. How about same group of patients that 
experience walking difficulties? 
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1 typical dosimetry with high dose rate brachytherapy 
2 for an advanced prostate patient as you just 
3 described? 
4 A. well the dosimetry was --
5 Q. With high dose rate brachytherapy. 
6 A. Yes. The dosimetry was such that the 
7 prostate line itself got the dose. The isodose 
8 contours corresponded to the contour of the prostate 
9 gland. 
10 Q. Uh-huh. 
11 A. Now, you're asking me to quote the doses 
12 that were given. I 'm sorry, I'm not remembering the 
13 doses. I t was something l i ke 500 times three and 
14 then they - - or 700 times three. I'm sorry, I'm not 
15 remembering. 
16 Q. And do you have any recall as you s i t 
17 here today what the biological effect ive dose is to 
18 the prostate? 
19 A. I can' t give you the biological 
20 ef fect ive dose. But again, that was something where 
21 there was very good coordination between the 
22 brachytherapy part and the EBRT part and patients 
23 tolerated i t quite w e l l . 
24 Q. With HDR brachytherapy of the advanced 
25 prostate pat ient , are you able to preclude the 
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A. I would think there would be less than 5 
percent. 
Q. How about same category of patients who 
•xperience sexual dysfunction? 
A. I would think tha t ' s very high. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Incomplete 
lypothetical. 
A. Especially because of the surgery. 
Q. Have you treated any prostate cancer 
ases with high dose rate brachy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many? 
A. when I was at the Lahey c l i n i c I had a 
3lleague, Dr. Ted Lowe, who was involved with the 
ation of using HDR as an adjunct with people with 
>re advanced prostate cancer, so you put tubes in 
le prostate. Those patients were treated on three 
xasions — the day of surgery, the next morning 
id the next afternoon — and then the tubes were 
i l led and then they went home and then they started 
:ternal beam radiation. So I was involved in that . 
Q. Did you ever prescribe a dosimetry for 
iose patients? 
A. Yes. 
Q. what was a t y p i c a l , i f you can t e l l me, 
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Sure. I t ' s r ight there. 
The bladder is not going to get blasted, 
1 bladder from receiving no radiation? 
2 A. Wel l , the bladder is going to get some 




7 Q. How much radiation do you understand 
8 that the patients with that advanced prostate cancer 
9 get to the posterior or anterior portion of their 
10 bladder? 
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, incomplete 
12 hypotheti cal. 
13 A. Well, the anterior portion of the 
14 bladder they're not going to get much. Certainly 
15 not up at the dome of the bladder. 
16 Q. Right. 
17 A. You recal l that the prostate is right 
18 below the — the prostate is wrapped around the 
19 bladder neck, so there 's going to be some radiation 
20 in the base of the bladder. 
21 Q. The posterior base. 
22 A. No. The ent i re base. 
23 Q. The ent i re base of the bladder. 
24 A. Because they ' re going in paral lel to the 
25 base of the bladder. 
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0. And you would agree with "me that high 
se rate brachytherapy with the prostate cancer 
tient there is no way to prevent the bladder from 
ing radiated; is that correct? 
A. Well, the bladder and the prostate are 
)ghbors. 
Q. Right. 
A. So i f you're going to put some radiation 
the prostate i t ' s going to s p i l l over into the 
idder. 
Q. And do you know what — and I hate to 
» the word typical because we don't l i k e that - -
t do you know what typical percentage of the 
atdder base would receive radiation? 
A. I 'd have to look at the isodose. 
Q. On any given pat ient . 
A. That's r ight . But we would see that , 
would be able to see tha t . 
Q. Okay. Let 's take a quick break. 
(Recess.) 
Q. Dr. Kadish, you mentioned to me e a r l i e r 
d the man's name escapes me. I t s tar ts with a G, 
Mayo or no - -
A. Lynn Gunderson. 
Q. Gunderson, where does he practice? 
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1 have a recol lect ion of what you're referring to. 
2 Q. So you would not know whether those 
3 studies, i f there are any, dealt with preoperative 
4 treatment and the percentages of tox ic i t ies from 
5 radiation versus postoperative treatment. 
6 A. Okay, i n his work on the IORT i t 
7 involved — some of the patients had preop radiation 
8 and then they had radiat ion intraoperatively as part 
9 of thei r surgery. 
10 Q. And some of those studies, i f you can 
11 r e c a l l , did they t a l k about percentages of 
12 tox ic i t i es due to that treatment as you just 
13 described? 
14 A. We've ta lked about t h i s . 
15 Q. Okay. I n th is case, given what we know, 
16 l e t ' s focus spec i f i ca l l y on Ralph Daniels, we know 
17 from the medical records that he did not receive any 
18 preoperative radiat ion or chemo, correct? 
19 A. Correct. 
20 Q. The first treatment that he received for 
21 his tumor was surgery, correct? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Are you aware whether or not Ralph had 
24 residual disease in the pelvic sidewall? 
25 A. Yes, I believe so. 
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A. Mayo c l i n i c . 
Q. okay. And you know Dr. Gunderson? 
A. I know him to say he l lo . 
Q. You are aware that Dr. Gunderson does 
gh does rate brachytherapy? 
A. okay. I t wouldn't surprise me. 
Q. Have you read any of the a r t i c l e s that 
\ Gunderson has e i ther authored or has been 
ivolved in studies at Mayo C l i n i c with? 
A. The major, as I said in the Perez book 
» made a big case about IORT, not about 
•achytherapy for advanced rectal cancer. 
Q. You're aware Dr. Gunderson d e f i n i t e l y 
,es IORT for advanced rectal cancer. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. okay. And again, are you aware of the 
ivo Clinic study in which he was involved or any 
her Mayo c l in ic studies about treatment for 
>cally advanced rectal or sigmoid colon cancers? 
A. Are you al luding to a speci f ic paper? 
Q. Yeah. Any papers or studies that you 
IOW the Mayo Cl in ic has done. 
MS. BURNINGHAM: You mean since 2001? 
Q. Before or a f t e r . 
A. Right o f f the top of my head I don't 
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1 Q. Are you aware whether or not Ralph 
2 Daniels had residual tumor in the presacral sleeve 
3 area? 
4 A. Yes, he d id . 
5 Q. Are you aware whether or not Ralph 
6 Daniels had residual tumor in the posterior bladder7 
7 A. He did. 
8 Q. Are you aware that Ralph Daniels had 
9 residual tumor in the posterior prostate7 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Are you aware that these were the areas 
12 where doses of brachytherapy were administered7 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. And I would assume you would not 
15 describe the doses of brachytherapy to these areas 
16 as modest; is that correct? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. flow would you describe them? 
19 A. They were hot. 
20 Q. Where are the high dose regions7 Can 
21 you t e l l me by looking at anything you reviewed? 
22 A. High dose region was in the region of 
23 the posterior bladder. 
24 Q. okay. Let 's look at these. Can you 
25 t e l l me what we've now marked as Exhibit No. 8, 
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Q. Okay. Does that picture t e l l you 
nything as a board c e r t i f i e d radiat ion oncologist 
s to the amount of radiat ion that Mr. Daniels got 
r received? 
A, I don't see the bladder depicted here. 
Q. Could you even begin to t e l l me where 
ie bladder would be on any of those views, 
Kadi sh? 
A. NO. 
Q. I t ' s almost impossible, i s n ' t i t ? 
A. Correct. 
Q. would you rely on anybody that would be 
tempting to place the bladder on those pictures as 
ing accurate? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Objection, incomplete 
potheti ca l . 
A. we l l , on th is there 's no anatomy 
picted here. 
Q. Right, i t ' s not meant to depict 
atomy, is i t? 
A. Right. 
Q. That's why we have picture number f i v e . 
i t ' s why the computer was designed to do tha t , 
3ht? ! 
A . Right. 
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MS. BURNINGHAM: object ion. 
lumentative. 
Q. would you agree with me? 
A. wel l , this whole idea about th is 
hnique is i t superimposes the dosimetry on the CT 
ulse so — 
Q. Right. So — 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Let him answer. 
Q. Picture number s ix , the purpose of that 
to impose the isodose l ines going into these 
heters, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Picture number six was not meant 
designed in your knowledge, was i t , to depose 
anatomy? 
A. There is no anatomy on t h a t . 
Q. And i t would be nearly impossible f o r 
Dody to t ry to place anatomy on picture number 
, wouldn't i t? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: well — 
A. You mean Exhibit 7? 
Q. seven. No. I'm sorry, picture six to 
ib i t 8, which is for you. 
A. Right. I wasn't t ry ing to do that . 
Q. Right. The best we have i s picture 
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number f i v e - -
MS. BURNINGHAM: objection. 
Q. -•- tha t you've been talking about, isn ' t 
i t ? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: objection. 
Argumentative. 
A. i t ' s a lovely plan. 
Q. Thank you. How much radiat ion, i f you 
know, can the anter ior abdominal wall receive 
without any problems? 
A. The anter ior abdominal wall — 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Did you say anterior or 
in ter ior? 
Q. Anter ior . 
A. Anter ior abdominal wall would again 
break down 7 or 8000 rads. i t would start to break 
down. 
Q. There i s no way he received that kind of 
radiation to the anter ior abdominal wal l . 
A. Right. 
Q. How about the kidneys, what can they 
tolerate? 
A. Kidneys don't do well a f ter 2000, 2500 
centigrade. 
Q. And no way did those kidneys get 
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anything l i k e that in th is case, did they? 
A. Right. 
Q. How about the rectal stump, how much can 
i t to le ra te before you s t a r t having problems? 
A. That 's a hard question because i t 
depends on the vascular i ty of the rectum and that 's 
hard to establ ish based on the fact that the 
patient - - t h a t ' s an area t h a t ' s been surgerized. 
Q. would you agree with me that a 
surgerized rectal stump could tolerate in the area 
of 7 to 8000 centigrade without complication? 
A. NO. 
Q. Less than? 
A . Yes. 
Q. How much less? 
A. Seven or 8000 centigrade is a formula 
for necrosis, for radiat ion necrosis, in v i r tua l ly 
any t issue. 
Q. HOW much did his rectal stamp receive, 
i f you know? 
A. we l l , I assume that he got both the 
brachytherapy dose and the external beam radiation 
dose. 
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A. Right. 
Q. Now, do you know whether or not there 's 
l imi t of how much the Hartman's pouch in a case 
ke this can to lerate without seeing complications? 
A. wel l , Hartman's pouch i s jus t another 
/ of saying i t ' s a piece of rectum but i t ' s a 
ctum that 's closed o f f on top. 
Q. Right. So would the same analysis apply 
r rectal tissue to a Hartman's pouch? 
A. i would think so. 
Q. okay. Have you discussed th is case with 
/ other physicians, Dr. Kadish? 
A. I haven't. 
Q. You obviously have discussed th is with 
Ascoli, correct? 
A. That's correct . 
Q. By talk ing to him yesterday I understand 
i t you talked to him and asked him to complete the 
lculations on biological e f f e c t i v e doses and 
tual doses that he has done. 
A. That's r ight . 
Q. Have you seen his calculat ions? 
A. I have. 
Q. And did you do anything to v e r i f y them? 
i you recalculate them at a l l ? 
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A . NO. 
Q. You just took them for face value based 
on his calculations, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. okay. Did you discuss with him how he 
Iculated these or did you jus t leave that up to 
u? 
A. i l e f t that up to him. 
Q. Okay. Oh, one question I forgot . Do 
u know i f there is data on determining how much 
e actual ureters coming into the bladder can 
lerate with radiation without receiving 
nplications? 
A. ureters are organs that are very 
i t t l e , i f you w i l l . They're hollow. And the 
eter goes down the ureter , but i f they ' re injured 
ey swell up and then they close down. 
Q. But how much radiat ion would i t take to 
ve a ureter close down? 
A. I would say 7000 centigrade. 
Q. And again based upon what we see by 
cture number f i v e on Exhibit No. 8, i t received 
where near that from the brachytherapy, did i t ? 
A. wel l , tha t ' s r i g h t . Based on that 
cture, r ight. 
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Q. A l l r i g h t , was high dose rate 
brachytherapy to your knowledge being done for 
loca l ly advanced recta l or sigmoid colon primary 
tumors in 2001? 
A. Was high dose rate brachytherapy done 
for loca l l y advanced sigmoid colon carcinoma in 
2001. 
Q. Yes, s i r . 
A. i t was not done very much. 
Q. Do you know where i t was being done 
besides Sal t Lake City? 
A . NO. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Dr. Sayed was 
doing i t at Long Beach? 
A. Maybe he was. 
Q. Do you know whether i t was being done at 
MD Anderson? 
A. I'm not aware that i t was being done at 
MD Anderson. 
Q. Are you aware of any other inst i tut ions 
where i t was being done? 
A. NO. 
Q. Have you read any l i t e r a t u r e that l i s t s 
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Q. Let me ask you a couple more questions 
about your opinion on consent. Your opinion on 
consent, as I understand i t , is that he, that Ralph 
should have been presented with information about 
preoperative multimodality treatment, correct? 
A. w e l l , the statement that is in that ACR 
guideline i s the pat ient needs to be presented with 
a l ternat ives of treatment. 
Q. Okay. And your opinion as to informed 
consent i s the f a c t tha t you believe he was not. 
A . correct . 
Q. And again who do you pin that 
responsibi l i ty on? Are you able to t e l l me Hayes 
versus Mintz versus Anna Beck or anybody else, or 
you just don't know? 
A. in terms of each of those doctors, they 
gave a treatment to that pat ient . They should have 
had a chance to obtain an informed consent that 
outlined a l t e rna t i ve treatment. 
Q. And you're including a l l of them. 
A. Right. 
Q. You're not spec i f i ca l l y focusing on any 
one of them. You've got them a l l grouped together, 
correct? 
A. w e l l , the ACR guidelines are 
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specif ical ly l is ted on a guideline for high dose 
rate brachytherapy. So the high dose rate 
brachytherapist is subject to those guidelines. 
Q. Right. 
A. The medical oncologist doesn't have 
those guidelines, but I'm sure the medical 
oncologist has analogous guidel ines. 
Q. And you believe that the medical 
oncologist should have presented information to 
Ralph presurgerically as w e l l . 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Wel l , object ion. 
Misstates his testimony. 
Q. Is that correct, Dr. Kadish? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: You can answer. 
A. wel l , I don't know when the medical 
oncologist — I should know but I don't have that 
information - - when the medical oncologist f i r s t saw 
the patient. I suspect that she saw the patient 
a f ter the surgery. 
Q. And you d e f i n i t e l y would agree that 
Dr. Mintz fa l ls into the category with Dr. Hayes 
that he should have advised Mr. Ralph of presurgical 
multimodality options, correct? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: Wel l , object ion. 
Beyond this witness's area of expertise and that 's a 
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1 A. You mean American College of Radiology 
2 guidelines? 
3 Q. Anybody, yeah. 
4 A. w e l l , I don't know when American College 
5 of Radiology guidelines began for high dose 
6 brachytherapy. I don't know that . I can find out 
7 but I don't know. 
8 Q. One question. Do you have any 
9 outstanding balances to be paid in this case by 
10 Ms. Burningham? 
11 A. NO. 
12 MS. BURNINGHAM: Just you. 
13 MR. WRIGHT: And you w i l l be paid 
14 promptly. 
15 Q. Based upon your record review of the 
16 case, Dr. Kadish, and again I'm sorry i f I asked 
17 this before, were you of the understanding that 
18 Dr. Mintz again cal led the Gamma West folks, 
19 including Dr. Hayes, a f te r he had made the decision 
20 to take Ralph to the OR? 
21 A. w e l l , t h a t ' s what you said. 
22 Q. But I 'm asking you do you know, 
23 independently of me, from anything you've reviewed 
24 that that i s the case? 
25 A. You said did you — didn't you read in 
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general surgeon's duty and he is not privy to that 
area of expertise. 
Q. Go ahead and answer. 
A. She's r ight . I 'm only assuming that a 
;urgeon has an analogous responsib i l i ty . 
Q. Okay. And that is essent ia l ly your 
opinion about any informed consent issues as you've 
ust described i t to me, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any other opinions 
oncerning informed consent as you s i t here today 
ther than what you've just described to me? 
MS. BURNINGHAM: object ion. He 
ndicated that he re l ied on those guidelines which 
ay include more opinions, but you can answer the 
uestion. 
A. I don't have anything else to say. 
Q. Do you know who trained Dr. Hayes to 
srform HDR brachy? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Do you know how much experience 
Hayes had as of 2001 in HDR brachy? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Do you know whether or not there were 
ly guidelines in 2001 for HDR brachy? 
138 
Merit Reporters 
L inda Van Tasse 7 7, CRR/RMR/RDR 
1 his deposition that that ' s what he did. 
2 Q. Uh-huh. 
3 A. So I'm accepting that. I don't have the 
4 whole deposition in my head. 
5 Q. And again do you know when the tumor 
6 board concerning Ralph was impaneled or who was on 
7 it? 
8 MS. BURNINGHAM: Kay, you told me that 
9 the tumor board was not on the 19th but it was on 
10 the 23rd, something like that. 
11 MS. BURNINGHAM: That's right. 
12 Q. Are you relying on what Ms. Burningham 
13 told you? 
14 A. I am. I don't have a document in front 
15 of me that says the tumor board was on the 23rd, but 
16 I think it would be fair to accept that as a fact. 
17 Q. And do you know who all comprised of the 
18 tumor board? 
19 A, I don't. 
20 Q. And do you know who --
21 A. I know that Dr. Beck is the leader of 
22 the tumor board. 
23 Q. Right. 
24 A. And I know that Dr. Patton was present 
25 at the tumor board. 
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Q. Right. 
A. He described in his deposition what werjt 
ut he was a little vagufc about it'. 
Q. And you know that Dr!, Pat ton * attendee! 
tumor board before the external <b,e#m^ a£p^ t;if0tf 
apy was begun, correct7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know whether or not the tumor 
d met before the brachytherapy had finished? 
A. My understanding is that the tumor board 
1't really opine about the brachytherapy. It was 
of a fait accompli. 
Q. what does that mean7 
A. Accomplished fact. Don't you speak 
ich out in Wyoming. 
Q. I'm sorry. Dr. Kadish, and again I 
logize, I just want to make sure I'm covering all 
3ases. when I use the word dosimetry for the 
chytherapy as Dr. Hayes described, you understand 
t I mean. It was the 350 centigrade over seven 
ctions b.i.d, I think, on most of the days, 
rect7 
A. Correct. 
Q. okay, when I used the term dosimetry 
m Ralph Daniels you told me earlier you have 
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1 Q. okay, i^m with you. would you be so 
2' kind as to pull out the CT scans that you found to 
3, b6 important in delineating your opinions in the 
4* case fdr me? I think today for the first time you 
$w ^sjaw^t^ preoperative CT scans, correct7 would you 
fe get those out for me7 
7 ' A. These<preop scans, I looked at. I 
8 looked at before and I wasn't able to see anything 
9 too dramatic or remarkable about them. 
10 Q. I guess my question would be to you, if 
11 you find anything remarkable or significant in any 
12 way as it relates to your opinions, do you see any 
13 of that on this preoperative CT scan? 
14 MS. BURNINGHAM: Take your time, 
15 Dr. Kadish. 
16 A. The longest scan that I have is one that 
17 covers the level of the kidneys but still has the 
18 lumbar spine in it. So for whatever reason, we 
19 don't have a cut through the pelvis so that doesn't 
20 show me where the disease was. 
21 Q. what you have doesn't show you the 
22 tumor? 
23 A, Correct. 
24 Q. There are CT scans that show the tumor. 
25 MS. BURNINGHAM: I don't know — 
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fer in your career prescribed a dosimetry for 
•ating a similar type of pa t ien t , correct 7 
A. You're not using the term properly 
»re. YOU don't prescribe a dosimetry. You 
ascribe a dose. 
Q. okay, whatever you want to use? 
A. is that what you men? 
Q. Yes. 
A. You say I have never prescribed a dose 
radiation for a pat ient s imi lar to Mr. Daniels. 
Q. Yes, s i r . 
A . That's not accurate, in other words, 
ve seen people with advanced recta l cancer and I 
ve done what I'm saying should have been done in 
is case, namely to give preoperative rad ia t ion , 
andard chemotherapy. 
Q, All r ight . And I think you've answered 
lis as well but you don't necessari ly agree with 
le dosimetry that was given for him v ia the high 
>se rate brachytherapy, correct? 
A. I t ' s not so much that I object to the 
>simetry. 
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1 A. is there more? 
2 Q. There should be. 
3 MS. BURNINGHAM: well, this is what we 
4 got from you Bobby, from Shawn. 
5 MR. WRIGHT: we didn't have — 
6 MS. BURNINGHAM: okay. Shawn said he 
7 found it arid it was at Gamma west in the preop CT 
8 and had been there all along. 
9 MR. WRIGHT: And we — 
10 MS. BURNINGHAM: He sent i t to us and I 
11 forwarded i t to Dr. Kadish and he said i t didn't 
12 help him. Maybe i t wasn't complete. I don't know. 
13 I asked for i t for months and months. Here's some 
14 more, actually. 
15 A, Here's something now that has the — 
16 Q. There's the tumor, isn't it7 
17 A. Yeah. 
18 Q. Anything significant about those cuts7 
19 MS. BURNINGHAM: Take your time, 
20 Dr. Kadish. 
21 A. Yes. This is dated 3-16-01 and it shows 
22 clips, presacral area. So this is not a 
23 preoperative. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. seems l i k e these - - some of these are 
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and this is not in t ra luminal . 
Q. who wrote the report? 
A. This i s some doctors from Memorial Sloan 
Kettering in New York. I t ' s an old paper. 
Q. These notes that are on the 40th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society For Therapeutic | 
Radiation and Oncology, were those notes that you 
just took as you reviewed things or - - i 
A. That's r ight . 
Q. okay. On th is note, w e ' l l make these 
copies, too, SK comments, these are your thoughts 
a f ter reading certain deposition t ranscr ip ts , i 
correct? 
A. Right. i 
Q. YOU write the standard of care 2001 for 
T3 NO cancer postop with posi t ive margins. Postop i 
EBRT would be 4500 to 5000 centigrade, would you 
agree with that? 
A. Could I see that? 
Q. Sure, YOU can just read that for me. 
why don't you read under SK comments for me, please. 
A. Number one, standard of care in 2001 for 
T3 NO CA rectosigmoid postop with posi t ive margin, 
postop EBRT 4500 to 5000 centigrade. 
Number two, idea of having big 
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brachytherapy dose 350 centigrade times seven, 2450, 
question mark, question mark. 
Q. what do you mean by the question marks? 
A. in other words, I 'm questioning the 
sense of that. Number three, t o t a l dose 2450 plus 
1500 equals 6950 centigrade, too hot. 
Q. what do you mean by too hot? Too much? 
A. Too much rad ia t ion . That 's radiat ion 
jargon, I'm sorry. 
Q. Abd we've reviewed, we've discussed your 
opinions as to why you think i t ' s quote-unquote too 
iot, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. And just quickly, i f you would be so 
ind, i t looks l ikes those are addit ional notes you 
ook upon review - -
A. Could I have my fo lder back? 
Q. Yes. Review of the materials? 
A. That's r ight . 
Q. And I think the second and t h i r d page i s 
ust another - - i t ' s a l i s t of the textbooks that 
ou and I already talked about. 
A. Right. 
Q. what's the t h i r d page? 
A. This page was what I wrote — I quoted a 
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A. The books. 
Q. okay, great . A l l r ight . I'm going to 
give you th is back because we've already marked 
t h i s , okay? 
(Exhib i t No. 10 was marked.) 
Q. This i s jus t a summary of charges and 
these are your charges today. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the cr from university of Utah have 
any relevance to your opinion today? 
A. NO. 
(Exhib i t No. 11 was marked.) 
Q. As number 1 1 , l e t ' s mark the three pages 
of the yellow pad. w e ' l l give your originals back 
and have Linda make copies. 
(Exhib i t No. 12 was marked.) 
Q. And as No. 12 w e ' l l mark this page which 
is on white paper and I believe that 's i t and we' l l 
give you the or ig ina ls back before you leave, okay? 
(Exhib i t No. 13 was marked.) 
Q. The a r t i c l e you're putting in there was 
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(Exhib i t NO. 14 was marked.) 
Q. This a r t i c l e which we ' l l mark as NO. 14 
was the one that you said purported to provide 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the treatment of Ralph? 
A. No. You have i t backward. 
Q. Reversed. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, so pul l the one out, please. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. w e ' l l mark that as No. 14. 
(Exhib i t No. 15 was marked.) 
Q. Then the notes wr i t ten on the 
let terhead, 40th Annual Meeting letterhead we' l l 
mark as 15. And those again are handwritten notes 
you made while reviewing depositions and other 
materials. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. I th ink I 'm just about done. I'm 
going to step out fo r j u s t a second and I think we 
can wrap th is up. 
(Recess.) 
(Exhib i t No. 16 was marked.) 
Q. Dr. Kadish, I so much appreciate your 
patience with me in going through th is . Again, as 
we s i t here today, I hopefully have accomplished my 
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First of all, have you told me exactly 
•ything that you understand you were asked to do 
.his case as far as rendering expert opinions? 
i you described to me what you were asked to do? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And have you offered and t e s t i f i e d to 
opinions as you s i t here today that you are 
jared to render in th is case concerning any 
jes you were asked to address? 
A. The only thing we haven't bogged down on 
s is the lack of mult id iscipl inary discussion 
operatively. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But I made that point and you're 
iliar with that point. 
Q. Okay. And we talked about that was the 
ormed consent issue we talked about. 
A. It's related to informed consent but I'm 
ing where we are in oncology today and back in 
0 and 2001. You know, years ago the surgeon was 
1, we're going to operate and then maybe you'll 
an up the mess that I left there, Today we sit 
fn like ladies and gentlemen and talk these things 
•r beforehand. 
Q. Right. And you've told me before you 
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1 much you got into this during the deposition today 
2 but do you recall talking to me about your opinion 
3 as to in general what radiation or too much 
4 radiation does to normal tissue? 
5 MR. WRIGHT: Objection. Vague. 
6 Q. You can answer, if you understand. 
7 A. Too much radiation will destroy normal 
8 tissue. 
9 Q. When you say destroy, can you be more 
10 specific on that? 
11 A. Well, first --
12 Q. what happens at a cel lular level? 
13 A. when I say destroy normal tissue, what I 
14 mean is you can in jure tissue with radiation and i t 
15 w i l l heal up and scar up but at a certain point i t 
16 w i l l be deprived of i t s a b i l i t y to survive and i t 
17 w i l l d ie . That 's cal led tissue necrosis. 
18 Q. And do you have an opinion as to whether 
19 that was present in th is case? 
20 A. Yes. There has been ample evidence of 
21 tissue necrosis in th is case. 
22 Q. And do you have an opinion as to whether 
23 necrotic t issue is more susceptible to infection? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 MR. WRIGHT: Objection. Foundation. 
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ink that should have been done in th is case. 
A. Doesn't seem to have been properly done. 
Q. Have you told me everything that you 
•e reviewed? I 've gone through everything you've 
en provided and everything you have reviewed, 
rrect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With the assumption that you've just 
Id me you have no more opinions that you're going 
offer in this case and you've delineated to me 
erything you've been asked to do, I think tha t 's 
1 the questions I do have. 
I w i l l state for the record I w i l l 
serve my right to come back and redepose you i f in 
ct you receive any other mater ia l , whatsoever, 
her than what has been l i s t e d in the deposition 
iday and other than what you've brought with you in 
le two boxes and your folder and I do appreciate 
>u providing that information to me. Thank you, 
Kadish. 




Q. Dr. Kadish, I don't recal l exactly how 
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1 Q. Have you dealt with infections that have 
2 come about in patients as a result of necrosis? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And do you have an opinion that radiated 
5 tissue which becomes necrotic is more susceptible to 
6 infection than healthy tissue? 
7 MR. WRIGHT: Foundation. 
8 A. It's like dead meat. It's susceptible 
9 to infection. 
10 Q. More susceptible than normal tissue? 
11 A. Correct. Normal tissue fights off 
12 infection. Dead tissue is like dead fish. It's 
13 just carrying it. It's a feeding ground for 
14 bacteria. 
15 Q. What does it mean when it says that --
16 I've read this several times that radiation can 
17 render tissue avascular. 
18 A. Well, one of the major effects of 
19 radiation of tissue is that it causes the small 
20 vessels to get smaller, it causes vascular damage 
21 that mimics aging. Therefore, as this process goes 
22 along, that is when the dose builds up you can have 
23 breakdown of vascular supply to a tissue and that 
24 brings out tissue necrosis. 
25 Q. And, Doctor, you're prepared, are you 
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not, and we've discussed rendering an opinion 
whereby you wi l l describe t o the j u r y the process , 
what radiation injury enta i ls as far as damaging 
tissue, necrosis, the rendering the t issue 
avascular, things l i k e t h a t , is t h a t go ing to be 
part of your opinion? 
A. Yes. 
MS BURNINGHAM: That 's a l l I have. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
3Y MR. WRIGHT: 
Q. Let 's t a l k about that because we d idn ' t 
talk about that what areas were avascular and 
lecrotic due to the brachytherapy, Dr. Kadish? 
A. I have to believe that th is area behincI 
the bladder developed i n t o a f i s t u l a . 
Q. Any others? 
A. The stenosis of the lei t ureter because 
:hat's in the same v i c i n i t y . 
<j, Any others? 
A. "l hat 's r e a l l y a l l I can po in t t o w i t h 
:onfidence 
Q. Did you read Dr. Saff le 's deposition? 
I believe so, yes, 
Did you read his notes? 
wel l , you're al luding to something, wli 
TT A. It contributed. 
Q. Do you believe that the external beam 
radiation caused or contributed to any other 
necrosis that Mr. Daniels suffered? 
It probably did. 
Where? 
A. I have to believe that somehow that 
horrible abdominal wall necrosis, I can't easily 
i elate it and it may be due to tracking infection 
i it 
Q. It had nothing to do w itt i the 
achytherapy, did it? 
MS. BURNINGHAMi Objection. Misstates 
timony. 
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MS. BURNINGHAM: Well, let me state my 
•bjecti on and I will. 
A. The abdominal wall was far away there 
where the catheters were so it's awfully hard to 
directly point to the brachytherapy and say you 
caused that. 
11 ihis causation testimony — 
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on't you t e l l me what you're a l luding to . 
Q. I just want to know d i d you read his 
edical records? 
A. I believe so, 
Q. when you read through I i is deposition and 
is medical records do you recal l looking and 
hinking about anything you disagreed w i t h that 
r. saff le said? 
A. He said that there was necrosis on the 
ectal stump. 
Q, uh-huh. 
A And that would f i t i n t o t h i s as w e l l . 
Q. So you believe that the brachytherapy as 
ir as tissue necrosis caused the necrosis to the 
jsterior base of the bladder and the ureter , 
>rrect? 
A. Correct. Now the ureter i s not down as 
iving necrosis. The ureter is down as having 
:enosis, which is a contraction which, as I said 
ifore, f i r s t there's scarr ing, contraction. But hi 
hollow viscus l i ke a ureter when i t closes down 
»en i t ' s obstructs the ureter and a person gets 
'dronecrosis. 
Q. Do you believe the external beam 
tdiation also contributed to that necrosis? 
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Q. Are you done? 
A Yeah. 
Q. The necrosis opinions about which 
Ms. Burningham just asked you that you wi l l render 
to the jury , I need to make sure I understand th is . 
\ oi J are going t o opine that tl ie brachytherapy-caused 
necrosis to the posterior base of the bladder and 
stenosis to the ureter , correct? 
Right l he reason is t h a t ' s where the 
implant took place. That's the hot spot. 
Q. Any other necrosis or stenosis of'any 
other organ do you believe the brachytherapy caused? 
A. Base o f bladder p o s t e r i o r l y , stenosis of 
the l e f t ureter and necrosis in the rec ta l stump. 
Q. Okay. 
A I hos e a i e the th ree . 
Q. Would you agree with me, Dr. Kadish, 
that when the tumor was removed from the posterior 
portion of the bladder, that to an extent a good 
part of the epithelial, if not lower or more 
integral parts of that bladder were lost? 
A. No, I wouldn't because --
Q. why? 
A , i f you say the ep i the l ium was removed 
:! iei i t l iere would hn a p a r t i a l cystectomy. He would 
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1 to what Dr. Hanson and I believe Dr. Mintz to ld him, 
2 correct? 
:! MS. BURNINGHAM: Weil l ID .M. i ies 
4 testimony, 
5 A That's cor rec t , 
6 Q. okay, was there anything else 
7 significant about Ralph Daniels' deposition <il KM in 
8 which you took n o t e s ? 
9 A. NO, I d idn' t take any — I d idn ' t wr i te 
10 anything down but i t ' s a sad deposit ion. He's 
11 suffering a l o t . 
12 Q. what about Dr. chidester, did you take 
13 any notes when you reviewed Dr. chidester 's 
14 deposi t ion? 
15 A, 1 d i d n ' t r e a l l y put any notes d - , 
16 was impressed with his discussion of his work 
17 i l i a l conduit and the obstruction of the l e f t 
18 ureteral junc t ion with the i l i a l conduit as 
L9 obstructed. 
10 Q. R i g h t , I would assume, D r . K a d i s h , you 
1 would defer to Dr. chidester as to what he found and 
2 his opinions concerning the urological medical care 
3 he has given t o Mr. D a n i e l s ? 
4 A. Absolutely. 
5 Q. was there anything s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t you 
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1 the primary care physician that this man is - - he 
•'-.- go back to work but he can't go back 
1
 He's c lear ly disabled. 
And do you remember reading in Ralph 
ieposition where he applied for d i s a b i l i t y 
summtM or l a t e summer o f 2001? 
A. Apparent ly he d id apply for d i s a b i l i t y , 
Having reviewed t h i s additional 
10 information, Dr. Kadish, have your opinions in any 
1 1 way changed o t h e r t h a n what y o u ' v e descr ibed to me 
12 t o d a y t h a n what you d e s c r i b e d t o me on May 26th o f 
13 2006 when I took your deposition in Massachusetts? 
14 A . NO 
15 0. 0'<<iv And the opinions that you'vT" 
If) given me in that deposit ion of May 26 th of '06 and 
17 the expansion of the opinion today, are those now 
18 all the opinions you intend to render in this case 
2 9 concerning-Mi Daniels and the medical care at 
20 issue? 
21 MS. BURNINGHAM: I would just object 
22 inso far as the global opinions set forth previously 
?3 may encompass some more specific sub opinions and we 
if4 know that can happen. 
2S Q. Wel l , the s p e c i f i c si rb opinions I i teed 
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1 reviewed or took n o t e o f when you r e v i e w e d t h e 
2 transplant progress note a t 8-16-06 from 
3 Dr . van der w e r f f ? 
4 A well, I was impressed w ith the fact that 
5 the story is of increasing creat inine which is a way 
6 of saying that the renal function i s f a i l i n g and he 
7 is saying that he is prepping the pat ient for a 
B renal transplantation. 
9 Q. Did you receive any other progress notes 
other than this one note from Dr. van der werff? 
i -n't have any reco F lec t ion o f other 
notrs from him, no. 
Q. okay. And was the re any notes or 
significance you l a i d to the one-page l e t t e r from 
or. Allen that he wrote on behalf of Ralph on Man h 
of '06 to the veterans Administration? 
r
 A. wel l , the only thing that came across my 
t mind is when I read his deposition he seemed to be 
i at some — you know, he d idn ' t sound l i k e an 
i. amazingly art iculate man but he was asked about 
. •going back to work and he was saying that he can't 
go back to work, 
And I believe you were the attorney who 
was querying him at this deposition but i t was clear 
from his deposit ion and l a t e r from t h i s l e t t e r from 
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1 to know about them today, Dr. Kadish. Are there any 
? other opinions you intend to render other than what 
3 you d e s c r i b e d t o me today and on May 26 o f 2006? 
4 MS. BURNINGHAM: Same o b j e c t i o n , Bobby. 
5 T h e r e may be some f o u n d a t i o n a l op in ions t h a t would 
6 l e a d t o t h e o p i n i o n s he gave you . He c a n ' t j u s t 
1
 pull them out of the sky, but that 's for the record. 
t! A I would o n l y say t o you no, I d o n ' t have 
9 anything that I'm holding back. But should new 
1 0 medica l i n f o r m a t i o n come a l o n g , sometimes, you know, 
11 radiation in jury can be delayed, so should new 
1,7 medical information come a long, I would reserve the 
13 right to expand on what I'm saying. 
14 Q. Sure. 
Li .hange what I 'm saying. 
16 Q. And I would ask - - s u r e . I would ask 
17 that i f in fac t any additional information is sent 
18 to you., Dr. Kadish, and i f you in fact intend to 
19 change, expand - -
20 MS, BURNINGHAM; I ' l l l e t you know, 
2 1 Bobby. 
22 Q. — any opin ions that you've rendered in 
23 th is matter, that you l e t Ms. Burningham know and I 
24 would expect that she'd l e t me know; is that fair? 
25 MS. B U R N I N G H A M : S u r e . Bobby — 
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Kay Burningham (#4201) 
Attorney at Law 
The Judge Building 
8 East Broadway, #710 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)746-3500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH L. DANIELS, ) 
Plaintiff ) AMENDED COMPLAINT 
v. ) Civil No. 03-0926947 
GAMMA WEST BRACHYTHERAPY) 
L.L.C., JOHN K. HAYES, M.D. ) Judge: Robin W. Reese 
Defendants. ) 
1 II. K Al ,1M I I I iANll',1 ,tt, tliiougli Ins counsel, hereby complains of defendants 
and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, lURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff, RALPH L. DANIELS, is a resident of Summit County, State of Utah, 
2 IK-k-iMJimi (iVMM \ WIS I' MU ACIIV I'l ll'KAI'S , l l u lll'KHNAI'TliR 
'GAMMAWEST') is a Utah Limited Liability Company which, at all relevant 
times herein was doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. JOHN K. HAYES, M.D. (hereinafter "DR. HAYES") was a resident of the State 
of Utah and was the principal owner, employer, and employee of 
GAMMA WEST, and at all relevant times was acting within the course and scope 
of his employment at GAMMA WEST. 
4. GAMMA WEST had additional employees, including but not limited to Roger S. 
Hansen, M.D., who at all relevant times was acting within the course and scope of 
his employment at GAMMA WEST. 
5. GAMMA WEST is responsible for the actions of Rogers S. Hansen under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior 
6. Plaintiff, RALPH L. DANIELS has complied with the notice and prelitigation 
review provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, section 78-14-1, et. 
Seq. of the Utah Code and a certificate of compliance has issued from the Utah 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
7. An original complaint was filed with this court on December 3, 2004, based upon 
the treatment, actions/failure to act by Defendants herein in regard to Plaintiff in 
January of 2001. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. On or about January 18, 2001, Plaintiff, RALPH L DANIELS met with Roger S. 
Hansen, M.D., above described employee of GAMMA WEST. Dr. Hansen 
2 
examined plaintiff and recommend a course of 'brachytherapy' after MR. 
DA 1 IIEI ,S'' coloi € ctal ti 11 i ioi was excised by si n geoi i Steven. Mintz. 
9. Subsequent to this discussion and before surgery, which occurred on the afternoon 
January ,<|l'\ M) I Mi i Ltnsni t'onlmctf u nh Ml>' H AYES about MR. 
DANIELS' case. 
10 Dr. I laiisc n i: loted it i his pre-operative report of January 19, 2001, that if MR 
DANIELS' tumor could not be resected they would perform preoperative 
radiatio mv, 
11. At no time prior to the surgery did either Dr. Hansen or Dr. Hansen inform MR. 
Di VNIEI S of the option for preoperative radiation therapy. 
12. Approximately 20 minutes prior to surgery an informed consent for "colostomy 
resection of v'olon Sc rectal tumor and placement of brachytherapy catheters" was 
allegedly signed by MR. DANIELS. 
13. i Vccording to Dr I"1 lintz, the tumor was removed and there were residual margins. 
14. Neither Dr. Hansen nor DR. HAYES were in the operating room at the time of the 
excision of the tumor. Neither Dr. I layes nor Dr. Hansen saw the residual 
margins. Neither radiation oncologist reviewed the preoperative pelvic CT scan or 
pathology report prior to their procedure. 
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15. According to DR. HAYES and Dr. Hansen, Dr. Mintz showed them where the 
tumor had been. They inserted approximately 10 brachytherapy catheters through 
MR. DANIELS' perineum into the "areas of high risk/residual tumor" 
16. On or about January 23, 2001 a tumor board was held to discuss the amount of 
radiation and adjuvant treatment to administer to MR. DANIELS. DR. 
HAYES/Hansen prescribed a dose of 2450 given in 7 fractions of 350. 
17. There was discussion about the fact that the brachytherapy radiation when 
combined with external beam radiation treatment might be too much. 
18. MR. DANIELS had the planned brachytherapy from January 23 through January 
26,2001 and had the catheters removed on or about January 26, 2001. At no time 
did either DR. HAYES or Dr. Hansen discuss the amount of radiation to be 
administered to MR. DANIELS, with MR. DANIELS. At no time did Dr. Hansen 
tell MR. DANIELS that he had not performed this procedure on a colorectal 
tumor. At no time did DR. HAYES tell MR. DANIELS that he had never 
performed brachytherapy on a tumor exactly like his and that this was an 
uncommon [if not rare] use of interstitial brachytherapy. At no time did either Dr. 
Hansen or DR. HAYES tell MR. DANIELS that due to the combined amounts of 
brachytherapy and external beam radiation therapy and chemotherapy in 
conjunction with the surgical excision that he would be more susceptible to severe 
4 
radiation toxicities and delays in wound healings and more general overall 
complications. 
19. At no time did DR. HAYES or Dr. Hansen tell MR. DANIELS that the procedure 
they were going to perforn i woi ilci 01 il> ii lcrease his cl lai ice of si u vi\ al b;; • 15%. 
20. At no time did DR. HAYES or Dr. Hansen tell MR. DANIELS that there were no 
prospective clinical studies which wotilci show a significant increase in 5 year 
survival with this added treatment, 
21. As a result of the combination of surgery, IID brachytherapy EXBRT and 
chemotherapy MR. DANIELS suffered a series of disastrous complications over 
the next 5-6 years and is still left with permanent, debilitating injuries. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: GROSS MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 
22. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations, paragraphs 1-21 inclusive as if 
fully set forth herein. 
23. Defendants GAMMAWEST and JOI IN K I IA Y ES, individually as to HAYES 
and by and through their employees and agents, including but not limited to Roger 
S. Hansen, 1\ -H to perform the therapeutic radiation in a manner and in an 
amount, especially in combination with other known proposed adjuvant therapy, 
that was accepted among radiation oncologists at that time. 
24. Performance of an untried procedure constituted gross negligence and a conscious 
disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff. 
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25. As a result of the above gross negligence, Plaintiff suffered the injuries and 
damages more fully described above. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT 
26. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations, paragraphs 1-25, inclusive, as 
though fully set forth herein. 
27. As of January 18, 2001 at the time Dr. Hansen examined and spoke with MR. 
DANIELS, a health care provider/physician relationship was created between the 
patient and Dr. Hansen. At the time Dr. HAYES consulted with Dr. Hansen 
regarding the patient, MR. DANIELS' case, a similar relationship was created 
between Dr. HAYES and the patient, MR. DANIELS 
28. The administration on interstitial HDR brachytherapy as done by Defendants 
herein carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing MR. DANIELS 
serious harm, above and beyond what a normal dose of therapeutic radiation 
would expect to render. 
29. MR. DANIELS was not informed of the increased substantial and significant risk. 
30. A reasonable and prudent person in MR. DANIELS' position would not have 
consented to the experimental HDR brachytherapy had he been full informed of 
all material facts. 
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31. The HDR brachytherapy was the proximate cause, and a substantial factor in 
causing tin; fXT.soji.i'l injuries su '•* more fully described 
above. 
32. riii vviiUen nitiscnt signed h) MR I»AN 1KLS 20 minutes prior to surgery was 
void due to the fact that defendants herein fraudulently failed to disclose the 
follow iii}:» nmlri i.il il.u Is jvaihihilily oi another, commonly accepted, less risky 
procedure (preoperative RT) which was acknowledged by Dr. Hansen; fact that 
the EXI**2T) to be given to Plaintiff is considered 
high and more than many of his organs could tolerate and in that range would 
expose 50^ o of patients to severe complications,: lack of common acceptance of 
this type of application of interstitial HDR brachytherapy among radiation 
oncologists, lank ol Defendants' experience in performance of this particular 
procedure, lack of proof of increased survival as a result of the procedure, or 
significant increased local control as a result of having this procedure; lack of 
studies as to the toxic and adverse effects of this procedure when combined with 
surgei") , EXBP " I ' arid chemotherapy. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
'«-1 ("" I; J i n (i 11 in corporates the preceding allegations, paragraphs 1 -3 3, inclusive as 
if fully set forth herein. 
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35. Under Utah law, a fiduciary relationship existed between Plaintiff, RALPH L. 
DANIELS and Defendants herein. 
36. That fiduciary relationship required Defendants to provide the fiduciary duties of 
'full disclosure', in addition to good faith, loyalty and confidentiality. 
37. Defendants breached their fiduciary duty of full disclosure and good faith as 
more fully described above. 
38. Had Defendants fully disclosed the material facts set forth in paragraph 32 above, 
MR. DANIELS would not have agreed to the unproven procedure and would not 
have suffered the injuries more fully described above. 
38. As a result of Defendants' breach of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff was injured 
and suffered damages as more fully described above. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF RALPH L. DANIELS PRAYS FOR RELIEF AS 
FOLLOWS: 
A. For special damages, including, but not limited medical and health care costs, 
value of his household services and income benefits loss/impairment of 
earning capacity; and 
B. For general damages , both past and future, including but not limited to 
damages for physical, mental and emotional pain and suffering; and 
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C. For punitive damages pursuant to the causes of action above pled and to the 
extent allowed by law 
D. For costs, expenses pre and post judgment interest and 
E. For other such relief as the court may deem just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff initially demanded, and hereby reiterates, his demand for trial by jury and 
has previously submitted the required statutory fee. 
Dated this/*? day of December, 2006. 
Kay Burningham, Attorney fo^RALPH L. DANIELS 
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